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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 
It is with great excitement and enthusiasm that I present 
to you the spring 2019 issue of The American Philosophical 
Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, my 
first issue as editor. As you may or may not know, I have 
taken over the position of editor from Serena Parekh, who 
has held the office for the last three years. Before providing 
a proper introduction to this issue, I’d like to announce 
several changes to the newsletter, as well as to give you a 
peek at some of the upcoming issues I have planned. 
At a recent meeting of the APA Committee on the Status 
of Women, there was discussion about the purpose of the 
newsletter. Specifically, we noted the shift it has undergone 
in the last number of years from being more of a traditional 
newsletter with updates about and news in the profession, 
to its newer role, that of a publication forum. In this shift, 
something that has been lost is the newsletter as a go-to 
point for learning about what’s going on in the profession, 
specifically, relevant conferences, workshops, fellowships, 
scholarships, grants, etc. In response to this concern, I have 
decided to include in this and in all forthcoming issues an 
Announcements section. If you’d like to publicize an event 
or opportunity that is relevant to feminist philosophy and/ 
or female-identified philosophers, please send it along and 
it will be included in the next issue (fall 2019). 
A second addition that I’m making to the newsletter is to 
include a new category of submission, narrative essays. 
There is a lot of flexibility in terms of what a narrative essay 
can be. I see them as being something in between a blog 
post and an academic essay and in the area of around 1,500– 
3,000 words. Narrative essays need not be argumentative, 
but they can be; they can also be a personal reflection 
on something that happened to you in the profession 
or the classroom, or outside of these contexts, that is in 
some way relevant to feminist philosophy and/or female-
identified philosophers. Developing this new category of 
submission, I have taken inspiration from “Musings” that 
Hypatia publishes. I realize that what narrative essays are 
or can be is incredibly broad, so in case you have an idea 
for a narrative essay that you’d like to write but aren’t sure 
whether it quite fits, I invite you to contact me in advance. 
Narrative essays, like all submissions, will be anonymously 
reviewed. I look forward to broadening the scope of the 
newsletter with this addition and to providing a platform 
for more marginalized voices to be heard, voices that, for 
various structural and other reasons, have heretofore not 
had venues to speak about issues that are both relevant and 
important to feminist or female-identified philosophers. 
I would also like to mention the topics for the next two 
issues of the newsletter; I hope that you will consider 
submitting your work. By now, I hope that you have seen 
the CFP for the fall 2019 issue on the topic of #MeToo and 
philosophy. The spring 2020 issue of the newsletter will 
cover the topic of Parenthood and Philosophy. This issue, 
perhaps more than any of the others I’ve overseen, will 
be an issue in which narrative essays may occupy a more 
central place than argumentative essays. I invite stories of 
success, failure, and ideas for improvement surrounding 
issues related to parenthood in the profession, which 
can include, but are not limited to pregnancy, labor and, 
birth (hospital births, home births, birthing center births), 
post-partum depression, miscarriage, abortion, prenatal 
genetic screening, successful and unsuccessful attempts 
to conceive, negotiating parental leave (or inability to do so 
successfully), returning to work, work-life balance (if there 
is such a thing!), single-parenting, parenting while trans, 
parenting while gender non-binary, raising gender neutral 
children, parenting children with disabilities, parenting 
while disabled or impaired, loss of a child, navigating 
childcare, blended families, adoption, foster parenting, or 
divorce. Discussions surrounding most of these issues are 
wanting in the philosophical literatures, if they exist at all, 
and I see this issue more as a starting point to engage, 
publicly, in more discussions on these topics. 
Finally, and before moving on to the substance of this 
issue, I’d like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to 
Serena Parekh, who has been an important mentor to me, 
both personally and professionally, for close to a decade 
and who walked me through the transition to taking over 
this position with precision, skill, and great care. Also, 
thanks to the APA Committee on the Status of Women for 
nominating me to this position and for their faith in me, 
and, specifically, deep thanks and gratitude to Charlotte 
Witt, chair of the committee, for acting as a sounding board 
in the early days of being editor, and for her confidence in 
and encouragement of me. 
And without further ado, on to introducing the issue to you! 
I am delighted to dedicate the spring 2019 issue of The 
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism 
and Philosophy to a critical engagement with Kate Manne’s 
provocative, groundbreaking book, Down Girl: The Logic 
of Misogyny (Oxford University Press, 2018). Though much 
actual and virtual ink has already been spilled over Manne’s 
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masterpiece (and rightly so!), in print, at conferences, in 
reading groups, in popular media, and on social media, the 
insightful engagements with her work that you will read 
in what follows are novel and continue the long-from-over 
conversation about Down Girl, the implications of Manne’s 
position, and new directions in which her thinking can be 
and will be taken. I am so grateful to all of the wonderful 
author-critics–Kathryn Norlock, Agnes Callard, Briana Toole, 
Ishani Maitra, Audrey Yap, and Elle Benjamin–for their 
thoughtful words and to Kate for her engaging, stimulating 
response to the critics. I would also like to thank all of 
the book reviewers who contributed to this issue: Ellie 
Anderson, Meryl Altman, Céline Leboeuf, Valerie Williams, 
and Charlotte Witt. Everyone involved in this issue was a 
true pleasure to work with. Because I don’t want to spoil 
all of the surprises to come, I’ll only briefly outline some of 
the questions and issues that are raised by the critics, with 
the purpose of piquing your interest and nudging you to 
keep on reading. 
Kathryn Norlock’s response to Down Girl unpacks the 
phenomenon of white female misogynists, namely, those 
women who are protected by their white privilege, and 
who regularly and often without consequence or question, 
thwart the interests of other girls and women. Why, Norlock 
asks, don’t we count them as misogynists? (Or if we do, why 
are we so reluctant to?) In Manne’s response, she further 
develops her position stated in Down Girl by, among other 
things, elaborating upon her concept of “himpathy,” which, 
combined with misogyny, is a concept that refers to our 
tendency to police women’s moral errors more harshly 
than men’s. In Manne’s words, himpathy also refers to “the 
disproportionate or inappropriate sympathy sometimes 
extended to powerful men over girls and women.” Manne’s 
explanation as to why we are hesitant to call white women 
misogynists is but a brief entre into her forthcoming book, 
Entitled (Crown US/Penguin UK), where we can look forward 
to hearing more of her thoughts on himpathy among many 
other related topics. 
Agnes Callard’s commentary on Down Girl questions both 
the intelligibility and the usefulness of the economic 
“give”-“take” model of patriarchal social relations that is 
central to Manne’s account of misogyny. Such a model, as 
Manne clarifies in her comments, 
embodies a false, pernicious, and thoroughly 
moralized ideal, in which women are deemed 
obligated to give feminine-coded goods (primarily 
in the form of seamless social, emotional, 
reproductive, and sexual, services) to designated 
(typically, dominant) men, in ways that also reflect 
racist, heteronormative, cis-sexist, and other 
politically objectionable, assumptions. Men, on 
the other hand, are tacitly deemed entitled to 
take analogous goods from women, in the form of 
social, emotional, sexual, and reproductive, labor. 
Crucially, and in response to Callard’s remarks, Manne 
explains that the “give”-“take” model should not be 
understood as descriptive of gender relations, but rather, 
as prescriptive—and objectionably so. Callard considers 
whether this model is “unhelpfully hyperbolic.” Manne 
responds: “no! It is helpfully hyperbolic.” In developing 
her response to Callard, Manne proposes a rather radical 
reading of a book that many of us at one time or another in 
our lives (likely, before we were woke) probably found dear, 
Shel Silverstein’s 1962 children’s classic, The Giving Tree. 
In her reading of this story, Manne develops the position 
that this pernicious ideal of male-female relationships that 
Callard critiques may harm such social relations in rather 
subtle ways by presenting a false set of obligations and 
entitlements. 
In her comments on Down Girl, Briana Toole turns the 
table on Manne’s focus on misogyny’s pernicious effects 
on girls and women and asks, what are the implications of 
misogyny on boys and men? Her position is that a complete 
analysis of the “logic” of misogyny must explain how the 
patriarchy engenders in men an interest in participating 
in its enforcement. Toole’s comments aim to draw a line 
from patriarchy to toxic masculinity to misogyny, thereby 
providing a clearer picture of precisely why men are 
invested in this system. Her claim is that if feminists are 
really interested in promoting justice and improving the 
social world in general, then we ought to consider this other 
side of misogyny as well. By reflecting on the motivations 
for writing Down Girl, expanding upon how himpathy works, 
and embracing the (intentionally) incomplete and partial 
nature of the account presented in the book—one that 
focuses specifically on girls and women—Manne defends 
and justifies her interest in a narrower account of misogyny. 
Given the kinds of examples and cases that Manne uses 
for rethinking and reconceptualizing misogyny in Down 
Girl, Ishani Maitra considers whether Manne is really 
successful at shifting our conception of misogyny away 
from a traditional individualistic, naïve account toward 
one rooted in and defined by social environments (as 
is Manne’s goal). In response, Manne acknowledges 
and expands upon how tricky it is to do justice to the 
supposedly hostile quality of misogyny, including the 
negative reactive attitudes that accompany it, while at the 
same time not falling back into the very kind of account 
that she is criticizing, namely, an excessively psychologistic 
and individualistic one. Maitra also pushes further in 
another direction and argues that Manne’s substantive 
account of patriarchy and the conception of misogyny that 
results from it is more closely related to humanism than 
she allows. In a move of philosophical humility—a type of 
dialectical response that is perhaps more needed in our 
profession—Manne confesses that she shares Maitra’s 
criticism that it would have been beneficial to include 
in Down Girl more discussions of shaming, guilting, and 
punitive social practices that are experienced by so many 
girls and women who are perceived as, or representative 
of, gendered norm-violators. Very humbly, Manne goes 
on to acknowledge that “some marks were missed” in the 
“Humanizing Hatred” chapter of Down Girl; in response, 
she considers how that chapter should have unfolded. 
Following nicely from the discussion that Matira (and 
Callard) begin, Audrey Yap’s comments are motivated by a 
desire to consider the best ways to model the oppressive 
social structures and institutions that shape our lives, as 
well as the ways in which such structures and institutions 
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are bolstered by the very people who participate in them— 
including well-intentioned feminist like us. Yap develops 
a specific concern related to Manne’s characterization 
of women’s roles in oppressive hierarchies as givers of 
distinctly human moral goods. Manne’s position is that 
misogyny is not a matter of dehumanization. Though Yap 
does not contest this conclusion, she argues that the cases 
that Manne uses in order to make her case are, in fact, 
instances where dehumanization is present—not as a result 
of misogyny, but rather, due to other oppressive forces that 
frequently accompany it. Yap concludes that in order to 
better understand misogyny in many real social contexts, 
we need an even greater intersectional analysis of how it 
interacts with other forms of oppression. 
Finally, and switching gears, Elle Benjamin’s comments 
develop the intersection of misogyny with ableism in 
general and with anti-autism bias in particular, which is, as 
Manne acknowledges, is “manifestly lacking in my book.” 
(Though she qualifies that this was by design, on account 
of her lacking an epistemically appropriate standpoint 
from which to speak on the issue.) Provocatively, Benjamin 
considers whether there are any cases where focusing on 
the experiences of the misogynist can be beneficial for 
everyone—including the misogynistic perpetrators and
the misogynistically oppressed. More specifically, she 
asks if there might be an unhimpathetic way to talk about 
Elliot Rodger (the Isla Vista shooter), one that illuminates 
the effect of his condition on his misogyny, without at 
the same time emitting any sympathy at all in virtue of 
his maleness. In so doing, Benjamin considers the ways 
in which Elliot Rodger may have been neuroatypical and 
if he was, the consequences this might have had for the 
ways in which his crimes were discussed. She goes on 
to consider the himpathetic commentators that appear in 
Manne’s discussions and how they mischaracterized the 
nature of Rodger’s condition by calling it mental illness. It 
is Benjamin’s position that readers were denied a deeper 
understanding of what Rodger was experiencing, why he 
was experiencing it, and how we can help people with 
similar experiences avoid Rodger’s fate. Though Manne 
finds some important insights in Benjamin’s approach, she 
problematizes the general account on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. 
As you can see with this brief introduction, the discussions 
in this issue are rich and robust. In addition to these 
contributions to the newsletter, you can also find reviews 
of the following books: Linda Alcoff’s Rape and Resistance
(reviewed by Charlotte Witt), Laura Hengehold and Nancy 
Bauer’s (eds.) A Companion to Simone de Beauvoir
(reviewed by Céline Leboeuf), Mary Rawlinson’s Just Life: 
Bioethics and the Future of Sexual Difference (reviewed by 
Ellie Anderson), F. Vera-Gray’s Men’s Intrusion, Women’s 
Embodiment: A Critical Analysis of Street Harassment
(reviewed by Meryl Altman), and Sandrine Bergès and Alan 
Coffee’s (eds.) The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary 
Wollstonecraft (reviewed by Valerie Williams). 
I hope that you enjoy reading everything that follows as 
much as I did. 
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored 
by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The 
newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent 
philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None 
of the varied philosophical views presented by authors 
of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any 
or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of 
Women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does 
the committee advocate any particular type of feminist 
philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical 
attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of 
gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND
INFORMATION 
1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish 
information about the status of women in philosophy 
and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more 
widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of 
recent developments in feminist philosophy and related 
work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book 
reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the 
traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on 
feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about 
the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. 
Articles submitted to the newsletter should be around ten 
double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines 
for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays 
electronically to the editor or send four copies of essays 
via regular mail. All manuscripts should be prepared for 
anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago 
Manual of Style. 
2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published 
a book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, 
please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. 
We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer 
to review books (or some particular book), please send the 
editor, Lauren Freeman (lauren.freeman@louisville.edu), a 
CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of 
research and teaching. 
3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, 
suggestions, books, and other communications to the 
editor: Dr. Lauren Freeman, University of Louisville, lauren. 
freeman@louisville.edu. 
4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for spring issues 
are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall 
issues are due by the preceding February 1. 
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ARTICLES 
White Women Misogynists 
Kathryn J. Norlock 
TRENT UNIVERSITY 
I found myself thinking a great deal about the 52 percent 
of white women who voted in the 2016 election in the 
USA for Donald Trump, as I read Kate Manne’s Down Girl: 
The Logic of Misogyny. I continue to find myself thinking 
about my membership in the category of white women, 
and appreciating Kate Manne’s ameliorative approach 
to conceptual analysis, influenced by the work of Sally 
Haslanger, especially evident in Haslanger’s well-known 
essay, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We 
Want Them to Be?” Manne’s book moves me to consider 
writing a paper emulating Haslanger’s title, perhaps, 
“White Women: (What) Are They? [Are We a We? Are They 
Me?] (What) Do We Want Them or We to Be?” 
I am moved to ask because the first and most successfully 
cruel and harmful misogynists that I encountered in my 
life were cis-het white girls and white women.1 I find it 
striking that we are culturally comfortable with the concept 
of “mean girls” who are brutal to other girls, but we are 
not (yet) culturally comfortable with calling girls or women 
misogynists. I want to press on why we would be so ready 
to see cruelly gendered behavior by some girls and women 
as mean, and as targeting of other girls and women, but 
not as misogynist. I believe the answer is partly to be 
found in Kate Manne’s book and in her perception of us 
as remaining attracted to “naïve conceptions” of misogyny 
as hatred of all women on the part of a self-aware and, 
implicitly, masculine and heterosexual agent.2 
We are accustomed to assuming that by misogynists, we 
mean men. In her book, Kate Manne tends to focus on 
men as well, although she, wisely, both steers attention 
away from discussing agents as misogynists and rejects 
the gender binary as a metaphysical entity, two points I 
appreciate for their wisdom and their strategic value. But I 
wish to steer attention back toward agents as misogynists 
and as members of a gender-group for the purposes of 
this paper. I want to try to think more clearly about why 
more than half of white women voted for Trump, about why 
calls to white women who didn’t vote for Trump to organize 
our white sisters tends to fall on some of the deadest 
ground in my heart, and why some white women remain 
hugely sincere fans of Trump who were, reportedly, deeply 
offended by Hilary Clinton’s suggestion that they did so 
due to “pressure” from husbands, sons, and other men in 
their lives.3 
The women in news reports and narratives online who 
reject Clinton’s reasoning assert that they are voting their 
own minds and very happy to support Trump. I believe 
these women. I grew up with some of them in the same 
neighborhood. I also believe that the behaviors and voting 
choices of some such women are misogynist, not because 
they hate all women in their hearts; they would never agree 
that they hate themselves, and as Manne points out, they 
don’t have to, in order to qualify as misogynist. Instead, I 
suggest that some white women are misogynists because 
their behaviors fit so many of the characteristics that Kate 
Manne outlines, including overt and expressed hostility to 
nonheterosexual women and to trans* women, policing 
of insufficiently feminine women of all embodiments, 
and extreme and consistent obstacle-creation to women’s 
liberation from oppressive circumstances. (At this point, 
if anyone is quietly wishing away my criticizing of women 
and thinking, Can’t We All Just Get Along?, let me just 
provide the heads-up here that we never have, at least 
in part because some heteronormative white women are 
misogynists. Below, I provide more reasons why unification 
isn’t going to happen.) 
First, I offer some quick introduction to anyone reading this 
essay who hasn’t read the book. Kate Manne’s ameliorative 
account of misogyny is helpful and heartening. What we 
take misogyny to be is obvious if misogyny just is hatred 
of women, but Manne devotes early chapters to up-ending 
that “naïve conception.”4 She rejects, as simplistic and 
overly psychologistic, the definition of misogyny as an 
emotion, (or) lodged in an individual’s heart, (or) toward 
the entirety of women, a cluster of criticisms with which I 
agree.5 Manne is persuasive that if misogyny is essentially 
hatred, then we can never be certain anyone harbors it 
unless they self-report. 
And as she demonstrates with vivid examples, even when 
some do self-report, social commentators routinely go to 
work on doubting whether expressions of deeply hostile 
feelings really apply to all women, as if hatred of a set 
must distribute equally to all its members. The shooter 
loved his mother! He wanted to date the sorority girls that 
he threatened! He killed a man, too, so his hatred wasn’t 
exclusive! In a writing style both informative to scholars and, 
with each chapter, increasingly clear to any reader, Manne 
systematically argues against the application of the naïve 
conception to instances of evidently misogynist violence. 
“Misogynists can love their mothers,” Manne says, and the 
sentence is welcome to my eyes.6 Of course they can. If 
a definition of misogyny rules out a misogynist’s loving 
being loved, then we need a better definition. I am grateful 
to Manne for adding one to our understandings. 
Manne offers an account of misogyny based on its social 
function rather than its psychological nature, “as primarily a 
property of social environments in which women are liable 
to encounter hostility due to the enforcement and policing 
of patriarchal norms and expectations.”7 For those of us 
trying to articulate the problems with hostile environments 
and deadly violence that disproportionately affects women, 
Manne says, we need a term more distinctive than sexism, 
which identifies a rationale for a structure of unfairness. 
Sexism purports to give reasons for structural inequity; 
misogyny is the better term for the sorts of coercive 
regulations of patriarchy that work to hold the structure in 
place. If sexism offers planks, misogyny provides the nails. 
Misogyny is, then, what misogyny does, Manne argues. Her 
more victim-centered account of what misogyny means is 
reminiscent of the good feminist practices of philosophical 
forerunners like Claudia Card, who described misogyny 
as “the term feminists apply to the most deeply hostile 
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environments of and attitudes toward women and girls and 
to the cruelest wrongs to them/us, regardless of whether 
perpetrators harbor feelings of hatred. Misogyny tends to 
be highly culpable and grossly oppressive.”8 
Now let’s talk about misogynists. 
In careful terms, Kate Manne suggests “that the term 
‘misogynist’ is best treated as a threshold concept, and 
also a comparative one, functioning as a kind of ‘warning 
label,’ which should be sparingly applied to people whose 
attitudes and actions are particularly and consistently 
misogynistic across myriad social contexts . . . (a) more 
extreme, and (b) more consistent than most other people 
in the relevant comparison class.”9 She grants that this is 
a loose conception with some “weasel words” allowing 
some room for debate; then she moves on, as she rightly 
observes that she does not “have to take a stand on how 
to fill out the definition.”10 I find that Claudia Card’s account 
of misogyny contributes to the project of filling out the 
definition; Card describes misogyny as involving “evils 
perpetrated with aggressive . . . use of force and violence 
against women,”11 on that distinctively Cardian account of 
evils as the “foreseeable, intolerable harms” that make a 
decent life difficult.12 
Intolerable harms, Card emphasizes, are not merely 
inequities or even all injustices. Evils, intolerable harms 
inflicted by culpable humans, are the more serious 
iterations of wrong: 
What makes harms intolerable is not altogether 
subjective. A reasonable conception of intolerable 
harm is that it is a significant deprivation of 
basics ordinarily required for a life (or a death) 
to be decent for the person whose life (or death) 
it is. Such basics include . . . the ability to make 
choices and act on some of them; freedom from 
severe and unremitting pain and from debilitating 
humiliation; affective bonds with others; a sense 
of one’s human worth. Although not exhaustive, 
that list is enough to show that intolerable harm 
does not totally depend on individual preferences. 
Intolerable harm interferes with one’s ability to 
function decently as a human being.13 
Card’s account of intolerable harms supplements Manne’s 
recommendation that we use the attribution of misogynist
sparingly, providing an idea as to where the threshold 
might be for attaching a label to a person and not just their 
several acts. For Card, the seriousness of the harms is what 
graduates some culpable wrongs to the category of evils; 
acts or institutions that it is reasonably foreseeable can 
make some lives intolerable or indecent are evils (in the 
plural-noun sense, not the adjectival-trait sense). Evildoers 
are agents that embrace and carry out such acts. 
Compare Card’s intolerable harms to Kate Manne’s 
examples of misogyny (and Audrey Yap’s, in her 
contribution to this issue). Manne includes examples of 
mass shootings and murders by boys and men for the 
express purpose of harming or avenging themselves 
upon girls and women. Such examples clearly contribute 
to Manne’s account of misogynistic environments as, 
“constitutively speaking, [comprising] social forces that (a) 
will tend to be faced by . . . girls and women . . . and (b) 
serve to police and enforce a patriarchal order, instantiated 
in relation to other intersecting systems of domination and 
disadvantage that apply to the relevant class of girls and 
women.”14 Shootings of this sort in the USA are numbingly 
common news. Manne adds that “as a substantive matter 
of fact, these misogynistic social forces will . . . often 
target girls and women (in the relevant class) for actual, 
perceived, or representative challenges to or violations of 
applicable patriarchal norms and expectations . . . where 
those norms and expectations may involve, for example, 
(a) distinctively gendered contents, which reflect and help 
to regulate or restore patriarchal order; or (b) particularly 
harsh enforcement mechanisms for girls and women. . . ; 
or (c) particularly intense and/or invasive forms of policing 
(e.g., surveillance, scrutiny, and suspicion).”15 
With increasing urgency, commentators draw attention to 
the frequency with which boys and men are the shooters and 
the van-drivers, and women are the victims and the targets. 
This is misogyny, some commentators rightly exclaim. And 
it is, in these contexts, misogyny that is noticeable in part 
because the shooters and killers are male. Their maleness 
is a salient feature of the situation that moves some writers 
to notice the possibility of misogyny at work. As heralded 
above, however, I wish to advance the possibility that we 
may more easily notice the misogyny at work in cases of 
men killing women, because of the gender difference, and 
because, at times, heterosexual boys and men announced 
their sexual or romantic frustrations as motivations. We may, 
consequently, overlook misogyny in contexts in which the 
differences are not so obvious, and the motivations are not 
expressed in heteronormatively laden sexual terms. 
Can girls or women be misogynists in ways that reflect 
the characteristics of misogynist acts, norms, forces, and 
agents as Manne sketches them? Consider the information 
provided at bullyingstatistics.org that girls are more likely 
to engage in verbal bullying, cyberbullying, and “indirect 
bullying,” which “takes place when a person or group of 
people spread rumors and stories about a person behind 
their back. These can be false and malicious attacks. . . . 
Social alienation is also another type of bullying that 
females can be responsible for committing. A group of 
girls may decide to deliberately shun another girl from 
the group because they are mad at her or find it funny to 
hurt another person simply because they are different.”16 
These social forces lead some girls to suicide. In 2010, a 
girl in her first year of high school, Phoebe Prince, killed 
herself after a verbal harassment campaign on the part of 
girls at her school who called her a slut and shamed her for 
briefly dating a boy. I am saddened, but not surprised, that 
prosecutors described Prince’s suffering as “intolerable,” a 
description apt to Card’s characterization of evils.17 There 
are more examples than I care to provide the reader of older 
girls and younger women who engage in bullying prior to 
the target’s death or attempted suicide, bullies who tend to 
fit a pattern of being not just female, but white, and not just 
white, but heterosexual, and not just heterosexual, but, as 
one news source said of Prince’s tormenters, “pretty, and 
popular.”18 Girls targeted for feminine bullying who go so far 
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as to attempt to take their own lives are often those bullied 
on gendered and sexed lines: targets of slut-shaming, or 
perceived as having or actually having lesbian or bisexual 
identities, or simply unfeminine presentations in body or 
appearance. Note that in the USA, “lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and questioning (LGBQ) teens are more than three times 
as likely to attempt suicide as their heterosexual peers, . . . 
[possibly] because they experienced verbal harassment, 
physical bullying or felt unsafe at school.”19 
I am not saying anything that we have not heard before. It 
is so ordinary, in truth, that “mean girls” can be dismissed 
as just typical teens, just high school. If boys will be boys 
(shrug), well, girls will be girls. But Manne is persuasive 
that what boys and teens do in elementary school and high 
school is not irrelevant to analyses of misogyny. If misogyny 
is as misogyny does, then let’s look at what girls’ bullying 
does to girls. 
Constitutively speaking, let us agree that what some cis­
het white girls do—in targeting other girls for slut-shaming, 
body-shaming, femininity- and heteronormativity-violating, 
while the bullying girls are succeeding on these same 
dimensions—fits Manne’s description of attitudes, acts, 
and “social forces that (a) will tend to be faced by . . . 
girls and women . . . and (b) serve to police and enforce a 
patriarchal order.” More specifically, I would add to Manne’s 
analysis, such fatal bullying serves to police and enforce a 
heteronormative, white supremacist, and feminine order. 
Therefore, such bullying and shaming, when deadly, is 
“instantiated in relation to other intersecting systems of 
domination and disadvantage that apply to the relevant 
class of girls and women.” 
Let’s look as well at Manne’s “substantive matter of 
fact,” that girls can target girls “for actual, perceived, or 
representative challenges to or violations of applicable 
patriarchal norms and expectations” that “involve, for 
example, (a) distinctively gendered contents, which 
reflect and help to regulate or restore patriarchal order,” 
and in this case, I would add, reflect and regulate norms 
of femininity and heteronormativity; I find the patriarchal 
order inseparable from attention to orientation, which is 
by definition gendered. When verbal, cyber, and indirect 
bullying contribute to a girl’s death or attempted death, one 
might then agree that such behavior meets Manne’s criteria 
of being “(b) particularly harsh enforcement mechanisms 
for girls and women. . . ; or (c) particularly intense and/or 
invasive forms of policing (e.g., surveillance, scrutiny, and 
suspicion).”20 
In short, just as Manne rightly urges us to consider that 
“boys will be boys” may allow misogyny to grow and 
prosper, I am arguing that dismissing the behavior of “mean 
girls” as just typical school, or just kids being kids, without 
attending to the pronounced demographic pattern that 
these tend to be white and heterosexual and femininity-
successful girls, is also to allow misogyny to grow and 
prosper. Behavior that targets girls along gendered lines 
for surveillance and enforcement of feminine expectations 
is as misogyny does. I don’t think it is a coincidence that 
some of the cis-het white girls who policed and enforced 
norms of femininity and heterosexuality in youth are now 
so likely to be members of the white women block that 
votes for Trump. 
I promised the reader that I would think with you about 
women who vote for Trump, and instead you got to read 
about teen suicides. But I hope it is now clear why I silently 
agreed with women who rejected what they took to be 
Clinton’s characterization of them as women who voted 
for Trump because their men told them to. In the news 
coverage that I’ve read, the white and heterosexual and 
married women who proudly proclaimed that they did as 
they wanted and not as they were told demonstrated a 
high interest in self-motivated maintenance of what they 
believe to be the proper social order. That order includes 
the maintenance or improvement of their lives as white 
and heterosexual and American women, secured by voting 
for a man whose talk of grabbing his objects of desire by 
the pussy is dismissed, by these women, as locker-room 
talk, a man who threatened to sue all the women who 
could make a sexual assault claim against him, a man who 
aligned himself with bathroom-bill supporters and pro-
life lobbyists, who campaigned for Ron Moore, who has 
reinstituted the gag order on international aid workers 
advising victims of war rape about abortion, who has 
packed the judiciary with a record number of conservative 
and anti-choice appointees, who said he could not imagine 
an exemption for the health or life of the rare woman who 
seeks a third-trimester abortion, who vowed to roll back 
health-insurance reforms that include employer-provided 
contraception, who has increased the practice of separating 
families in the interests of deporting “illegals.” If this isn’t a 
list of obstacles to tolerable and decent lives for women, I 
think I am not up for seeing what is. And I submit that avidly 
and sincerely supporting a candidate who places obstacles 
in the way of good lives for women, on the grounds that 
he’s not hurting you—he’s hurting those other women, the 
trans women, the brown women, the raped women, the 
illegals—is misogynist. 
Am I calling all Trump voters misogynists? No. Like Kate 
Manne, I don’t think it is always true or always strategically 
wise to paint all actors with the same agent-trait-accusing 
brush. But I hope I have made a case for considering that 
we don’t take seriously enough the possibility that some 
white women are misogynists, notably some feminine and 
heterosexual white women who demonstrate repeated and 
lifelong interest in policing and enforcing social structures 
that benefit them at the cost of intolerable harms to other 
women and girls. Encountering the urging of women of 
color that those of us with privileges of whiteness should 
try to organize white Trump-supporting women yanks a 
grim laugh from me, as I reflect that some of these Trump 
voters were my own schoolgirl torturers, and calls to those 
of us who were their targets to Walk Up and Not Out on 
them get less than my full belief in that possibility. And yet, 
when I expressed this pessimism at the presentation of this 
paper at the Canadian Philosophical Association, a woman 
of color did not give up on me; Andrea Dionne Warmack 
contacted me to say that she attended and appreciated my 
presentation, but she still noticed that I’m better placed 
than less privileged women to do the work of reaching 
out, talking to women who support Trump, moving them 
to consider alternative perspectives. When misogyny 
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encourages us to forget what we can do and instead agree 
that we’ve lost, agree that efforts at changing minds are 
hopeless, then the work of feminism may have to include 
both the clarification of the nature of our obstacles and 
the encouragement and support of fellow feminists when 
we get weary. Manne’s book provides both: conceptual 
clarification and encouragement. It would be difficult to 
carry on without such company. 
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NOTES 
1.	 The Queer Dictionary supplies the following definition of cishet,
which I hyphenate for clarity: “Cishet, used as both an adjective
and a noun, describes a person who is both cisgender and
heterosexual... First used in online communities in the 2000s,
cishet is a portmanteau of cis—as in cisgender, from the Latin
cis-, meaning “this side of”—and het—as in heterosexual, meaning
attracted to the opposite sex.” Available at http://queerdictionary. 
blogspot.com/2014/09/definition-of-cishet.html. 
2.	 Manne, Down Girl, 18-19. 
3.	 See Scott, “Clinton said she meant no disrespect by comments 
about white women who voted for Trump.” Cf. Abernathy, “No, 
women didn’t vote for Donald Trump because their husbands 
told them to.” 
4.	 Manne, Down Girl, 18, 32. 
5.	 Manne, Down Girl, 39-41, 44-49. 
6.	 Manne, Down Girl, 52. 
7.	 Manne, Down Girl, 32. 
8.	 Card, “Challenges of Local and Global Misogyny,” 473, emphasis 
mine. 
9.	 Manne, Down Girl, 66. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Card, “Challenges of Local and Global Misogyny,” 474. 
12. Card, The Atrocity Paradigm, 3. 
13. Card, “Challenges of Local and Global Misogyny,” 474. 
14. Manne, Down Girl, 63. 
15. Manne, Down Girl, 63-64. 
16. “Female Bullies,” Bullying Statistics. 
17.	 Miller, “Phoebe Prince’s Final Days: Bullied Girl Suffered 
‘Intolerable’ Abuse Before Suicide, Say Court Docs.” 
18. Cullen, “The untouchable Mean Girls.” 
19.	 Rapaport, “One in four gay, lesbian, bisexual teens attempt suicide.” 
20. Manne, Down Girl, 63-64. 
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What Do Men Find Threatening about 
Women’s Empowerment? 
Agnes Callard 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
Hilary Clinton faced a distinctive kind of obstacle in 
her quest for the presidency: she was behaving like 
the “wrong kind” of woman. To pick just one example, 
the psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett has argued that 
people were inclined to perceive Hilary’s failures to smile 
differently from her competitors’: “A woman making stern-
looking facial movements must be angry or upset. A man 
who looks the same, on the other hand, is focusing on the 
important matters at hand.”1 Kate Manne studies this kind 
of obstacle and dissects it into two components—sexism 
and misogyny—in her important new book, Down Girl. 
Manne’s guiding model for describing sexism is as an unfair 
commercial interaction, an “uneven, gendered economy of 
giving and taking moral-cum-social goods and services” 
(107). Her thought is that such an arrangement constitutes 
a “patriarchal division of labor” (79) in which women have 
the role of “giving” attention, care, nurture, and affection, 
whereas men are entitled to “take” these things from them. 
Manne contrasts a world ordered in this patriarchal way 
with one in which everyone has “equal moral purchase” 
(70). She regularly refers to the sexist structure as one in 
which “she gives” and “he takes.” 
Manne understands misogyny as the enforcement 
mechanism for this interaction: it is a way of extracting 
what women are perceived to owe men. Manne does not 
spell out why women might be unwilling to give what 
they “owe,” but presumably the inequity at the heart of 
the arrangement is what leads women to want out of it. 
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Thus she describes misogyny as the “law enforcement 
branch of the patriarchal order.” Misogyny, in Manne’s new 
construal of the term, serves to describe social practices 
of treating women differentially based on their willingness 
or unwillingness to cleave to the “giver” role: the former 
being rewarded, the latter sanctioned. 
I want to begin by raising some doubts about both the 
intelligibility and the usefulness of this particular economic 
framing of male-female interaction. There is a large literature 
in economics analyzing interpersonal relationships in 
economic terms.2 Unlike Manne, these models tend to 
presuppose that goods are given and exchanged on both 
sides; indeed, that is arguably criterial on an economic 
analysis of an exchange. Even in exploitative exchanges the 
disadvantaged party is conceived of as securing goods at 
too high a cost, rather than as bearing only costs, with no 
goods to show for the expenditure. 
Manne does not explicitly deny that goods flow in the 
reverse direction—from men to women—but her recurrent 
framing of the arrangement as one in which “he gives” 
and “she takes” suggests this interpretation. There is only 
one place in which she gestures at goods provided by 
men to women—she lists money, chivalry, respect—but 
she describes these as “goods or services that he once
might have provided” (112, italics mine). The traditional 
conception of the role of men assigns to them the job of 
providing for women and protecting them against external 
dangers, but Manne seems to see this “male part” of the 
division of labor as outdated. 
Finally, consider her classification of what she calls “male­
coded goods”—“social positions of leadership, authority, 
influence, money and other forms of power, as well as 
social status, prestige, rank, and the markers thereof” (113). 
She sees these as yet more goods for men to take “from 
women,” in the sense that women are misogynistically 
sanctioned for competing for them. Traditionally, those 
sanctions would themselves be underwritten by the fact 
that these goods are connected to men’s fulfillment of 
their part of the bargain—providing and protecting—but 
on Manne’s conception, they become free-floating goods 
by which men attain a kind of self-actualization to which 
women have only restricted access. Once again, men get 
something for nothing. 
My concern, then, is that Manne’s conceptual apparatus for 
elucidating sexism and misogyny is unhelpfully hyperbolic. 
For consider relationships in which there are, in fact, norms 
dictating only what one party owes. We find non-reciprocal 
normative regulations—in which one side is morally 
obligated to “give” and the other side may “take” without 
facing any sort of sanction—structuring the relationships 
between human beings and their pets, or their infant 
children. It is an interesting feature of explanatory accounts 
of misogyny that they tend to be emasculating—accusing 
men who mistreat women specifically of weakness and 
impotence—but it is possible to take such rhetoric too 
far. Assimilating men to pets and infants would, I think, 
constitute an excess of classificatory vengeance. 
Should we, perhaps, consider a weakened version of 
the “she gives/he takes” structure, in which women give 
more than they take? A somewhat less extreme picture of 
the iniquity of the interaction provides a better starting 
point for an analysis of sexism as a form of exploitation, 
and misogyny as the violence required for keeping an 
exploitative exchange in place. (And Manne does, in 
one place, specifically describe the interaction as one of 
exploitation (209).) 
But consider how that story would go. Manne’s view that 
men “used to” give women goods of protection, respect, 
and chivalry would have to be modified to the view that 
they used to give more of those goods than they now 
do. Perhaps she would refer to the loosening of gender 
norms to which the entry of women into the workforce 
corresponds, and the fact the movement has been in one 
direction rather than the other—women readily took to 
wearing pants, whereas very few men want to wear dresses. 
There is some indication that she is inclined to frame the 
historical account this way, since she does say that the 
goods women provide have become “scarce resources.” 
But consider what this story entails: the world used to be 
less sexist than it is. Back when men did their jobs, and 
women did theirs, was there a more equal exchange and 
a less exploitative relationship? This seems unlikely. Before 
women joined the labor force, it seems they were subject 
to far more of what we might traditionally call domination. 
This points, I think, to the limits of even a more temperate 
version of the economic model as the primary mode of 
expressing what is unjust about sexism. Carol Pateman, 
whom Manne references in her discussion of patriarchy, 
contrasts an economic critique of it as “exploitation . . . 
in the technical Marxist sense of the extraction of surplus 
value” with an approach by way of contract theory. The latter 
“directs attention to the creation of relations of domination 
and subordination.” The two critiques are not mutually 
exclusive, since each accepts the terminology of the other 
as descriptive of the phenomenon—the economic critique 
conceives of the exploitation in question as an instance 
of domination, and the political critique conceives of the 
domination in question as exploitative. Nonetheless, it 
is relevant that the directions of explanation differ, and 
Pateman sees her project as that of exposing contractual 
injustice as the underlying cause of inequity: “exploitation 
is possible precisely because, as I shall show, contracts 
about property in the person place right of command in the 
hands of one-party to the contract.”3 
Manne’s heavy use of the language of economic imbalance 
suggests that she favors the other direction of explanation. 
But perhaps her descriptions of “giving” and “taking” 
are meant to be rhetorical rather than explanatory. If that 
were the case, it would be necessary to articulate what lay 
beneath these ways of talking. The answer could well be 
something like the relations of command and obedience 
described by Pateman. Alternatively, Manne might think 
that relations of command and obedience follow from the 
more basic fact of exploitation. I do not think Manne comes 
down clearly on this question of priority, so I want to spend 
a minute explaining why it is such an important one. 
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Consider the example Manne uses to illustrate male 
entitlement. She asks us to imagine sitting down at a 
restaurant and not being served—all the while one can see 
the server “lounging around lazily or just doing her own 
thing” (50). Or perhaps she is serving everyone but you. In 
this circumstance, you might eventually explode with anger 
and frustration. Manne’s thought is that this consideration 
of this schematic example could help us model the rage 
some men feel when they do not receive what they expect 
from women. 
The question is, what is making the restaurant goer so 
angry? There are two interpretations of the schema: it could 
be that he is angry at not getting the food and attention 
he was expecting, or he could be angry about being 
disobeyed. Unpacking the analogy, do men want certain 
goods that they have come to expect that they can receive 
from women, where the characteristic means by which they 
receive these goods is through command, or do they want 
to be able to command women, where the characteristic 
form that such command takes is the demand for a particular 
set of goods? In both cases, the anger will encompass 
both the goods and the subordination, but I think it is 
important to ask which of the two is fundamental. It is one 
thing to think that the customer is “banging his spoon on 
the table” because the absence of food symbolizes the 
insubordination of the server, and another to think that he 
bangs it because he’s hungry. 
There are, then, two distinct ways of analyzing the 
mechanism of sexism and misogyny: 
(1)	 You can approach it economically, as an injustice 
with respect to the equitable distribution of goods 
and labor. 
(2)	 You can approach it politically, as an injustice 
concerning the manner in which the agency of one 
person is coordinated with or subordinated to that 
of another. 
In the remainder of this essay, I want to make a case for 
the explanatory fruitfulness of the latter as opposed to the 
former approach. 
I. MASCULINE-CODED GOODS 
Consider what Manne calls “masculine-coded goods” such 
as “social positions of leadership, authority, influence, 
money and other forms of power, as well as social status, 
prestige, rank, and the markers thereof” (113). The economic 
exploitation account asserts that men are simply unwilling 
to give up a set of goods they have been accustomed 
to—or, more accurately, unwilling to lower their chances 
of getting those goods by allowing an increase in the size 
of the group competing for them. But if I orient myself by 
way of Manne’s examples, the men who seem most upset 
at women winning these goods are precisely those men 
who would be unsuccessful in competing for them in any 
case. Women aren’t “taking anything” away from them that 
another man wouldn’t have stepped in to take. (If Hilary 
Clinton loses the presidency, that doesn’t mean you will 
win it.) 
If one’s desire is, in the first instance, for the object itself, 
one doesn’t care who one loses it to; if, by contrast, men 
aim not so much to attain the goods but to prevent women 
from having them, that suggests the political model. The 
political model of sexism analyzes the resistance women 
face competing for wealth, honor, and authority as an issue 
of domination. But how, exactly? Let me sketch one account 
of how that analysis might go, admitting that what I present 
here should be taken as a hypothesis or suggestion. 
If a good is competitive—which is to say, zero-sum—then 
much engagement with it is characterized by the experience 
of failure. In the workplace, everyone is dominated by 
someone, since you can always find the person who has 
more power, authority, and wealth than you do. If the 
home was traditionally a place where a man could expect 
to be dominant—he commands, his wife and children 
obey—it would have constituted a kind of antidote to the 
psychological trauma wreaked by a day of immersion in a 
competitive culture in which one inevitably came out some 
kind of loser. 
The entrance of women into the workplace threatens to turn 
the home from a haven—the one place where a man was 
assured of a “win”—into yet another competitive space. 
In support of this interpretation, consider the research 
of Christin L. Munsch, showing that men who earn less 
money than their wives are more likely to have extramarital 
affairs.4 Munsch hypothesizes that such affairs constitute 
an attempt to compensate for economic dependency on 
their wives. To put the point in the terms above, we can 
hypothesize that such men are looking for an alternative 
“haven.” 
Consider, also, Munsch’s overview of the literature in this 
field: 
Men still regard providing as their responsibility 
even if they welcome their partner’s contributions 
(Townsend 2002), couples with similar wages tend 
to interpret women’s earnings as supplemental 
(Potuchek 1997), and husbands of high-earning 
women report increasing their work hours to 
maintain primary-earner status (Deutsch and 
Saxon 1998). Conversely, breadwinning wives 
downplay their financial contributions, defer to 
their husbands in decision making (Meisenbach 
2010; Tichenor 2005), and do a disproportionate 
amount of housework (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 
1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Greenstein 
2000; Tichenor 2005)5 
Given that most men are not in direct workplace competition 
with their wives for money, honor, or authority, the political 
explanation seems more credible than the economic 
one here. More specifically, it seems plausible that 
seeing women as competitors represents a loss of one’s 
defense against the noxious features of the competitive 
environment—a loss that threatens the psychological 
possibility of engaging in the forms of competition on 
which not only manliness but also survival depends. 
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II. FEMININE-CODED GOODS 
Let us, now, turn to what Manne calls “feminine-coded 
goods.” I believe that Manne is right to call the condemnation 
of women who seek to avoid motherhood “misogyny.” She 
observes that a deep undercurrent of antipathy seems to 
be based on the thought that a woman is “failing to nurture, 
refusing to give life or to care for the vulnerable” (100). Why 
is the fact that a woman won’t nurture—especially if you 
aren’t seeking for her to nurture you in particular—such a 
threatening prospect? 
Manne is surely right to notice that nurture, affection, 
and care are genuinely good, but it is remarkable that 
those men who are most angered by women’s failing to 
provide them—in the quote above, Manne is referring to 
an incident involving Rush Limbaugh—do not seem to 
be the ones who most highly value those goods. I want 
to make a suggestion about the political motivation that 
might underlie what sounds like an economic demand for 
women’s “services.” 
Margaret Atwood’s novel The Handmaid’s Tale describes 
a totalitarian takeover in which the (relatively few) fertile 
women in a society become pregnancy-slaves to the 
wealthy and powerful. I want to propose that what Atwood 
describes is a version of the panic that underwrites the 
motherhood-enforcement branch of misogyny, but writ 
large. The panic in question is that of having one’s extinction 
held hostage to the whims and choices of women. If 
women can choose whether or not they want children—in 
the form of birth control and abortion—then men’s ability 
to reproduce depends on the will of women. 
And there is, in turn, reason to think that the ability to 
reproduce—perhaps not necessarily at the individual level, 
but at least at the level of one’s social group or cultural 
cohort—is deeply connected to a sense of one’s own life as 
meaningful and one’s death as bearable. So Samuel Scheffler 
argued in his book, Death and the Afterlife,6 contending that 
a belief in the existence of future generations underwrites 
the ways in which human beings, as a matter of contingent 
fact, engage in the various valuing-practices that are central 
to the meaning of our lives. He shows that every arena of 
valuing, from close, personal relationships, to intellectual 
and aesthetic engagement, to the pursuit of humanitarian 
goals, is more affected than you might have predicted by 
the prospect of being cut off from the human beings who 
might inherit those values. 
Consider the following thought experiment: Suppose it 
were simply a biological fact that a man dies if he does not 
have sex with a woman before the age of twenty, and that 
such sex were consequently seen as a right, enforceable 
by law. One day, however, the society wakes up to the 
immorality of this arrangement and lifts the requirement 
that women supply life-saving sex. Men would react with 
panic, desperation, and perhaps also—and this is the 
crucial point—a certain level of resentment at the power 
women hold over them. One’s life is now literally in the 
hands of the woman who will consent to have sex with one. 
Of course, we are not in such a life-or-death scenario, 
nor do we face a dire infertility crisis such as that in The 
Handmaid’s Tale. But the connection between extreme 
sexism and misogyny, on the one hand, and the threat of 
such a crisis, on the other, is a telling one. Women’s power 
to control the future represents a form of domination even 
those men disinclined to place much value on the work of 
nurturing and caregiving experience as deeply, perhaps 
even existentially, threatening. In pushing back against this 
threat, men may be resisting what they experience as a 
profound form of domination. 
I have tried to articulate a way in which women’s increased 
power with respect to income and reproductive choices 
could be experienced, by men, as an existential threat. I 
hope thereby to have illustrated the explanatory power of 
the political model of sexism. With respect to male-coded 
goods, if competition for these goods is constitutive of male­
ness, but predicated on the now uncertain cooperation of 
women, then women threaten men with non-being—which 
is to say, not being able to be what they are. And with 
respect to the female-coded goods, if they become truly 
the province of women to give or withhold, then women 
have control over the future on which (women’s and) men’s 
valuations depend. The desire of men to dominate women 
is not, on this picture, so different from the desire of Achilles 
to dominate Hector, or, more generally, the desire of the 
Greeks to dominate the Trojans—it traces not to greed but 
to fear, the alternative being not only defeat but that deep 
sort of annihilation in which even memory is “blotted out” 
(Iliad XII l.85, XIII, l.270, XIV, l.85). 
NOTES 
1.	 “Hillary Clinton’s ‘Angry’ Face.” New York Times, September 
23, 2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/ 
opinion/sunday/hillary-clintons-angry-face.html. 
2.	 The locus classicus for the familial relationship is Gary S. Becker, 
A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1981). 
3.	 Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1988). All quotations from page 8. 
4.	 Christin L. Munsch, “Her Support, His Support: Money, Masculinity, 
and Marital Infidelity,” American Sociological Review 80, no. 3 
(2015): 469–95. 
5.	 Ibid., 470. 
6.	 Samuel Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife (Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
Masculine Foes, Feminist Woes: A
Response to Down Girl 
Briana Toole 
BARUCH COLLEGE-CUNY 
In her book, Down Girl, Manne proposes to uncover the 
“logic” of misogyny, bringing clarity to a notion that she 
describes as both “loaded” and simultaneously “politically 
marginal.” Manne is aware that full insight into the “logic” 
of misogyny will require not just a “what” but a “why.” 
Though Manne finds herself largely devoted to the former 
task, the latter is in the not-too-distant periphery. 
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Manne proposes to understand misogyny, as a general 
framework, in terms of what it does to women. Misogyny, 
she writes, is a system that polices and enforces the 
patriarchal social order (33). That’s the “what.” As for the 
“why,” Manne suggests that misogyny is what women 
experience because they fail to live up to the moral 
standards set out for women by that social order. 
I find Manne’s analysis insightful, interesting, and well 
argued. And yet, I find her account incomplete. While I 
remain fully convinced by her analysis of what misogyny 
is, I am less persuaded by her analysis of why misogyny 
is. For a full analysis of the “logic” of misogyny, one needs 
to understand how the patriarchy manifests in men an 
interest in participating in its enforcement. Or so I hope 
to motivate here. I aim to draw a line from the patriarchy 
to toxic masculinity to misogyny so that we have a clearer 
picture as to why men are invested in this system. I thus 
hope to offer here an analysis that is underdeveloped in 
Manne’s book, but is equally worthy of attention if we want 
fully to understand the complex machinations underlying 
misogyny. 
ANALYZING MISOGYNY
The ultimate aim of Manne’s book is to provide an 
ameliorative conception of misogyny that is distinct, in a 
number of respects, from the existing “naïve conception” 
of misogyny. First, unlike the “naïve conception” of 
misogyny, which is defined so loosely as to be virtually 
nonexistent and meaningless (19), Manne’s ameliorative 
conception unpacks misogyny as a political phenomenon 
that is “metaphysically dependent on there being norms 
and expectations of a patriarchal nature” (67). Second, in 
contrast to the “naïve conception” of misogyny as hatred 
directed towards women qua women, the ameliorative 
conception takes misogyny to involve the enforcement of 
patriarchal social norms and the policing and punishment 
of the women who violate those norms. 
Misogyny, ultimately, is the hostility displayed towards 
women who, as Manne writes, “resist or flout gendered 
norms and expectations,” who “disrupt or pose a threat 
to gendered hierarchies” (61). The aim, or “logic,” of 
misogyny is to restore the patriarchal social order that has 
been threatened by this disruption. 
So, what norms is misogyny directed at enforcing, and how 
do women flout these norms? Manne writes that under 
a patriarchal social order, “a woman is often expected 
to play the role of a man’s attentive, loving subordinate” 
(57). She is thus cast in an asymmetrical moral support 
role, where she is obligated to provide certain emotional 
goods to which he is entitled. However, women flout these 
norms when, as Manne writes, they “take what’s his”—for 
instance, when she asks for or takes “masculine-coded” 
goods (e.g., power, respect, recognition, etc.), or when 
she withholds “feminine-coded” goods (e.g., admiration, 
sex, security, etc.) that she is obligated to provide. Thus, 
under a patriarchal social order, women are relational and 
functional—they (ought to) stand in certain relations to 
specific men, and they ought to provide emotional care to 
those men. 
It is for me, here, that a question arises: Why are men 
invested in upholding the patriarchal order? Put simply, 
what’s in it for them? Manne’s analysis offers one possible 
answer. Men engage in misogynistic behavior (and thereby 
enforce a patriarchal social order) because women who 
violate the norms of a patriarchal social order lead men to 
experience a perceived loss in social standing. In a sense, 
then, misogyny functions essentially as a “corrective” to 
this perceived loss. That is, it functions so as to “put women 
back in their place.” 
But I want to offer another possible answer—one that both 
builds upon and, I hope, complements and completes the 
answer Manne offers within the pages of Down Girl. I will 
argue here that men are motivated to enforce the patriarchal 
social order because the norms that govern male behavior 
are so repressive that they cannot get “feminine-coded 
goods” except from women. This in turn motivates them to 
engage in misogynistic behavior1 so as to ensure they can 
access these goods. 
While Manne explores in great detail the norms that govern 
women, and how men engage in misogyny in order to 
enforce these norms, she talks very little about the norms 
that govern men, and how these norms might similarly lead 
men to engage in misogyny. If the function of misogyny 
is, ultimately, to uphold patriarchal social order, then we 
need to examine the various ways in which it achieves this 
function. Oppressing men, so that they in turn oppress 
women, is one route by which this happens. 
Manne does gesture at this possibility, writing that 
one locus of concern that she will not investigate is the 
“punishment and policing of men who flout the norms 
of masculinity” (72). It is precisely this “punishment and 
policing” I believe needs to be explored more fully in order 
to have a full picture of how and why misogyny works. 
THE MARKETPLACE OF FEMININE-CODED GOODS 
In my discussion of Manne, I will largely engage with 
Chapter 4, in which Manne describes the give-and-take 
economy that she takes to be at the heart of misogyny’s 
operation, a theme to which she returns throughout 
the book. In this chapter, Manne offers an analysis of 
feminine-coded goods (love, support, affection) and 
feminine-coded work (emotional labor, caregiving, and 
so on), acknowledging that these goods and services are 
both valuable and internalized as “woman’s work.” Where 
Manne suggests that men engage in misogyny because 
they are not being given something to which they feel 
entitled (i.e., these goods and labor), I want to complicate 
this explanation somewhat by suggesting that men engage 
in misogyny because it is (for many men) the only way they 
can imagine to access these valuable goods. To motivate 
this argument, I will take, as a metaphor, the concept of the 
marketplace. 
I argue that providing feminine-coded goods, or engaging 
in feminine-coded work, is in tension with the norms 
of masculinity such that there are strong prohibitions 
against men engaging in or performing this kind of 
work. Consequently, I suggest this creates an “emotional 
marketplace,” so to speak, in which women are viewed as 
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the only suppliers of these goods. Thus, when women fail 
(by men’s lights) to provide these goods, this results in a 
“shortage in the marketplace.” 
To some extent, this explanation has already been 
investigated by Tom Digby (2014). Digby, for instance, 
writes that use of misogyny functions so as to encourage 
men to behave in conformity with masculine norms. 
What’s missing in Manne’s analysis (and Digby’s, for that 
matter), I argue, is a bridge between this idea and the 
“logic” of misogyny. That is, work can be done to connect 
the idea that men engage in misogynist behavior both 
to enact masculine norms, and because in accepting 
and participating in these masculine norms, they cut off 
possibilities for other suppliers of these valuable goods. 
In Digby’s analysis, the cultural work of misogyny is 
not just, as Manne argues, to confine women to those 
roles associated with femininity, but also to enforce the 
expectations of masculinity. These expectations are such 
that men are punished when they show compassion for 
others, especially as this is taken to be a feminine trait. 
As Digby notes, if a man shows compassion, empathy, 
or emotional vulnerability, he risks being thrown to the 
other side of the gender binary. He will be called “a pussy, 
a bitch, a wuss.”2 Still further, there is abundant research 
to the point that men entering fields incongruent with 
masculinity face great prejudice. Research on male primary 
school teachers, for instance, notes that men entering this 
field, traditionally associated with the feminine, are seen as 
“weak,” “weird,” or “gay.”3,4 
Thus, according to the norms of masculinity, offering goods
associated with emotional caregiving is incompatible with
being a “real man.” It should be unsurprising, then, that men
often turn to women for this sort of support; they are unable to
provide it themselves, or indeed, to seek it from other men.5 
Of course, as Digby notes, the prohibition against being 
emotionally vulnerable is that it is associated with the 
feminine. Inherent in misogyny is the presupposition that 
to be female is to be despised. And so, Manne would 
emphasize, I’m sure, that ultimately men are unwilling to 
be emotionally vulnerable because they are unwilling to 
lower their status and become the thing they have been 
taught to despise. But this only serves to reinforce the 
point I wish to establish here. 
I concede that, to some extent, men engage in misogynistic 
behavior out of the desire to avoid being seen as feminine. 
But it is precisely for this reason that men are not socialized, 
or are unwilling to play (and in some cases, are incapable 
of playing), emotional support roles. This produces, as a 
consequence, the need to outsource that labor to others 
more capable of the task, i.e., women. 
If misogyny is to be defined, as Manne proposes, as a 
mechanism by which a patriarchal social order is enforced, 
we must consider not just how it enforces the behavior of 
women, but also how it enforces the behavior of men. In 
framing misogyny as a mechanism which realizes itself 
through multiple modes, we can see that misogyny also 
enforces a relationship of a certain kind between men and 
women. One in which, by their nature, women provide 
certain goods that men feel entitled to, in no small part 
because they are unable to acquire those goods via other 
means. 
EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS
Mark Greene, in an article for Medium, notes that “American 
men can go for days or weeks at a time without touching 
another human being.”6 Greene’s article reminded me of 
a Facebook post I came across once, not long after the 
publication of Down Girl. This post described a man who 
attended a session organized by his wife’s church group on 
the topic of what wives don’t know (but should) about their 
husbands. At the close of the discussion this man raised his 
hand. He talked briefly about the fact that, except for the 
affection shown by his wife, he can go through an entire 
week (sometimes longer) without an affectionate touch 
from another person. Women, he noted, have affectionate 
friendships—they cuddle, they hug, they hold hands. But 
men are not permitted these pleasantries within their male 
friendships. And so, men who are not in committed, loving 
relationships might plausibly go weeks at a time without a 
soft touch from another person. 
This cold existence is so far removed from the reality of my 
own life that it seems almost inconceivable. But it is borne 
out by the empirical data on the subject. Data collected by 
Wester et al. (2012) suggests that men are socialized such 
that they have difficulty expressing concern and affection 
for other men. Moreover, research by Werking (1997) on 
cross-gender friendships suggests that men prefer cross-
gender friends because they are able to be emotionally 
open with their female friends. Still further, research 
shows that women are given greater permission than are 
men to touch and be touched by either gender (Zur and 
Nordmarken, nd). 
Misogyny works, then, I suggest, not merely by policing 
women so as to ensure that they adhere to certain social 
norms, but by policing men as well. When men effectively 
live up to the patriarchal norms to which they are held 
and successfully perform masculinity, they participate in 
and perpetuate the false belief that men are inherently 
stoic creatures. This creates, in effect, a pseudo-double 
bind. Men can either violate the social norms that govern 
masculinity and suffer the social costs, or they can adhere 
to those norms and in so doing cut off other means for 
emotional fulfillment. 
I have thus far argued that men engage in misogyny, in 
part, out of a desire to get feminine-coded goods that 
they cannot get elsewhere or otherwise. If we unpack the 
logic of misogyny in such a way that men are included in 
the analysis, then it can be argued that when men feel 
comfortable providing emotional support for other men, 
the burden will be taken off of women to provide this 
sort of labor. This notion, too, is supported by the data. 
Though research on the topic is limited, existing studies 
on the relationship between masculine ideology and sexist 
attitudes shows that men who embrace nontraditional 
masculine ideologies are more likely to show a positive 
attitude towards gender equality.7 
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Let me return now to the analysis of misogyny that I opened 
with. According to Manne, misogyny aims to reinforce 
patriarchal social norms by policing those individuals 
(i.e., women) who flout those norms. I have argued that 
in much the same way that misogyny functions so as to 
police and enforce the social norms that govern women, 
it also aims to police men and enforce adherence to the 
norms of masculinity. Men who “flout gendered norms 
and expectations” regarding masculinity experience “peer 
disapproval, reduced social standing, negative judgments, 
and psychological consequences.8 In no small part this is 
because men who flout these norms “disrupt the gender 
hierarchy” by engaging in activities and behaviors perceived 
to be stereotypically feminine. Thus, if the success of 
misogyny is measured by its capacity to restore a disrupted 
patriarchy social order, this goal is only accomplished to the 
extent that disruptions from both genders are policed and 
the social norms that govern those genders reinforced.9 
ERASING MISOGYNY 
When my little brother was 13, he was brutally beaten by a 
gang of boys in our small town. It was no doubt motivated 
in large part by racism—we’re biracial and our small town 
in the Florida panhandle was largely white. But it also had 
to do, I’ve always believed, with the fact that my brother 
at that age was positively cherubic. An extremely talented 
baseball player and an avid skateboarder, he was also the 
only male ballet dancer in our entire county. He had to 
be put back in his place—with fists, if that’s what it took. 
Almost half his life ago, he has not recovered and he will 
never be the same. He has become emotionally hard, cut 
off, he tries (but struggles) to be vulnerable. Sadly, my 
brother is not unique. I mourn for our boys; I mourn for the 
emotionally stunted men they will become. But that is the 
work of misogyny, and they are the mark of its success. 
I worried, in undertaking an analysis that suggests that men,
as much as women, are victims of misogyny, that I might be
considered a “bad feminist,” a victim of “himpathy.”10 While
I would dispute this charge, I would nevertheless count
myself in good ranks. In “Men: Comrades in Struggle,” bell
hooks writes that while men are not exploited or oppressed
by sexism, “there are ways in which they suffer as a result of
it. This suffering should not be ignored.”11 As she goes on to
say, it does not diminish the seriousness of male oppression
of women to acknowledge this fact. But in ignoring it, we do
overlook an important piece of the puzzle as we consider
ways in which to erase misogyny. The feminist movement
has made great strides for women (though our work is far
from finished); but I fear that men have been overlooked
almost entirely in the feminist enterprise. This fact, I worry,
has impeded our progress somewhat. 
In undermining the patriarchy, it is not enough simply to 
empower women to shrug off the cloak of femininity; men 
must feel (and be) equally empowered to disrobe from the 
masculine. As hooks writes, “we cannot teach boys that 
‘real men’ either do not feel or do not express feelings, 
then expect boys to feel comfortable getting in touch 
with their feelings.”12 As feminists, we must recognize
that men are both sustained as perpetrators and boxed 
in by how dependent their sense of self is on masculinity 
as a core pillar of identity. An adequate feminist solution 
cannot, then, be asymmetrical either in its analysis or in its 
proposed solutions. The feminist movement cannot merely 
free women from the burden of providing emotional labor, 
it must also endeavor to empower men to be emotional 
stewards for each other. 
Manne ends her book on a less-than-hopeful note: “I 
give up,” she writes (300). I’m slightly more optimistic. 
The difference in our approaches to the problem of 
misogyny produces a difference in the outcomes we seek 
and solutions we consider. Manne, given her one-sided 
analysis, feels hopeless. As she also writes, misogyny 
produces “a bitterly sad state of affairs, but it is hard to see 
what would change it” (281). 
I hope that new and emerging work on social imaginaries 
and the disruption of social scripts might provide a helpful 
prescriptive and offer a blueprint for changing this “sad 
state of affairs.” Sociologist Ruha Benjamin writes that 
“social change requires novel fictions that reimagine 
and rework all that is taken for granted about the current 
structure of society. Such narratives are not meant to 
convince others of what is, but to expand our own visions 
of what is possible.”13 Social imaginaries thus function so 
as to disrupt harmful social norms by offering alternative 
models of the social world. 
One helpful social imaginary (for men and, by extension, 
women) is that of the “bromance.” The “bromance” allows 
men to disrupt the social script governing masculinity by 
imagining a social world in which being a “real man” is not 
inconsistent with providing emotional care and support for 
each other.14 As an illustration, the long-popular television 
show Friends, though it had no shortage of problems, 
did serve as a model for how intimate male friendships 
might look. My favorite episode involves Joey and Ross 
(two of the three main male characters) realizing, to their 
initial dismay, that they get their best rest when they nap 
together—and so they do precisely that.15 
We have succeeded in imagining, and to some extent in 
creating, a world in which women are free to pursue their 
own projects. Now our work must turn to creating social 
imaginaries where men are similarly free. That’s what it 
would take to change the sad state of affairs brought about 
by misogyny. Or, at the very least, it’s a step in the right 
direction. 
NOTES 
1.	 This, of course, will not adequately explain all instances of 
misogyny. However, I think it will help better understand certain 
trenchant attitudes by certain groups of men (in particular, 
attitudes endorsed by men’s rights activists and incels). See 
Allain, “Finding Common Ground: A Feminist Response to Men’s 
Rights Activism,” 2015. 
2.	 Digby, Love and War: How Militarism Shapes Sexuality and 
Romance, 68. 
3.	 Kim and Weseley, “The Effect of Teacher Gender and Gendered 
Traits on Perceptions of Elementary School Teachers,” 115. 
4.	 Digby notes that there are clearly issues here with homophobia, 
but, namely, the problem is the assumption that if one is gay, 
one is not masculine, and therefore feminine. And inherent in 
misogyny is the idea that the worst thing one can be is anything 
associated with the feminine. 
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5.	 I mean, here, that they are unable in the normative sense. 
6.	 Greene, like Digby, largely attributes this to homophobia 
among men. Again, this is not incompatible with what I have 
to say, though it is incomplete. Even with the legalization 
of gay marriage and more positive messaging surrounding 
same-sex relationships, if the norms of masculinity hold that 
men are emotionally independent and self-sufficient, we will 
continue to see men eschewing close male relationships, as by 
definition, such relationships require intimacy and by extension 
vulnerability (behaviors and attitudes which are incompatible 
with “masculinity”). See Digby, Love and War, esp. Ch. 3. 
7.	 Wade and Brittan-Powel, “Men’s Attitudes Toward Race and 
Gender Equity.” 
8.	 Pleck, “The Gender Role Strain Paradigm”; Bosson and 
Michniewicz, “Gender Dichotomization at the Level of Ingroup 
Identity.” 
9.	 Though I do not endorse a gender binary, I assume it for the
purpose of this discussion, since, no doubt, patriarchy assumes it. 
10. To be clear, I do not think men and women are victims of 
misogyny in equal degree. 
11. hooks, Feminist Theory, 72. 
12. hooks, The Will to Change, 36. 
13. Benjamin, “Racial Fictions, Biological Facts.” 
14. For work on disrupting social scripts, see Hesni, “How to Disrupt 
a Social Script” (ms). 
15.	 “The One with the Nap Partners,” Friends, NBC, November 9, 
2000. Television. Other episodes show Joey sleeping with a 
stuffed animal (a penguin), deep embraces between Joey 
and Chandler (who are roommates and best friends), Chandler 
luxuriating in long baths, and other behaviors at odds with 
patriarchal norms of masculinity (of which we’re reminded by 
the counterbalancing of these progressive scripts—through the 
incredulous or mocking reaction from at least one other character 
when these “deviations” are revealed). 
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Misogyny and Humanism 
Ishani Maitra 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Down Girl, Kate Manne sets out to reclaim the word 
“misogyny.” To do this, she takes on the naïve conception, 
according to which misogyny is the hatred of women— 
universally or at least generally speaking—simply because 
they are women (32).1 Manne argues that this conception 
has many drawbacks, chief among them its tendency to 
“deprive women of a suitable name for a potentially potent 
problem facing them” (44). Her aim, then, is to develop 
an alternate conception of misogyny that names this 
problem, and in so doing, provides a more effective tool 
for understanding this aspect of gender-based oppression. 
Where the naïve conception begins with individual agents, 
Manne’s positive view begins with social environments. 
For her, misogyny is in the first place a property of 
an entire social environment. More specifically, she 
characterizes misogyny in terms of its function within a 
social environment. As she sometimes puts it, misogyny 
is the “law enforcement” branch of patriarchy, working to 
preserve a patriarchal order in a given social environment 
by doling out punishments and penalties (63). Spelling this 
out further, misogyny “comprises the hostile social forces 
that 
(a)	 will tend to be faced by a (wider or narrower) 
class of girls and women because they are girls or 
women in that (more or less fully specified) social 
position; and 
(b) serve to police and enforce a patriarchal social 
order, instantiated in relation to other intersecting 
systems of domination and disadvantage that 
apply to the relevant class of girls and women (e.g., 
various forms of racism, xenophobia, classism, 
ageism, transphobia, homophobia, ableism, and 
so on)” (63). 
This conception, Manne argues, avoids both unnecessarily 
psychologizing and individualizing misogyny. Even more 
importantly, it is “more epistemologically tractable” than 
the naïve conception, and so yields a term that can be 
better put to (political) use (60). 
Manne’s rejection of an agent-centered view of misogyny 
is in keeping with arguments against agent-centered views 
of related notions like racism or racial oppression.2 Her 
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account is also very much in the tradition of views that 
recognize that it’s often rational for the oppressed to act in 
ways that end up furthering their own oppression.3 Insofar 
as misogyny aims to maintain patriarchy by punishing 
those who depart from patriarchal norms and expectations, 
women (and men) have a strong incentive to try to avoid 
misogynistic penalties by abiding by those norms and 
expectations. 
For Manne, what’s distinctive about misogyny is not just 
that it seeks to uphold patriarchy via a system of penalties 
and punishments but that these punitive measures often 
have a particularly nasty flavor. In fact, she thinks that 
the “characteristic sentiment” of misogyny may be that 
it is “punitive, resentful, and personal, but not particular” 
(59).4 To explain this, Manne moves beyond the abstract 
characterization of misogyny sketched above to a more 
substantive account of patriarchy, as it operates in the 
United States and elsewhere.5 In these contexts, patriarchy 
takes the form of a sense of entitlement—on the part of 
privileged men, at least—to personal goods and services 
from women. These “feminine-coded” goods and services 
include sex, care, love, and attention, among others. The 
associated sense of entitlement means that women’s 
failure to provide these goods and services can result not 
only in disappointment but also resentment, and from 
there, nastiness. Misogyny, on this picture, functions as a 
kind of backlash to (perceptions of) failure to live up to 
patriarchal expectations (101). 
For Manne, then, patriarchy can be regarded as a separable 
oppressive structure, separable, that is, at the level of 
analysis, if not operation. Patriarchy, on her view, has a 
logic of its own, and misogyny as one of its main supports. 
It interacts with other oppressive structures, including 
racism, xenophobia, transphobia, and the like; and Manne 
recognizes that misogyny will manifest differently as these 
interactions take place. Nonetheless, to a significant extent, 
her focus in this work is on misogyny as its own object of 
analysis, apart from these other structures. 
Despite taking social environments as its starting point, 
Manne’s view also permits us to speak derivatively of other 
misogynistic entities, including individual misogynists, as 
well as misogynistic practices, movements, institutions, 
and so on. It is a somewhat striking feature of her 
discussion that it focuses to a great extent on agents, 
both perpetrators of misogyny (e.g., Elliot Rodger, Rush 
Limbaugh, Donald Trump, Tony Abbott, Brock Turner, and 
many more) and targets (Hillary Clinton and Julia Gillard 
are discussed especially extensively in this volume). One 
might wonder how much of this discussion generalizes to 
less individualistic forms of misogyny. For example, what 
might it mean for an institution, rather than an agent, to 
behave in a resentful or nasty or otherwise personally 
antagonistic manner towards targets? I think this question 
can be answered, but I would have liked to see more 
discussion along these lines in the book. 
Despite this and other points of disagreement, I found 
much to admire about this book. The extended discussion 
of real-life cases of misogyny is particularly compelling. 
Manne is especially insightful in analyzing different ways in 
which misogyny can show itself, and she provides us with a 
valuable set of concepts and tools—e.g., “entitled shame” 
(121), “exonerating narratives” (179), “himpathy” (197), 
and so on—to help illuminate these cases. I also found 
Manne’s discussion of humanism—i.e., views that seek to 
explain inhumane treatment by appealing to dehumanizing 
psychological attitudes—to be particularly noteworthy. 
Though, as will become clear below, I don’t share her 
pessimism about humanistic views, that discussion 
forcefully presents an important set of challenges that the 
humanist must confront. I learned a great deal from that 
discussion. 
In the rest of this commentary, I’ll focus on two themes. 
First, I’ll look in more detail at Manne’s critique of the 
naïve conception. I find that critique entirely persuasive. 
However, I’ll argue that Manne’s preferred conception 
of misogyny ends up being very broad, in at least three 
respects. This breadth, I worry, is incompatible with 
generating predictions about the phenomenon. I’ll also 
consider some responses to this worry, but argue that these 
too have a cost. Some misclassify clear cases, while others 
risk re-raising some difficulties for the naïve conception. 
Second, I’ll consider Manne’s rejection of humanism. In this 
part, I’ll argue that her substantive account of patriarchy, 
and the resulting conception of misogyny, is more closely 
related to humanism than she allows. I’ll also emphasize 
differences between distinct versions of humanism and 
argue that some may be able to counter some of Manne’s 
main criticisms of this family of views. This part of the 
discussion seeks to press Manne on precisely how much 
of humanism she ultimately wishes to reject. 
2. AGAINST THE NAÏVE CONCEPTION 
Recall that the naïve conception renders misogyny as 
hostility towards women—all women, or women generally 
speaking—simply because they are women. Manne levels 
several distinct criticisms against this view; I’ll focus on two 
of these in particular. 
First, Manne notes that in a moderately well-functioning 
patriarchy, men will tend to receive feminine-coded goods 
and services from some women. So there’s no reason for 
them to feel hostility towards all women, or even women 
in general. That, in turn, would seem to make misogyny— 
in the sense of the naïve conception—surprisingly rare in 
just the circumstances in which we most expect to find it 
(47–49). (As Manne points out, it is a common response to 
charges of misogyny that the man in question loved some 
women—his mother, perhaps—or that he put women on 
a pedestal. One might think that defenses along these 
lines miss the point, but the naïve conception threatens 
to make them relevant. So much the worse for the naïve 
conception.) 
Second, Manne also argues that the naïve conception 
makes misogyny difficult to diagnose in particular cases. 
Insofar as misogyny is a matter of what’s in the heart, it is 
(often) epistemically inaccessible (44). Putting these two 
worries together, it seems that on the naïve conception, 
“misogyny” will end up playing a much less useful role than 
one might have hoped in helping us understand patriarchy. 
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Building on this critique, Manne makes two critical moves 
towards a better view of misogyny. The first of these, which 
I’ve already discussed above, is the move from agents and 
their psychological attitudes to social environments and 
their functioning. The second move is from perpetrators 
of misogyny to its targets or victims: instead of asking 
what perpetrators feel, i.e., what’s in their hearts, Manne 
suggests that we focus on what victims face. These moves 
lead to the conception of misogyny quoted at the very 
outset of this commentary. This conception, she suggests, 
avoids “a waste of the only word in English that . . . is 
increasingly being used to refer to a problem that women 
need a name for” (49). 
But it’s worth pausing at this point to think about which 
problem it is that’s been named here. On one way of 
understanding Manne’s view, the phenomenon she is 
describing is very broad indeed. In fact, it’s so broad— 
and so varied—that it’s hard to see what predictions or 
generalizations it can sustain. 
To see this, let’s start by noting the wide range of examples 
of misogyny discussed through the book. These range from 
cases of intimate-partner violence (Introduction, chapters 4 
and 6) to Rush Limbaugh’s rhetoric towards Sandra Fluke 
(chapter 2) to cat-calling and other street harassment 
(chapter 4) to bias in teaching evaluations (chapter 8), 
among a host of others. It’s plausible that all of these 
examples involve some hostility towards targets, but one 
would expect that this hostility would have quite different 
flavors in these different cases. In particular, not all of this 
hostility will feature the sort of personalized nastiness 
described earlier. Some of it may appear quite impersonal, 
such as when a woman professor, or a woman candidate, 
is simply held to higher, or different, standards than a male 
counterpart and found wanting in comparison. 
Second, and as Manne notes, misogynistic hostility needn’t 
be directed against those who in fact violate patriarchal 
norms and expectations. It needn’t even be directed against 
those who are perceived as doing so. Instead, misogynistic 
forces can also pick out targets who are merely convenient. 
That is, misogyny may manifest in “‘punching down’ 
behavior,” i.e., behavior that targets whoever happens to be 
available and vulnerable, regardless of how unthreatening 
their actions may be (54). In these cases, even though the 
target of the abuse doesn’t violate patriarchal norms, there 
may still be a sense in which she is picked out because
she is a woman (as required by Manne’s conception). This 
would be the case if, for example, the abuser is the target’s 
partner, and the abuse reflects his awareness that he is 
more likely to get away with violence inside the home than 
violence directed against non-family members. 
Third, as Manne also notes, misogyny will regularly be 
entwined with other systems of oppression. But she tells 
us very little about what this interaction looks like, or what 
we can say about how significant the role of misogyny is 
in any particular instance. This gives rise to two related, 
but different, concerns. One is that this conception of 
misogyny will include cases in which patriarchy in fact plays 
a relatively small role, while something else—say, white 
supremacy, or xenophobia—plays a much more significant 
role in generating the hostility towards a particular target. 
So this is another way in which the conception is quite 
broad. A related concern is that, epistemically speaking, 
the cases in which it will be clearest that misogyny plays a 
sizeable role will be those in which oppressive structures 
beyond patriarchy are not involved. To put the point another 
way, the clearest cases will be ones where the targets are 
privileged women. And that seems like a shortcoming for 
the account. 
I’ve been arguing so far that Manne’s conception of 
misogyny may be very broad indeed, along three 
dimensions. In fact, the phenomenon seems so broad that 
it’s hard to see how it can support predictions, including 
predictions about where misogyny is most likely to arise, 
and who the targets are most likely to be. On this picture, 
then, misogyny seems less about law enforcement—contra
Manne’s preferred metaphor—and more akin to collective 
punishment, where all women and girls live under the 
threat (or reality) of sanctions. 
There are some different responses available at this point. 
One response is to restrict the conception of misogyny 
along some or all of the dimensions described above. For 
example, we could say that misogyny must be directed at 
those who themselves violate (or are perceived to violate) 
patriarchal norms or expectations, thereby excluding 
punching down behavior. But this risks excluding from 
the realm of misogyny much that arguably belongs there, 
including much intimate-partner violence. 
Another response would retain the broad conception of 
misogyny, but distinguish between instances that are 
paradigmatic, and others that are less so. For example, 
we might say that the most paradigmatic instances of 
misogyny feature the kind of personalized nastiness that 
Manne emphasizes, even if not all instances do so. I’m 
inclined to think that this is the more plausible response, 
but here too there are concerns. 
Briefly, here’s one concern. Consider Manne’s analysis of 
Limbaugh’s rhetoric towards Fluke, after Fluke testified 
before Congress that contraception should be covered 
by health insurance at religious institutions. Manne 
argues that Limbaugh is not just hostile towards Fluke, 
but seems also to hold a “personal-seeming” grudge 
against her (56). As evidence for this claim, she notes 
Limbaugh’s characterization of Fluke as demanding to 
be paid to have sex, and his use of the labels “slut” and 
“prostitute” to describe her. She suggests that Limbaugh 
regards—or at least purports to regard—Fluke as “entitled 
and demanding,” and as owing something to taxpayers 
in return for being paid by them (57). But this, one might 
think, comes very close to making claims about Limbaugh’s 
attitudes, or purported attitudes, towards Fluke. And if we 
need to appeal to such attitudes in order to show that a 
particular instance of misogyny goes beyond hostility to 
personalized nastiness, then we might be on our way back 
to the naïve conception. 
3. AGAINST HUMANISM 
I’ll turn next to Manne’s substantive account of patriarchy, 
according to which men take themselves to be entitled 
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to certain kinds of labor from women. For Manne, this 
entitlement is rooted in a particular view of women, 
specifically, a view about what a woman’s purpose is, or 
“a sense of what she’s (there) for as a woman” (175). It’s 
this ideal of “the giving she”—an excellent phrase that 
Manne styles on the unfortunately popular children’s book 
by Shel Silverstein—that is meant to explain why there is 
disappointment, resentment, and vitriol when particular 
women fail to live up to it (279). 
Now, one might think that the idea that women are for
something—i.e., that we have a purpose or an end, not of
our own choosing, but perhaps by our very natures—is a kind
of dehumanizing view.6 It’s not the kind of dehumanization
that fails to recognize that women have inner lives in the first
place, or that we are capable of intentional action. That is to
say, it’s not the kind of dehumanization that regards women
as less than human.7 Rather, it’s the kind of dehumanization
that goes along with viewing women as determined by
our natures in some significant way, while men are not so
determined. To put it another way, it is to see women as
importantly different from other human beings, as having
a kind of fixity or uniformity that other human beings lack.
Perhaps we should say that this kind of dehumanization
involves seeing women as other than human, but not
necessarily less. This kind of view—about women being
determined in some significant way by our natures—is one
that feminists have long been concerned to counter. 
Manne, however, rejects humanism; further, she regards 
her own view as an alternative to humanistic views.8 In fact, 
she thinks that humanism is, in general, a failure: it can’t 
even explain the cases that it was designed to explain, 
i.e., mass atrocities under the influence of dehumanizing 
propaganda, let alone the cases of misogyny which are her 
principal focus. In the remainder of this commentary, I’ll 
take up some of her criticisms. 
One of Manne’s main arguments against humanistic views 
goes like this. Humanism is committed to the following 
claims: we human beings are able to recognize something 
like a “common humanity” in other human beings that goes 
beyond recognition of shared species membership; further, 
failure to recognize this common humanity functions 
as a “powerful, perhaps even necessary, psychological 
lubricant” to inhumane treatment of others, including mass 
murder, rape, and torture (141–45).9 In response, Manne 
points out that recognizing a common humanity is, at best, 
a “double-edged sword” (148): while other human beings 
can be friends and loved ones, they can also be enemies 
and rivals. And the latter can be threatening or dangerous in 
distinctive ways that non-humans cannot. Thus, recognizing 
a common humanity in others is entirely compatible with 
regarding them as threats, and as such, being disposed to 
subject them to deeply inhumane treatment. 
This seems right, and an important insight. But it’s not clear 
why this should spell doom for the humanist. It seems 
open to the humanist to make two (related) responses 
here. First, they might note that even if recognizing a 
common humanity isn’t sufficient for morally acceptable 
treatment, failure to recognize this will tend to produce 
morally egregious treatment. That is, recognizing another’s 
humanity isn’t enough to preclude hostile treatment; but 
lack of recognition will ease the way for atrocities. Second, 
there are distinct ways to regard another as an enemy, only 
some of which are compatible (in my view) with recognizing 
a common humanity. For example, consider the difference 
between regarding another as someone to be defeated in a 
“fair” fight versus as someone to be destroyed by whatever 
means happen to be available. The former seems to me 
more clearly compatible with recognition of a common 
humanity than the latter. 
A point of clarification may be helpful here. Manne regards 
humanism as primarily a psychological story, one that 
attributes dehumanizing psychological attitudes towards 
targets. But just as there was an alternative to the naïve 
conception of misogyny that de-emphasized psychological 
attitudes, there is surely an alternative version of humanism 
that does the same thing. Instead of starting with 
psychological attitudes, this alternative version might focus 
instead on social treatment. In fact, Manne herself suggests 
resources for developing such a view when she notes 
that recognizing others’ common humanity can include 
“enter[ing] into and sustain[ing] various characteristically 
human social relations, including marriage, parenthood, 
siblinghood, friendship, [and] collegial relations” (142, 
emphases in original).10 If that’s right, then dehumanizing
others can involve systematically excluding them from 
social relations, or licensing others to do the same. And this, 
in turn, points the way towards a non-psychologized—or at 
least, a much less psychologized—version of humanism. 
It’s this version of humanism that, in my view, bears some 
striking similarities to Manne’s substantive account of 
patriarchy (and misogyny). 
There’s more to be said here. As Manne recognizes, one 
major attraction of humanism is the explanation it appears 
to offer for the prevalence of dehumanizing propaganda 
in the lead-up to genocides and other mass atrocities. If 
dehumanization doesn’t in some sense pave the way for 
these atrocities, then why does this type of propaganda 
show up time and again in the lead-up? 
Manne makes two points in response. First, she suggests 
that “the uptake of dehumanizing propaganda [may 
amount] to false consciousness, at least in many instances” 
(165). The thought, I take it, is that the content of the 
propaganda may be parroted but isn’t genuinely believed; 
the acceptance of this content doesn’t go that deep, so 
to speak. Second, and relatedly, Manne also notes the 
prevalence of mass rapes in times of war, and argues that 
genuine acceptance of dehumanizing propaganda would 
render these difficult to explain. She writes: 
It is not just that sex between human beings 
and nonhuman animals is generally taboo. . . . It 
is also that the spirit in which mass rapes tend 
to be committed is typically vindictive, punitive, 
triumphalist, and domineering. These acts hence 
bear all of the hallmarks of interpersonal violence. 
. . . (165, emphasis in original) 
And if that’s right, then it seems that humanism cannot even
explain some of the central cases for which it was designed. 
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I’m not entirely persuaded by this line of argument. For 
one thing, the false consciousness hypothesis doesn’t 
explain why the propaganda in question so often has 
dehumanizing content, rather than some other derogatory 
content, e.g., why it doesn’t merely cast the targets as 
enemies or rivals. More importantly, a less psychologized 
humanism has a story to tell about the social functions 
served by this dehumanizing propaganda, regardless 
of whether it is believed; such a view could point to the 
role this propaganda plays in marking some as members 
of outgroups, and legitimating morally egregious actions 
towards them.11 And, finally, while I think Manne is right 
to emphasize the “punitive” and “triumphalist” spirit that 
accompanies mass rapes, it’s worth asking whether that 
spirit is directed against the victims (as she suggests) 
or against the entire communities to which they belong. 
Some researchers have argued that rape in war sometimes 
functions as weapons against entire communities, by 
destroying some members, and forcing others to bear 
children from those violations.12 If that’s right, then the 
violence involved may not be as distinctively interpersonal 
as the passage above suggests. 
Putting this all together: I’ve suggested that there’s more 
to be said in defense of (some versions of) humanism 
than Manne allows, and that her positive view bears some 
striking similarities to those versions. There is, obviously, a 
lot more to be said on these issues. And I look forward to 
continuing this conversation. 
NOTES 
1.	 All citations to Manne, Down Girl, except where otherwise noted. 
2.	 See, for example, Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack,” and Haslanger, 
“Oppressions.” 
3.	 See, for example, Cudd, Analyzing Oppression. 
4.	 Manne draws a helpful connection here between misogyny in 
her sense and P. F. Strawson’s account of the role of interpersonal 
reactive attitudes in capturing the “essentially personal
antagonisms” (Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” quoted on 
58, emphasis in original). 
5.	 In this connection Manne mentions “cultures such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia” (106). 
6.	 To be clear, Manne doesn’t talk of women’s natures. But the view 
that women are for something, that we are meant to be givers 
not takers, invites the question, “From where does this purpose 
arise?” An appeal to women’s natures would be one way of 
answering that question, though perhaps not the only one. 
7.	 For a useful taxonomy of distinct uses of the term “dehumanize” 
in the philosophical literature, see Smith, “Paradoxes of 
Dehumanization.” Smith himself uses the term to mean 
“conceiving of others as subhuman creatures” (419). 
8.	 Manne emphasizes that the feminine-coded goods demanded 
by patriarchy can only be provided by human beings. I don’t 
have the space to discuss this important part of her view here. 
But I am suggesting that patriarchy, on her view, is committed 
both to viewing women as fixed, perhaps by our very natures, 
and viewing us as “all too human” givers; there is a tension there 
that is reminiscent of tensions that appear on humanistic views, 
between viewing some as subhuman and, at the same time, 
recognizing that they are in fact human. 
9.	 These correspond to the Conceptual-cum-perceptual claim and 
the Quasi-contrapositive moral psychological claim, respectively, 
that Manne discusses in her chapter 5. 
10. For a detailed account that uses ability to stand in social relations 
as a crucial explanatory device for some inhumane treatment, 
see Melo Lopes, Recognizing Social Subjects. 
11.	 For views along these lines, see McGowan, “On ‘Whites Only’ 
Signs and Racist Hate Speech”; Tirrell, “Genocidal Language 
Games”; and Stanley, How Propaganda Works, among others. 
12. See, for example, Beverly Allen’s analysis of “genocidal rape” in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzogovina (Allen, Rape Warfare). 
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Misogyny and Dehumanization 
Audrey Yap 
UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA 
Kate Manne’s book, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny, is an 
important and timely intervention in the public discourse 
on gendered hostility and violence. It provides us with 
a useful framework for understanding the distinctive 
function that misogyny plays in contemporary society. This 
work is extremely rich, but for the purposes of this article, 
I will only be focusing on one particular aspect of it, and 
arguing against one particular claim, which is the link (or 
lack thereof) between misogyny and dehumanization. But 
I want to make it clear from the outset that the nature of 
my disagreement has primarily to do with the best ways to 
model the oppressive social structures and institutions that 
shape our lives, as well as how such things are upheld by 
the people who participate in them—including ourselves. 
Misogyny is a real phenomenon, as is racism, ableism, 
colonialism, and other forms of oppression. And even if 
we might disagree on the details of how they have shaped 
actual cases, we can nevertheless appreciate the depth 
and insight with which Manne has helped us to understand 
one such destructive force.
This paper will be divided into two sections. First, I will outline 
what I see as a particularly insightful aspect of Manne’s 
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work, namely, the close relationship between misogyny 
and the maintenance of social hierarchies. Second, I will 
outline a concern related to Manne’s characterization 
of women’s role in such hierarchies. Manne argues that 
women are positioned as givers of distinctly human moral 
goods, and for this reason, misogyny is not a matter of 
dehumanization. While I do not contest this conclusion, 
I will argue that the cases she chooses to illustrate it 
are nevertheless cases in which there is significant 
dehumanization—not as a result of misogyny, but because 
of other oppressive forces that frequently co-occur with it. 
I think that in order to better understand misogyny in many 
real-world situations, we need to consider how it interacts 
with other forms of oppression. While Manne’s analysis of 
misogyny is excellent as a tool for analyzing much hostility 
and violence that women face, this analysis needs to be 
combined with our understanding of racism, ableism, 
transphobia, and many other oppressive forces in order to 
be more broadly applicable, even to some of the cases in 
which it is applied in this book.
The book, however, is undeniably timely. When I was 
reading it in preparation for giving a commentary, ten 
people in Toronto were killed, and several more were 
injured, by a man driving a van aimed at hitting pedestrians. 
Alek Minassian, a self-described “incel” (abbreviating 
“involuntary celibate”) posted on Facebook a short time 
before the attack, declaring the “Incel Rebellion” to 
have started, and concluding with “All hail the Supreme 
Gentleman Elliot Rodger.”1 Elliot Rodger is the perpetrator 
of the 2014 Isla Vista killings, which serves as one of the 
motivating examples in Manne’s analysis of misogyny. 
Then a twenty-two-year-old man, Rodger became famous 
when he stabbed and killed his roommates and a guest 
in their apartment before driving to the Alpha Phi sorority 
house nearby. When he found himself unable to gain 
entry to the house, he began a public shooting spree. 
Several young women from another sorority were killed 
just around the corner from Alpha Phi. Through drive-by 
shootings, he killed or injured several other people, both 
men and women, before turning his gun on himself.2 What 
made Rodger stand out, and the reason why he went on to 
become a kind of heroic figure for many frustrated young 
men, was the YouTube video he posted shortly before the 
killings started. Despite the fact that several of Rodger’s 
victims were men, his stated motive for the killings in the 
posted video was the punishment of women—particularly 
attractive women, who had never been attracted to him. 
Now, as is often the case when there are acts of violence 
committed by light-skinned people, some media and at 
least one of Minassian’s friends, cited the issue as primarily 
one of mental illness.3 But a lone wolf-type attack, even 
when it is committed by someone neuroatypical, does 
not necessarily have mental illness as its primary cause. 
Nor should we allow the underlying ableism of such 
assumptions to go unquestioned. Manne’s focus, though, 
is not on the ableism inherent in the ready availability of 
mental illness as an explanation of many violent crimes. 
Nor is it on the racism that leads many of us to engage 
in differential treatment of acts of violence perpetrated by 
people of different ethnicities. After all, acts of domestic 
terror committed by darker-skinned folk are readily 
characterized as belonging to a larger pattern of terrorism 
waged on North America by faceless darker-skinned others. 
Her account of misogyny can, however, be seen as a kind 
of implicit challenge to such presumptions, by providing 
us with a better explanation of many cases of gendered 
violence than mental illness or cultural differences. 
Understanding misogyny is a matter of understanding the 
social dynamics behind much of the hostility that is directed 
at women. As Manne describes it, it is “the ‘law enforcement’ 
branch of a patriarchal social order, which has the overall 
function of policing and enforcing its governing ideology.”4 
Unlike sexism, its function is not to justify women, or non-
men, as having a lower place in the social hierarchy, but is 
rather to enforce that lower social status. Moreover, it is not 
best understood in terms of individual attitudes or sexist 
hatred of women. While many who commit misogynist 
acts may also hate the women against whom they are 
engaging in hostilities, this is not a necessary component 
of misogyny as a general phenomenon. In fact, it is entirely 
compatible to claim that misogynist acts, like the Isla Vista 
killings, can be committed by people who desired women, 
perhaps loved them in some way. But this should not be 
surprising to anyone familiar with statistics of violence 
against women, since the majority of violence enacted 
against women is at the hands of people they know, often 
current or former intimate partners, and in the name of 
love or desire. Misogynist violence, then, is less a matter of 
hatred than of maintaining subordination. 
After all, the sexual entitlement that drives the violence 
enacted by men such as Minassian and Rodger doesn’t 
require a hatred of women, specifically. It might require 
anger directed at women, but anger is generally 
independent of our more general attitudes towards others, 
as we are capable of being angry at a range of people, 
including strangers, enemies, and loved ones. While incel 
rhetoric might encourage a hatred of women in general, 
their feelings towards individual women can and should 
be kept conceptually distinct from the ways in which 
they act in accordance with misogyny to punish women. 
On the subject of incels, though, it might nevertheless 
be worth noting that there might be something political 
about hierarchies of sexual desirability. Stereotypes about 
hypersexual Black men and sexually submissive Asian 
women remain in popular culture, while disabled people 
are often viewed as asexual. The “cotton ceiling” is a term 
that was introduced to describe the difficulties that queer 
trans women have in navigating lesbian spaces.5 While 
many incels occupy relatively privileged social identities, 
many of them do accurately perceive themselves to be 
less conventionally attractive and socially adept than other 
men, and attribute this to their lower sexual desirability 
among women. (Though it is likely no accident that violent 
misogynists are also sexually and romantically undesirable, 
sadly, being a violent misogynist does not seem sufficient 
to guarantee a nonexistent romantic life.) As a result of this 
lower degree of desirability, some of them see themselves 
as victims of injustice. And while Manne’s later discussions 
of victimhood are more centered on what we might see 
as appropriate claims of victim status, many of its insights 
still carry over. As she points out, to cast oneself as a victim 
is to place oneself at the center of the story, and in many 
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cases to cast others as oppressors.6 Such is the narrative 
that many incels attempt to claim as their own. 
Incels see themselves as victims because they see 
themselves as unjustly deprived of sexual attention. 
Centering themselves in the story means that the desire of 
others doesn’t matter—only the fact that they themselves 
are not desired. Consequently, since victim narratives 
typically require a villain, the natural scapegoats are the 
desirable-for-them women who are not desirous of them, as 
well as the men who they perceive as getting more women 
than they deserve. Lashing out against this victimhood is, 
then, taking, by force if need be, what they perceive as 
their due, namely, sex with whichever women they want. 
So the victim narrative leads them to a kind of justification 
for rape, which involves a kind of analogy between sexual 
and literal starvation. But what they do not do is challenge 
the social hierarchies in which they themselves are at 
the bottom. Lashing out against their own perceived low 
status does not take the form of challenging who is seen as 
desirable in the first place. That would involve criticizing an 
overall system in which many bodies besides their own are 
seen as essentially unfuckable. After all, the “Chads” that 
incels seem to both envy and despise make up a relative 
minority of men. And certainly not all men outside that 
relative minority embrace incel modes of thinking. So when 
we look at the ways in which incels protest hierarchies 
of desirability, it is clear that they are not in fact making 
demands for justice (even when they claim to be). Nor are 
they genuinely challenging a system that privileges only 
a small number of bodily configurations. Rather, they are 
demanding to be among the beneficiaries of an unjust 
system left intact.
Misogyny is fundamentally about the maintenance of social 
hierarchies, specifically those that stem from a patriarchal 
social order. Incels do not direct their own positive attention 
towards women other than “Stacys,” those also occupying 
positions of stereotypical sexual desirability. But there are 
many women who are not seen as desirable (and the term 
“incel” was, in fact, originally coined by a woman, though 
with extremely different intentions behind it). Incel rhetoric 
maintains the overall patriarchal arrangement by situating 
men in general as being owed something by women. Incels 
are generally acutely aware of their low social status with 
respect to other men, but they still take themselves to be 
above women in general, and entitled to women in general. 
But the question of what exactly they see themselves as 
entitled to forms the crux of one of Manne’s points that I 
will argue is misdirected.
Incels and other misogynists often demand love, care, 
and sex from women they desire, punishing women, 
or in some cases the world, if they are not given their 
due. What Manne notes is that the things demanded are 
distinctively human in that the kind of care that women are 
supposed to provide is of a distinctively human sort. This 
is a key claim that she uses to argue against a view that 
she calls humanism, which considers dehumanization to be 
a key factor in atrocities such as war crimes. The positive 
proposal that accompanies this view is that we might hope 
to forestall such crimes by finding strategies for us to see 
others as fully human. Under this thesis, the recognition of 
another person as a genuine fellow human is necessary for 
treating them as such, but also motivates us to do so. This 
leads us to the idea that dehumanization makes it easier 
to treat others in morally abhorrent ways, by torturing or 
killing them, for instance. Though the connection between 
these claims is certainly not one of logical entailment, the 
positive proposal of making others’ humanity more visible 
in the face of their marginalization or vulnerability then 
becomes better supported.
I have little to say about the positive proposal of humanization 
as a central strategy for preventing atrocities, and nothing 
I will say turns on its effectiveness. Nevertheless, we 
might be skeptical about the positive proposal while still 
maintaining that dehumanization contributes significantly 
to atrocities. For instance, David Livingstone Smith gives 
an account of dehumanization under which it functions 
by positioning others as simultaneously human and sub­
human.7 While those dehumanized are acknowledged 
as having a human form, and behaving in many ways as 
humans do, they are treated as having an essence that 
is “uncanny” or unheimlich, in Smith’s terms. So such an 
account does not suffer too much from counterexamples 
in which pointing out commonalities between “us” and 
“them” fails to have desired effects, since it is built in to 
the view that there will be some, at least superficial, points 
of resemblance. 
As further points of support for an account under which 
dehumanization plays a key role in enabling atrocities, we 
have empirical evidence of dehumanizing language at the 
very least being used prior to genocides. Lynne Tirrell in 
particular takes a close look at the Rwandan genocide, 
and argues that calling Tutsi people by terms used for 
cockroaches and snakes performed action-engendering
functions.8 This does not mean, of course, that Tutsis were 
to be thought of as literal insects or ophidians, but that they 
were to be considered in such terms, culturally speaking. 
As a matter of course, snakes are things that Rwandan 
boys take pride in killing. A snake is, then, an animal for 
which a particular course of action is suggested, namely, 
extermination. As Tirrell argues, it is not an accident that a 
group to be targeted was described in terms that equate 
them with animals to be exterminated. Portraying Tutsis 
as being essentially snakes or some other kind of vermin 
was to suggest that they be treated as vermin. We might 
worry that something similar is going on in the US as well, 
when President Trump refers to some deported people as 
animals,9 or when we consider the history of dog whistle 
politics.10 
Manne’s strongest argument against humanism as 
described above relies on her argument that the things 
demanded of women (feminine coded goods) are 
distinctively human. For instance, she points out the 
tensions between a dehumanization thesis and the fact of 
sexual enslavement and wartime rape:
if the perpetrators of mass atrocities often 
dehumanize their victims, then why do the 
perpetrators so frequently rape the female ones? 
It is not just that sex between human beings and 
nonhuman animals is generally taboo, and relatively 
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unusual, partly because of this. It is also that the 
spirit in which mass rapes tend to be committed 
is typically vindictive, punitive, triumphalist, and 
domineering. These acts hence bear all of the 
hallmarks of interpersonal violence, which is 
expressive of and gives vent to paradigmatically 
interpersonal reactive attitudes.11 
While it is true that we do not tend to want sexual 
relationships with those perceived as animal—incels who 
desire sexual relationships with women might hate women 
but still view them as human—I want to push back against 
a characterization of wartime rapes (and many other cases 
of rape) as sexual encounters. Instead, a characterization 
of women as goods rather than human givers seems 
consistent with both the view that perpetrators dehumanize 
victims, as well as other typical wartime actions.
One prima facie reason to accept that the victims of mass 
atrocities are dehumanized is the prevalence of apparently 
dehumanizing propaganda targeting enemy populations 
during wartime. For example, American anti-Japanese 
propaganda during World War II gives us a prime example 
of dehumanizing racist portrayals of enemies. But then 
Manne’s question of why one would rape an individual 
who is seen as subhuman still stands. One candidate 
explanation is to see wartime rape as continuous with a 
general tendency towards looting and the destruction of 
property. On such an account, rape would be a way of 
degrading a particular kind of loot, namely, women for 
whom no sexual desire would need to be present. Soldiers 
might burn homes as a way of displaying dominance over 
civilians in an enemy country, just as they might steal 
valuables. It seems compatible with Smith’s account of 
dehumanization to see women, in such cases, as having 
the moral status of objects and other goods that might be 
plundered. But given the kinds of goods that women are 
(in human form, after all), sex can be a way of claiming 
ownership, or of destroying another’s property. So while 
misogyny might dictate how women are to be dominated, 
the purpose of such domination may not be to put women 
back in their place, nor to treat them as agents who might 
be motivated or cowed by intimidation. Rather, it might be 
to send a message to “their” men, just as the vandalism or 
theft of property might send a message. If the (probably 
male) soldiers on the opposing side of the war are the (more 
fully human) enemies to be resisted, then one way to lash 
out at them would be to vandalize what is theirs: homes, 
land, valuable items, and women. In such a way, wartime 
rape can still be understood as having the characteristics 
of interpersonal violence. But rather than being directed 
towards the women who are being victimized, revenge is 
being enacted against male enemy combatants through 
the degradation of their property.
I think that this candidate explanation is plausible, but 
much more work would need to be done to argue that it is 
in fact what is going on in cases of war. It is simply intended 
to illustrate one potential answer to Manne’s question for 
proponents of a dehumanization thesis. Further, insofar 
as misogyny contributes to atrocities, my argument here 
has not been that its contribution lies in dehumanization. 
Based on what I have argued, we still do not need to 
suppose any close connection between misogyny and 
dehumanization, or claim that a sexist ideology justifying 
a patriarchal social order needs to dehumanize women in 
order to be coherent. Indeed, in many cases of misogyny, 
such as misogyny applying to more privileged women like 
Julia Gillard and Hillary Clinton, dehumanization seems a 
fairly inappropriate explanation for the ways in which they 
were treated. Rather, they do in fact seem to be treated as 
rivals, or as fellow humans laying claim to status to which 
they are not entitled. Rather, what I want to point out is 
that even if misogyny does not require dehumanization, it 
certainly seems to be compatible with it, and wartime rape 
is very plausibly a place in which the two coincide.
Since Down Girl was not about dehumanization, nor about 
the maintenance of sexist or racist ideologies, some of 
the issues I have raised may be outside of its scope. But 
the reasons for raising these issues is the fact that the real 
horrors we find in the world are often complicated. And in 
many cases of oppression, multiple different subordinating 
forces will be at work, the effects of which can often be 
extremely difficult to untangle, much less mitigate. I think 
that Down Girl has given us a very helpful analysis of one 
such force that contributes to the enforcement of gender-
based oppression. But it has also helped us see just how 
much more work there is still to do in understanding the 
ways in which oppression shapes our lives. 
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Autism, Himpathy, and Down Girl: The 
Logic of Misogyny 
Elle Benjamin 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny by Kate Manne is a 
comprehensive exposition and analysis of society’s 
subjugation of people who are girls and women. Contrary 
to the naïve conception, Manne holds that misogyny is not 
a blanket hatred of girls and women. Rather, misogyny 
functions to punish her socially for failing to adequately 
perform her patriarchal role as provider of moral and social 
goods, such as love, sex, sympathy, and admiration, to the 
men in her life. Manne’s project is an ameliorative one, 
striving towards a conception of misogyny that unifies 
the multifaceted ways that girls and women experience 
patriarchal subjugation, even the ones who comply. 
Notably, Manne argues that misogyny is not grounded in 
a confusion about what she is essentially like, for instance, 
whether she is essentially nurturing or submissive. Rather, 
misogyny is the normatively motivated practice of instilling 
in her these traits, because according to the logic of 
misogyny, they comprise her human value. 
Manne invokes many case studies in support of her thesis 
that misogyny primarily serves to punish girls and women 
who fail to perform their patriarchal duties. Two notable 
incidents discussed in depth are the widely publicized 
cases of Elliot Rodger and Brock Turner, both of them 
students in college when they garnered national attention. 
On Friday, May 23, 2014, Elliot Rodger, aged twenty-two, 
killed six people in what he dubbed his Day of Retribution. 
After stabbing his roommates to death that morning, 
Rodgers attempted to gain access to a sorority house 
on the UC Santa Barbara campus in order to murder the 
women inside, but he was denied access because the 
women were alarmed by the aggressive tone of his knock 
on their door. Instead, Rodgers took his rampage to the 
streets, murdering four people in his path and injuring 
many more. Rodger’s motivations were transparent. From 
a YouTube video he posted earlier that day, Rodger says, 
“[I’ve been] forced to endure an existence of loneliness, 
rejection, and unfulfilled desires, all because girls have 
never been attracted to me. Girls gave their affection and 
sex and love to other men but never to me. . . . It has been 
very torturous.”1 
A year later, Brock Turner, aged twenty, was indicted for 
sexually assaulting an unconscious twenty-two-year-old 
woman behind a dumpster on the Stanford University 
campus, which Turner attended on an athletic scholarship. 
Two visiting graduate students from Sweden caught Turner 
digitally penetrating the woman, who appeared to be 
unconscious. Turner tried to run away from the scene, but 
the graduate students chased him down and restrained 
him until the police arrived. Turner plead not guilty on all 
charges and was sentenced to six months in the Santa Clara 
County jail, but ultimately served only three months in jail 
and three months of probation before he was released. 
Elliot Rodger’s and Brock Turner’s actions are both
misogynistic on Manne’s account. Both behaved as though
they are entitled to sexual favors from women, with Rodger
explicitly punishing her for withholding sex, and Turner
acting as if her consent for sex is irrelevant. Furthermore,
both received misogynistic responses to their actions. In a
letter to the judge presiding over the case, Turner’s father’s
chief concern was that his son suffered emotionally in the
aftermath of the crime he committed. In response to feminist
pleas for gender equity following Elliot Rodger’s Day of
Retribution, Chris Ferguson, a professor of psychology,
countered in Time magazine that “Misogyny didn’t turn Roger
into a killer.” Instead, Ferguson argued, Roger’s misogyny
was a product of mental illness, social isolation, sexual
frustration, and general frustration, “rather than anything
‘taught’ to him by society. Had he not been so focused on
his own sexual inadequacies, his focus might simply have
moved to mall-goers rather than sorority sisters.”2 
Manne calls responses of this sort instances of himpathy, 
the tendency to justify and exonerate men’s misogynistic 
behavior by reflexively redirecting the flow of sympathy 
from their female victims back onto the men who mistreated 
them.3 Turner’s father’s response to his son’s misogyny 
was himpathetic (an instance of himpathy) because an 
appropriate response to someone feeling down about 
having committed sexual assault is: Good. People should
feel bad about committing sexual assault. Hopefully that 
bad feeling is guilt, and hopefully that guilty feeling will 
motivate people to never commit sexual assault again. By 
framing his son’s negative feelings about the incident as 
the undesired result that merits further consideration and 
sympathy, Turner’s father implicitly rejects the premise that 
those negative feelings are deserved. He also hoards the 
judge’s sympathies for his son when they are better spent 
on the victim of his son’s misogynistic behavior. 
Chris Ferguson’s and others’ responses to Elliot Rodger’s 
Day of Retribution also exhibited himpathy. Many 
commentators explicitly rejected the outcries of women 
who felt that Rodger’s actions, and especially his rhetoric, 
represented a broader cultural problem with the way 
we think about and behave towards women. Instead, 
Ferguson and others derailed that conversation by casting 
blame on Rodger’s mental illness, with National Review
contributor Heather Mac Donald claiming that “there is no 
pattern of gender-based rampages in this country; there 
is an emerging pattern of rampages by the untreated 
mentally ill.”4 One glaring omission in this response is 
the existence of very many women who also suffer from 
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mental illness, yet are not making these sorts of headlines. 
This counterpoint is such low-hanging fruit that one might 
wonder whether motivated thinking prevented these 
otherwise intellectually competent people from noticing 
the gendered asymmetries at all. 
What is especially betraying about this response is that, 
for all the sympathy exhibited towards Rodger’s plight, not 
even Ferguson, the professional psychologist, seems to 
have investigated the condition that Rodger was suspected 
to have had. Nor did they bother to explain in any detail 
why, given that particular condition, Rodger would have 
been especially susceptible to the misogynistic rhetoric 
that he displayed. One might expect that where there 
is genuine sympathy, there is some sort of attempt to 
educate the public about what the sympathy is for, why 
the sympathy is warranted, and how we can help such 
sympathetic individuals avoid this fate in the future. But 
these commentators displayed little interest in doing the 
leg work to justify and exonerate Rodger in virtue of his 
condition. This implies that Rodger’s condition was not the 
real target here. What they wanted is to divert attention 
away from the conversation about misogyny, using 
Rodger’s condition as a smokescreen. Their sympathy 
towards Rodger should therefore not be construed as 
sympathy for his condition, but rather, sympathy for his 
maleness. Himpathy. 
One of Manne’s criticisms of himpathy is that it diverts 
attention away from the experiences of the victims of 
misogynistic mistreatment, and instead refocuses the 
discussion back onto the experiences of those who 
mistreated them. But I wonder if there are any cases 
where focusing on the experiences of the misogynist can 
be beneficial for everyone—including the misogynistic 
perpetrators and the misogynystically oppressed. In 
particular, I wonder if there is an unhimpathetic way to talk 
about Elliot Rodger that illuminates the effect of his condition 
on his misogyny, without emitting any sympathy at all in 
virtue of his maleness. The himpathetic commentators that 
Manne discusses mischaracterized the nature of Rodger’s 
condition by calling it mental illness. Consequently, readers 
were denied a deeper understanding of what Rodger was 
experiencing, why he was experiencing it, and how we can 
help people with similar experiences avoid Rodger’s fate. 
Without crossing the line into himpathetic territory, that is 
what I am going to try to do here. I leave it to Manne to 
decide whether or not I succeed. 
In a statement on behalf of the Rodgers family, a family 
friend notes that Elliot Rodger was suspected to be on the 
autism spectrum. Autism is a neurological condition, not 
a mental illness, although many autistic people develop 
mental illnesses like depression and anxiety as a result 
of being neurodivergent in a world made for and run by 
neurotypical people. Autism can manifest in many ways, 
and there are many theories of autism. The Intense World 
Theory of autism describes autism as a hyper-functioning of 
local neural microcircuits that results in hyper-reactivity and 
hyper-plasticity. Some of the core cognitive consequences 
of this is hyper-perception, hyper-attention, hyper-memory, 
and hyper-emotionality.5 In sum, autistic people have 
more intense perceptions and emotional experiences of 
the world. Unlike bipolar disorder, this intensity does not 
oscillate between depression and mania. Autistic people 
experience those emotions intensely, but also many others. 
Autistic people prefer a literal and explicit communication 
style, often missing connotative content, including implicit 
normative content. Additionally, autistic people are prone 
to exhibit weak central coherence, the cognitive tendency 
to focus on parts instead of wholes, sometimes missing 
the wholes entirely. To mediate these cognitive difficulties, 
many autistic people are over-reliant on rules, heuristics, 
and social scripts, as opposed to social intuition, to navigate 
their environments. Consequently, autistic people can 
become very confused and frustrated when these social 
scripts and rules do not yield expected results, or when 
social intuition is a prerequisite that becomes a barrier for 
access. Autistic people are often characterized as having 
poor theory of mind, but many autistic people reject this 
characterization. Insofar as autistic people have historically 
been pathologized by those with different cognitive 
architectures, it seems unfair to describe autistic people as 
mind-blind.6 There is a distinctive autistic culture in autistic 
communities, and many autistic people find that in these 
environments the mind-blindness is reduced. This is only 
a brief and partial description of the autistic neurotype, 
but it touches on the reasons why Elliot Rodger, if he was 
in fact autistic, would have been especially susceptible to 
misogynistic ideology. Moreover, it touches on some of the 
ways that we can help similar people avoid Rodger’s fate. 
First, the stereotype of the misanthropic autistic person is 
false. Many autistic people yearn for companionship just 
like everyone else, as Rodger did. But much of our dating 
culture is mediated through social mechanisms that the 
autistic person lacks, like subtle body language and social 
cues, creating a barrier to access that social activity.7 This 
by itself is sufficient to generate a lot of anxiety about 
dating, especially for men, who are expected to initiate 
romantic engagement and seduce romantic prospects 
into cooperating. If Rodger was the only autistic person 
in his social environment, this would have presented the 
sort of challenge one might experience trying to conduct 
a business deal with people who speak another language. 
Rodger would not have met the minimal social qualifications 
to achieve a baseline level of trust upon which a relationship 
might develop. Indeed, Rodger’s family friend confirmed 
that he lived an isolated life and had no friends. We can 
conclude from his videos, however, that his social failure 
was not caused by a lack of social interest. 
The significance of Rodger’s involuntary social isolation on 
his misogynistic ideology is that he would not have had 
access to the counter-data that many men use to dismantle 
the sexist stereotypes and narratives about women that 
society proliferates. For example, when we are taught 
that women are essentially nurturing, but have no stake in 
the truth of that claim, we typically hold that belief until 
countervailing evidence comes along. For instance, we 
might get to know a woman who lacks a nurturing disposition 
and update away from the truth of the essentializing claim. 
After meeting enough women who are counterexamples 
to our stereotypes about women, one might wonder why 
these stereotypes exist in the first place, and uncover the 
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vast conspiracy that is patriarchal ideology. Having lacked 
the prerequisite social skills to gain access to that counter-
data, Rodger likely remained oblivious to the falsity of the 
patriarchy’s gender-essentializing narratives for his entire 
life. 
Lacking social skills, however, does not make one completely
socially oblivious. Rodger clearly learned much of what the
patriarchy wanted him to learn. He learned that women are
shallow and want boyfriends who emit status, so he drove a
fancy car and lamented his Asian ethnicity, an indication that
Rodger is aware of the racism towards Asian males in dating
culture.8 He learned that he was entitled to sexual attention
and affection from women, and aside from being Asian or
perhaps not having enough status, he was probably very
confused about why that did not happen. Rodger was so
over-reliant on patriarchal narratives that he failed to notice
its normative subtext. As Manne points out, the patriarchy
does not merely assert of women that they are nurturing, or
feminine, and so on. Patriarchal ideology is a value system.
It asserts of women that they should exhibit these traits, and
employs a wide range of social mechanisms from himpathy
to gaslighting to achieve this goal. 
Brock Turner demonstrated a more sophisticated 
understanding of the normative subtext of patriarchal 
ideology. Turner understood that the patriarchy exists 
because men like him perform actions to maintain it. Turner 
maintained the patriarchy by acting in accordance with the 
notion that women’s bodies were his for the taking. He 
then effectively mobilized his privilege as a Golden Boy 
to sway the judge to grant him leniency. This option was 
not available to Elliot Rodger for a few reasons. One is that 
nobody told him that patriarchal-compliant women aren’t 
born; they are made. Another is that even if he understood 
this, Rodger was not socially competent enough to 
manipulate people, as Turner could. A third is that Rodger 
lacked the communal support that is required in order 
to pull this off. Such privileges are reserved for Golden 
Boys who can recruit other patriarchs to side with them 
over the women they abuse, not for loner creeps. I raise 
these points not to muster any sympathy for Rodger, but 
to demonstrate the ways in which Rodger was incapable of 
fully understanding and following the rules that governed 
his social environment. Of course, Rodger did eventually 
realize that he was hopelessly mistaken about how all of 
this works. Because in true autistic fashion, when Rodger’s 
reality did not match his expectations, he had a massive 
meltdown. His meltdown was the Isla Vista Killings. 
We can see now that when Ferguson claims that “Misogyny 
didn’t turn Roger into a killer. . . . Had he not been so 
focused on his own sexual inadequacies, his focus might 
simply have moved to mall-goers rather than sorority 
sisters.” Ferguson is exactly wrong. Mall-goers do not 
represent a moral good that society told Rodger he was 
entitled to, but which Rodger lacked the performative 
ability to pursue. Mall-goers do not represent a gateway 
to the social acceptance and social respect that Rodger 
was so desperate to have. Most of all, Rodger was not 
inundated with false narratives about what mall-goers are 
essentially like, who they value, and how to pursue their 
attention and affections as he was when it came to women. 
If Ferguson truly sympathized with Rodger at all in virtue of 
his autism, as opposed to his maleness, Ferguson would 
have concluded with the feminists of the #YesAllWomen 
campaign that the conspiratorial nature of the patriarchy 
was Rodger’s problem. Rodger would have benefited 
immensely from reading Manne’s book, which dismantles 
this conspiracy in plain language. 
Rodger never got the chance to learn that the patriarchy is 
a lie, a story we tell young girls and boys to cajole them into 
fitting neatly into our social boxes. Fortunately, other autistic 
people are discovering this. Preliminary research suggests 
that autistic people are more likely than non-autistic people 
to experience atypical gender presentations, have non­
standard sexual orientations, and exhibit androgynous 
personality traits.9 This research is somewhat hampered by 
the fact that autistic women were denied recognition by 
the male-centric diagnostic criteria for autism until recently, 
but that gap is rapidly narrowing as more information 
about autistic women becomes available.10 The upshot of 
all this is that society is getting better for autistic people 
as we gradually detach from the narrow confinements 
of patriarchal gender roles and expectations, and as 
alternative lifestyles become more acceptable. My hope 
is that by dismantling the social constructions that feel so 
alien to autistic people, we can more easily direct them 
to communities with more transparent and less contrived 
performative standards so that all of us may avoid the fate 
that became of Elliot Rodger. 
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Response to Critics 
Kate Manne 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
In writing Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny, one of my 
dearest hopes was that my book—and my mistakes 
and omissions therein—would pave the way for rich 
conversations about the eponymous problem facing girls 
and women. I am delighted and honored that this hope 
has come to pass, in this forum among others. The present 
set of critical commentaries provides an embarrassment 
of riches to respond to, such that I can’t and won’t even 
try to do full justice to the substantive and methodological 
issues they raise for me as an author. Instead, I will use the 
occasion to try to clarify just a few of the central goals and 
ideas of Down Girl, in relation to each commentary. And I do 
so in a spirit of immense gratitude—to each of the authors, 
as well as Lauren Freeman, in her capacity as editor. 
ON THE MISOGYNY OF WHITE WOMEN 
I find much to agree with in Kathryn Norlock’s brilliant 
analysis, drawing on my framework as well as Claudia 
Card’s, of the phenomenon of white female misogynists. 
These are women who, bolstered and protected by their 
white privilege, routinely undermine and betray the 
interests of other girls and women.1 It will be a matter of 
some delicacy, both metaphysically and epistemologically, 
when an individual woman rises to the threshold where she 
can fairly be called a misogynist simpliciter, as opposed 
to someone who channels and perpetuates misogynistic 
social forces (as do virtually all of us to some extent, I 
believe). Nevertheless, there is nothing in my account that 
rules out this possibility, and I agree with Norlock that it is 
sometimes instantiated in reality. I myself have known white 
female misogynists, on my definition of the term—where, 
as Norlock notes, I hold that “the term ‘misogynist’ is best 
treated as a threshold concept, and also a comparative one, 
functioning as a kind of ‘warning label,’ which should be 
sparingly applied to people whose attitudes and actions 
are particularly and consistently misogynistic across myriad 
social contexts.”2 
Norlock rightly expounds on one common reason why 
we don’t tend to count women as misogynists: the naïve 
conception of misogyny, which I argue against in Chapters 
1 and 2 of Down Girl.3 But there are two additional reasons 
worth highlighting as to why people may hesitate to call 
individual women misogynists: one good (or, better, 
potentially sound), and one bad. Let me take these in 
reverse order. 
The bad (that is, unsound) reason why people may hesitate to 
call individual women misogynists is that they have trouble 
acknowledging the obvious truth that many victimizers and 
enablers of victimization are also victims themselves. Many 
people who are oppressed are also in turn oppressors. This 
obvious moral possibility can admittedly be a source of 
complexity and perplexity, when it comes to how to assign 
blame, how to treat these wronged wrongdoers, and how 
to speak in ways that eschew objectionably exonerating 
narratives, on the one hand, and a variant of victim-blaming, 
on the other—where we fail or refuse to acknowledge the 
wrongs suffered by morally compromised subjects. But 
these are problems that really exist: they should not be 
denied, nor avoided, nor minimized. They should be fully 
and freely acknowledged, despite the theoretical and 
practical quandaries that will sometimes thereby ensue. 
There is a better (that is, potentially sound, albeit highly 
defeasible) reason why one might hesitate to call women 
misogynists. The workings of what I call “himpathy”—the 
disproportionate or inappropriate sympathy sometimes 
extended to powerful men over girls and women— 
together with misogyny itself predicts that we will tend to 
police women’s moral errors more vigorously than men’s, 
all else being equal. (The “all else equal” clause here, as in 
most of my work, counsels us to hold fixed other relevant 
intersecting social factors, such as race, class, sexuality, 
being cis/trans, etc.4). So the prediction would be that, 
given a man and a woman of comparable intersecting 
social identities, we will tend to be quicker to blame her
versus him for comparable moral perfidies, including 
their engagement in misogynistic actions and practices. 
We will tend to hold her to higher (i.e., double, as well as 
differential) standards on this score, among others. Such 
is the moralistic form which misogyny often takes. Or so I 
argue in Down Girl. (I don’t pretend to have replicated, as 
opposed to merely reported, the upshot of my book-length 
argument to that conclusion.) 
If that is right, then we should be cautious about using 
the label “misogynist” for women, since we will often be 
prone to use it too quickly or too freely. But that doesn’t 
mean we shouldn’t do so at all. It just means that we 
should do so with an even greater dose of epistemic 
caution and humility than usual—epistemic virtues that 
I counsel when using this shaming label in general. That 
is, on my treatment, the word “misogynist” does have 
a use: but it is a limited one, subordinate to diagnosing 
misogyny as a property of social environments or systems 
as a whole. And, by the same token, we should be careful 
not to use the word “misogynist” to distance ourselves (the 
supposed, and hopefully genuinely, non-misogynists) in 
our particular social locations from the misogynistic actions 
and practices most of us do sometimes engage in, or are at 
least complicit in (wittingly or not). Here I speak as a white 
woman, and to other white women, in particular: we must 
not try to distinguish ourselves as one of the “good ones,” 
at the expense of actually making things better. 
MISOGYNY AS BANKRUPT MORALITY SYSTEM
Agnes Callard’s rich commentary on Down Girl raises a 
fascinating set of issues, primarily regarding the “give”­
“take” model of patriarchal social relations. She asks at 
one point whether this model is “unhelpfully hyperbolic.” 
I would respond, no: it is helpfully hyperbolic. Let me 
elaborate. 
The “give”-“take” model should be understood not as 
descriptive of gender relations in allegedly post-patriarchal 
contexts such as the US today. Rather, it is prescriptive—and 
objectionably so. As I envisage it, the “give”-“take” model 
embodies a false, pernicious, and thoroughly moralized 
ideal, in which women are deemed obligated to give
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feminine-coded goods (primarily in the form of seamless 
social, emotional, reproductive, and sexual, services) 
to designated (typically, dominant) men, in ways that 
also reflect racist, heteronormative, cis-sexist, and other 
politically objectionable, assumptions.5 Men, on the other 
hand, are tacitly deemed entitled to take analogous goods 
from women, in the form of social, emotional, sexual, and 
reproductive, labor.6 I also hypothesized at various points 
that social-cum-moral norms that deem him obligated to 
give masculine-coded goods to her (in the form of chivalry, 
protection, and so-called “breadwinning” labor), have been 
somewhat eroded in my milieu, especially since the global 
financial collapse. But that was intended to be a local 
observation, based on anecdotal evidence, rather than 
central to my argument. 
To me, a helpful crystallization of the above, pernicious 
(since grossly unfair) division of social-cum-moral labor 
is Shel Silverstein’s The Giving Tree (see Down Girl, 
conclusion, “The Giving She”). This still-popular children’s 
story, written in 1962, is often taken to be a beautiful tale 
about a tree who loved a boy, “very, very much, even more 
than she loved herself.” But I take it to be a cautionary one. 
The tree, referred to using the feminine pronoun, gives 
up everything she has for her beloved, son-like figure. He, 
“the boy,” enjoys playing in her branches and lying in the 
shade she offers. She gives him her apples so that he can 
go off to the city to make his fortune. She gives him her 
boughs so that he can build a house for his family, and 
ultimately a boat, in which to have adventures. At last, he 
returns, now a wizened man (or, I think better, man-child), 
to the amputated stump he has made of her. She says sorry 
one final time (making it a total of eleven times throughout 
the story—and he never says a word by way of “thank you”) 
for having nothing left to give him. He says that that is fine, 
since he wants only to rest: and he can rest comfortably on 
what remains of her body. He curls up on his she-stump to 
sleep. And that is where the story leaves them. 
There is a haunting line in the penultimate stanza of The 
Giving Tree: “And the tree was happy. But not really.” This 
fleeting acknowledgement never gets expanded upon. 
It would indeed be an exaggeration to say that many 
male-female relationships (intimate, parental, familial, 
or otherwise) resemble the narrative in The Giving 
Tree. (Although cf. the lack of progress on Arlie Russell 
Hochschild’s “second shift problem.”) But my point was 
that this pernicious ideal may nevertheless harm such 
social relations, in more or less subtle ways, by presenting 
a false set of obligations and entitlements. As I take pains 
to clarify in the book’s preface, many men who are privy 
to such entitlements will not take full advantage of them, 
partly for reasons of moral principle or conscience. And 
many women will not be amenable to norms of constant 
giving of the kind that eventually kill you. But there will be 
hazards in this direction. Or so I have argued. 
Callard asks what women get out of this arrangement. 
A first-pass answer on my account would be, freedom 
from the guilt, shame, resentment, blame, indignation, 
outrage, and the associated threats, policing, and myriad 
forms of punishment (including violence) that often attend 
violations of misogynistic law and order—whether from 
yourself (in the form of first-personal attitudes such as 
guilt and shame), a second party (in the form of second-
personal attitudes such as resentment and blame), or a 
third party (in the form of third-personal “vicarious reactive 
attitudes,” i.e., the indignation or outrage of others who 
are on his side, or channeling himpathy).7 For these will 
often be the predictable result, if you fail to give him all 
you are deemed to owe him, as a woman with respect to a 
dominant, designated male figure. 
A second word about himpathy is in order here. Callard 
offers an interesting thought experiment in her response 
to Down Girl, designed (I take it) to make it intelligible that 
men might fear and hate women because they are in some 
sense at her mercy with respect to her procreative labor, in 
the era in which contraception is at least nominally quite 
widely available. I would only point out that, when it comes 
to so-called unassisted reproduction, women are just as 
much at the mercy of men, who may choose to opt out of 
biological fatherhood, thanks partly to the advent of new 
technologies (e.g., a man may get a vasectomy). Yet, at 
least for my own part, I have never heard of a woman who 
develops a sweeping resentment of “men these days,” or 
rails against the availability of this elective procedure, or 
anything of the sort. The asymmetry in reaction, despite 
the basic symmetry in the structure of the social and 
technological situation, points to a systemic culture of 
assumed obligation on her part, and assumed entitlement 
on his part, when it comes to women’s procreative 
services. But there is no such obligation, on the one hand, 
or entitlement, on the other. This is a substantive normative 
claim. But I believe it is a true one. 
A final, related point: suppose, with Callard, that women’s 
procreative choices do represent an existential threat to 
men in her fairly abstract sense (one that depends on a 
controversial argument about both the importance of 
future generations existing to the value of one’s current 
projects, and which seems to place an extra emphasis on 
those future generations including one’s own biological 
offspring). Nevertheless, (some) men clearly and currently
represent an existential threat to (many) women: they want 
to, or do, annihilate us. Again, the asymmetry in terms of 
the subsequent social fallout is telling, and bears sober 
reflection in this context. 
ON FEMINIST INCOMPLETENESS 
Briana Toole’s insightful commentary on my book raises a 
variety of issues concerning boys and men, which Toole 
argues could productively be addressed by feminists for 
the sake of promoting justice and improving the social 
world in general. I agree with Toole completely that this 
is an important and legitimate goal that some feminists 
can and should pursue. However, my own methodology in 
writing Down Girl, and in my subsequent work to date, has 
been to focus somewhat relentlessly on the plight of girls 
and women. This is obviously an incomplete perspective. 
However, I also think it is a legitimate and useful one. 
Part of my impetus for writing Down Girl was a set of fears 
and related self-criticisms. Evidence suggests that many if 
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not most of us are heavily biased in favor of boys and young 
men in the classroom, inter alia, notwithstanding explicitly 
egalitarian beliefs (see Down Girl, conclusion). So, when 
I began teaching as a professor, in 2013, I was acutely 
aware that I would tend to look to boys and young men for 
answers, and call on them more often, if I was anything like 
the average person. And I don’t consider myself above the 
moral average, except by dint of strenuous moral effort. 
I could also observe some such patterns of biased moral 
attention on my own part directly. For example, despite 
my longstanding feminist views about the ills of sexual 
assault and harassment, I noticed myself feeling sorry for a 
male perpetrator over his female victims (or likely victims) 
far too often. This is one reason why I often call myself a 
recovering himpath. 
With that in mind, after the Isla Vista killings, and the 
subsequent himpathetic and victim-erasing reactions in the 
media, I chose to restrict my intellectual focus to girls and 
women facing misogyny, in order to see what happened. 
What happened was Down Girl. And instead of striving for 
completeness, I chose to fully embrace the partiality of 
my own concerns and perspective. For, my sense is that, 
if some of us don’t focus more or less exclusively on girls 
and women, then their distinctive concerns will tend to 
get lost (or written off) all too quickly, all too often. For 
himpathy will tend to shift us back to a “What about the 
men?” mindset. 
That being said, I am perfectly friendly to other theorists, 
Toole and Digby included, looking at various ways patriarchy 
hurts men. (Although I prefer to say, with bell hooks, that 
patriarchy typically harms men without thereby oppressing 
them qua men—though of course many men are oppressed 
along other axes of their social positions, e.g., in view of 
the workings of white supremacy, ableism, homophobia, 
transphobia, classism, and ageism, for example). Partial 
perspectives require complementary lines of inquiry. 
One slight caveat is that I think we should be careful of 
broad generalizations that boys and men are policed, lest 
we run afoul of empirical evidence that is pertinent to 
Toole’s discussion. For example, a recent meta-analysis 
showed very few differences between boys and girls on 
average, when it comes to displaying emotions.8 The main 
statistical difference that emerged had to do with the 
type of negative emotions that were exhibited, quite late 
in maturation: adolescent boys expressed more anger, 
whereas adolescent girls expressed more contempt. 
These descriptive findings admittedly leave room for 
the possibility that there is a social norm that polices the 
emotions of boys and men, tacitly disallowing them from 
doing so. But it must not be a very potent social norm: for 
boys do cry, seemingly, roughly as much as girls. Yet the 
idea that we have deeply pernicious double standards 
that discourage male versus female displays of emotions 
is entrenched and persistent. The evidence I’ve just cited 
casts doubt on its veracity. 
No doubt (based on anecdotal evidence) boys and men 
do sometimes face negative social consequences for 
displaying their emotions. But we should not forget that 
so do girls and women, albeit in potentially different ways, 
or for somewhat different reasons. Moreover, the idea that 
boys and men face disproportionate barriers to emotional 
openness could, in theory, be at least partly a product of 
himpathy. 
Similarly with the idea that boys and men are more stoic, 
when it comes to pain. This idea could—again, in theory— 
be partly or primarily a product of our tendency to take 
his pain more seriously than hers, all else being equal. 
(I discuss this tendency in detail in my book in progress, 
Entitled.) The result would be that we assume that, if he 
does manifest pain behavior, he must be in much more 
serious pain than we would tend to ascribe to a female 
counterpart (holding fixed race, class, and age, along with 
other intersecting social factors). I do not know if these 
hypotheses hold true. But they are well worth considering— 
lest we overestimate the specifically patriarchal policing 
forces to which boys and men are supposedly subject, 
thanks partly to himpathy’s operation. 
SPEAKING OF ATTITUDES 
In her astute commentary, Ishani Maitra rightly points out 
that my analysis of misogyny ends up being quite broad— 
at least in the sense that it refers to a wide and superficially 
disparate set of phenomena.9 At the same time, Maitra 
notes, my account aims to retain the hostile, nasty flavor 
of misogyny which I believe reflects a feature of current 
usage patterns (whether feminist or not). 
This makes for a delicate balancing act on my account: 
how to do justice to the supposedly hostile quality of 
misogyny, as well as the negative reactive attitudes that it 
paradigmatically (though not necessarily) involves, without 
falling into an excessively psychologistic and individualistic 
account. Let me take these two challenges in order. 
In response to the natural worry that my account is liable 
to become excessively psychologistic in its emphasis on 
negative reactive attitudes, I would point to the social 
nature of the attitudes I have in mind. In Chapter 2, I argue 
that we can construe reactive attitudes to focus more on 
the (socially) reactive part and less on the attitude. (Cf. the 
useful question, “What’s with the attitude?”) Instead of 
asking what feelings lurk deep down in an individual’s heart, 
say, we ask what their actions manifest to a reasonable 
woman faced with their behavior. 
This response to the worry about reintroducing psychologism 
paves the way for a response to the worry that my account 
is liable to again become too individualistic. For when it 
comes to the hostile and punitive reactions women face, I 
hold that these can be manifested by institutions and social 
practices, as well as individual agents. My main example of 
this in Down Girl is the anti-abortion practices and policies of 
the GOP currently. But I share Maitra’s criticism of my book 
that it would have been good to discuss more shaming, 
guilting, and punitive social practices which are faced by 
large swathes of girls and women who are perceived as, or 
representative of, gendered norm-violators.10 
Maitra also raises an important criticism of my critique of 
humanism: that we might understand dehumanization in 
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a more ameliorative, and rather less literal-minded, vein. 
I completely agree with Maitra that we could go in this 
direction. But, as with all ameliorative projects, we should 
ask: Cui bono? 
A confessional note: although my chapter on humanism, 
“Humanizing Hatred,” was the best I could do at the time, 
I believe in retrospect that I rather missed the mark in it. 
The discussion contains a fair amount of false precision, 
inasmuch as I spend a great deal of time clarifying my 
stalking horse, in the form of a set of central commitments 
which I attributed to humanists.11 This is a classic 
philosopher’s error. What I believe, and now think I should 
have just come out and said, is that there is a rhetoric 
and associated ideology of humanism which is deeply 
politically problematic. It serves to bolster exonerating 
narratives, by suggesting that racism as well as misogyny 
can be attributed to a kind of cognitive, quasi-visual error. 
If they only saw us as human beings, somehow, they could 
not fail to treat us properly. Or, at the very least, they would 
be highly unlikely to do so. I would hereby like to (politely) 
call bullshit on this hopeful thought: the idea that a kind of 
experiential flash, akin to gaining or regaining sight, would 
go a long way to solve the problem of misogyny, inter alia. 
And the visual metaphor here is telling, I think: and not 
in a good way. It analogizes bigotry to blindness. And it 
assumes blindness is inevitably a problem—which it need 
not be, given adequate material, social, and institutional 
resources. 
ON DEHUMANIZATION: A DISTINCTION
With that in mind, I find much to admire and little to 
disagree with in Audrey Yap’s subtle commentary on 
Down Girl, which focuses in the main on my chapter on 
humanism. Yap raises the possibility that we can remain 
neutral or even be skeptical about the role rehumanization
plays in preventing atrocities,12 while recognizing the 
important role of dehumanization in the etiology of some 
such. Yap rightly points out that the mass rape of girls and 
women is sometimes intended primarily as an attack on the 
men who are perceived as “owning” the girls and women 
who are, of course, its primarily victims. However, I would 
just point out an ambiguity in understanding the notion of 
dehumanization as it pertains to this possibility. 
We might understand dehumanization descriptively, i.e., 
as encompassing psychological states and/or cultural 
products that represent certain classes of persons as sub­
human creatures, non-human animals, inanimate objects, 
or (perhaps) super-natural beings. Alternatively, we might 
understand dehumanization normatively, i.e., as pertaining 
to individual beliefs, value judgments, and broader cultural 
ideologies which assert or imply that certain classes of 
persons ought to be treated as sub-human creatures, non­
human animals, inanimate objects, or (again, perhaps) 
super-natural beings. 
You might think that the latter would require the former as 
backing or justification. But part of my point in Down Girl is 
that this is fundamentally incorrect, and paints bigotry with 
too broad, as well as rather too polite, a brush. 
However, if dehumanization is understood normatively in 
the above sense, then I agree that misogyny does have 
certain dehumanizing components on occasion (though I 
would emphasize that this far from exhausts its nature). In 
particular, girls and women are often treated as designated 
men’s property, in the normative sense that he is (falsely 
and perniciously) tacitly deemed to be entitled to her 
sexual, emotional, reproductive, and material labor. (It is for 
this reason that attempting to attack such a man can take 
the form of “plundering” or “sullying” a woman deemed 
to be his, e.g., by raping her.) On the flipside, women are 
tacitly deemed to be obligated to give him these goods 
and services. It is this distinctively moralistic underpinning 
to which I trace a good deal (though not necessarily all) of 
misogyny. It is morally rotten. It may be descriptively hollow, 
inasmuch as it is founded on bad, tendentious science 
and the associated sexist ideology that depicts women as 
loving, giving human beings, who are “naturally” oriented 
to serving designated male figures (and his children). Or 
it may be descriptively empty, and all the more desperate 
and dangerous because of that.13 
Either way, I think it is apt to say that misogyny often 
involves girls and women being treated as human, all too 
human, givers—rather than human beings. As I wrote in 
Down Girl, she is not allowed to be in the same way as he 
is. I would now add: she is not allowed to be in pain. She 
is not allowed to move through the world freely—or be still 
within it, for that matter—with others of her choosing, or 
alone. She is liable to be hassled, heckled, blocked, wrong-
footed, and taken down, at practically every turn. Her 
humanity is not typically in dispute, descriptively speaking. 
But that does not mean it will be respected—particularly if 
she veers from the narrow path laid out for her, or discovers 
that it demands she be in two places at once. It often will. 
ON MISOGYNY AND AUTISM
I am particularly grateful to have the benefit of Elle 
Benjamin’s valuable perspective here, since the intersection 
of misogyny with ableism in general and anti-autism bias in 
particular is manifestly lacking in my book. (By design, since 
I don’t take myself to have an epistemically appropriate 
standpoint from which to speak here.) I also find her account 
of the socially clueless sense of entitlement evinced by 
Elliot Rodger, in contrast to the “Golden Boy” Brock Turner, 
compelling (and non-himpathetic, for the record). I also 
find much to agree with in her general remarks on autism 
in relation to misogyny—especially Benjamin’s important 
observation that neuroatypicality in girls and women has 
long gone comparatively underdiagnosed, and still tends 
to attract less by way of moral attention and material 
resources. 
However, I do worry somewhat about ascribing 
neuroatypicality to Rodger. Reports of his having been 
diagnosed with any kind of autism are, to the best of my 
knowledge, conflicting. It is true that a CNN story reported a 
family friend’s attribution of an autism-spectrum condition 
to Rodger; but subsequent reports said that the family 
friend had been mistaken. According to a comprehensive 
police report about the Isla Vista shootings, Rodger was 
diagnosed with “Pervasive Development Disorder–Not 
Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS)” in 2007 (a diagnosis 
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removed from the DSM-5). Subsequent testing in early 
adulthood put him below the cut-off for autism or autism-
spectrum conditions.14 Indeed, despite Rodger’s having had 
fairly extensive mental health treatment, there is a paucity 
of clinical labels that were confidently and consistently 
applied to him. 
Of course, philosophers deal in hypotheticals all the 
time, and so the easy thing for me to say here is that, if 
Rodger was in fact neuroatypical, then all of Benjamin’s 
suggestions and conclusions stand. I would only add one, 
hopefully friendly, addendum. Benjamin writes: 
Because in true autistic fashion, when Rodger’s 
reality did not match his expectations, he had 
a massive meltdown. His meltdown was the Isla 
Vista Killings. 
There is some risk that this line could be misinterpreted to 
imply (falsely, I take it) that autistic people are more likely to 
commit mass killings or other acts of violence, as opposed 
to having non-violent “meltdowns,” due to overstimulation, 
sensory overload, etc., of the kind Benjamin theorizes in 
her commentary. 
Benjamin goes on to conclude: 
Rodger never got the chance to learn that the 
patriarchy is a lie; a story we tell young girls and 
boys to cajole them into fitting neatly into our 
social boxes. . . . [S]ociety is getting better for 
autistic people as we gradually detach from the 
narrow confinements of patriarchal gender roles 
and expectations, and as alternative lifestyles 
become more acceptable. My hope is that by 
dismantling the social constructions that feel so 
alien to autistic people, we can more easily direct 
them to communities with more transparent and 
less contrived performative standards, so that all of 
us may avoid the fate that became of Elliot Rodger. 
I think it may be worth adding here that girls and women 
(autistic or no) do not, to the best of my knowledge, run 
any significant risk of becoming an Elliot Rodger: that 
is, a mass killer, animated by a false sense of aggrieved 
entitlement, and toxic masculine delusions reflective of 
patriarchal social structures. These structures are historical 
relics, which nonetheless cast a long moral shadow. Bring 
on the dismantling. 
NOTES 
1.	 One small point of potential disagreement with Norlock: 
although I am prepared to accept that female Trump supporters 
weren’t explicitly or simply pressured by their Trump-voting 
husbands into voting for him, I do propose a subtler dependence 
mechanism (via himpathy, inter alia) in Down Girl’s final chapter, 
drawing on work by Kimberlé W. Crenshaw and Sumi Cho on 
the aftermath of the 2016 election. See Down Girl: The Logic of 
Misogyny (Oxford University Press: New York, 2018), 265–66. 
2.	 So, “on this view, individual agents count as misogynists if and 
only if their misogynistic attitudes and/or actions are significantly 
(a) more extreme, and (b) more consistent than most other 
people in the relevant comparison class (e.g., other people of 
the same gender, and perhaps race, class, age, etc., in similar 
social environments).” Down Girl, 66. 
3.	 A brief précis: “On [the] “naïve conception,” as I call it, misogyny 
is primarily a property of individual misogynists who are prone to 
hate women qua women, that is, because of their gender, either 
universally or at least very generally. On this view, agents may 
also be required to harbor this hatred in their hearts as a matter 
of “deep” or ultimate psychological explanation if they are to 
count as bona fide misogynists. Misogyny is as misogynists are, 
then. And misogynists are agents who fit a certain psychological 
profile.” Whereas, “according to the positive proposal about 
misogyny I go on to develop . . . we should instead understand 
misogyny as primarily a property of social environments in which 
women are liable to encounter hostility due to the enforcement 
and policing of patriarchal norms and expectations—often, 
though not exclusively, insofar as they violate patriarchal law 
and order. Misogyny hence functions to enforce and police 
women’s subordination and to uphold male dominance, against 
the backdrop of other intersecting systems of oppression and 
vulnerability, dominance and disadvantage, as well as disparate 
material resources, enabling and constraining social structures, 
institutions, bureaucratic mechanisms, and so on.” Down Girl, 18­
19. I go on to offer precise definitions in Chapter 2. 
4.	 To anticipate one of the epistemological worries for my account 
which Maitra brings up, I don’t believe that my account will counsel 
us to focus unduly on white women as the target and victims of 
misogyny. All cases need intersectional analyses, including in 
taking into account the way white women are the beneficiaries 
of various kinds of unjust privilege, and their supposed plight 
used as the basis for opportunistic racism against Black men, 
for example. Moreover, in analyzing misogynoir, I advocate 
comparing the plight of Black women to their Black male 
counterparts, which reveals what I call the “hostile indifference” 
of white liberals, to, e.g., the systemic eviction of Black women, 
as compared with a moderately raised consciousness about mass 
incarceration (conceived of as a problem for Black men rather 
than women—even though the latter are in fact incarcerated at 
grossly disproportionate rates, as compared with white female 
counterparts). See Down Girl, 64–66, as well as “Misogynoir in 
Action: The Case of Daniel Holtzclaw,” 209–19, inter alia. 
5.	 I write in Chapter Four, “Taking His (Out”), when I turn from 
the abstract constitutive logic to the substantive workings of 
misogyny: “[I]f patriarchy is anything here and now, that is, in 
cultures such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia, I believe it consists largely (though by no means 
exclusively) in this uneven, gendered economy of giving and 
taking moral-cum-social goods and services. Consider then 
that the flipside of an entitlement is, in general, an obligation: 
something he’s owed by someone. So, if a man does indeed 
have this illicit sense of entitlement vis-à-vis women, he will be 
prone to hold women to false or spurious obligations. And he 
may also be prone to regard a woman’s asking for the sorts of 
goods she’s supposed to provide him with as an outrage, or a 
disgrace. This would be analogous to the waitress (from chapter 
1) asking for service from her customer, after having failed to 
take his order. Not only is it a role reversal, but it’s likely to 
prompt a “who does she think she is?” kind of sentiment: at first 
resentful, then scandalized, if she doesn’t respond to feedback 
by looking duly chastened and “lifting her game,” so to speak. 
There’s something especially vexing about someone who is 
shameless not only in shirking their duties, but who appears 
blithe and unapologetic when they effectively turn the tables. 
They’re not only failing to do their job; they’re demanding that 
others return the non-favor—or asking them to do their job for 
them. They’re feckless, careless, irresponsible, and so on.” Down 
Girl, 107. 
6.	 Callard draws a distinction between a political and economic 
model of misogyny that I believe ends up being ill-drawn on 
my construal, since I hold that many of the goods and services 
women are held to be obligated to supply draw irrevocably on 
her agency. See Down Girl, chapter 4, “Taking His (Out).” 
7.	 I draw here on P. F. Strawson’s famous discussion of the 
reactive attitudes ([1962] 2008), including first-personal and 
third-personal, as well as second-personal ones. “Freedom and 
Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–25. 
8.	 Tara M. Chaplin and Amelia Aldao, “Gender Differences in 
Emotion Expression in Children: A Meta-Analytic Review,” 
Psychological Bulletin: 139, no. 4 (July 2013): 735–65. They write, 
in opening: “In western popular culture, it is widely held that 
there are gender differences in children’s emotion expressions. 
Sayings such as “boys don’t cry” and “sugar and spice and 
SPRING 2019 | VOLUME 18  | NUMBER 2 	 PAGE 29 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
everything nice—that’s what little girls are made of” reflect 
cultural beliefs and expectations that girls show cheeriness or 
sadness whereas boys are strong and calm, showing anger if 
necessary. These beliefs are reflected in studies that ask adults 
and children about their expectations about the emotional 
expressiveness of females and males and to some extent in 
studies that ask individuals about themselves. Observations 
of emotional expression are less commonly conducted; and 
when they are, the observed emotions do not always show such 
consistent gender differences, raising the question of the nature 
and extent of gender differences in emotion expression.” 
9.	 Maitra notes my example of gender-biased teaching evaluations 
in the sections “Comparative Gender Biases,” and “Faking It,” 
Chapter 8, Down Girl, 250–56 and 273–78 (respectively). I will 
take the opportunity here to briefly clarify that only some forms 
of such bias would count as misogyny on my account: primarily 
the ones that reflect a differentially or disproportionately hostile 
attitude toward female professors who are felt to be violating 
feminine-coded norms of providing social and emotional labor, 
“personal” attention to each individual student, etc. 
10. In discussion at the author-meets-critics session on Down Girl
at the Eastern APA in January 2019, Maureen Eckert offered 
another excellent and complementary example of institutional 
misogyny: homes for unwed mothers, which both channeled and 
perpetuated the shame and stigma of such pregnancies. 
11.	 See the section of Chapter 5, “Clarifying Humanism,” in Down 
Girl, 141–46. 
12. This is my quick gloss of what Yap calls the “positive humanist 
proposal,” according to which we should focus primarily on 
[“making] others’ humanity more visible in the face of their 
marginalization or vulnerability,” as opposed to fighting bigotry 
and prejudice in other (and, I would add, many and various— 
including structural) ways. 
13.	 See Chapter 3, on the relationship between sexism and misogyny, 
and what happens when misogyny and sexism part company. 
14. “The suspect’s mental health records were obtained via Federal 
Grand Jury subpoenas served by the FBI. Materials were also 
seized pursuant to a search warrant, authorized by Santa Barbara 
Superior Court Judge Jean Dandona, served at [his mother] 
Chin Rodger’s residence. It should be noted that the material is 
sometimes conflicting. On several occasions, the suspect was 
mentioned as having been diagnosed with Asperger’s. However, 
no formal diagnosis was found amongst the material reviewed 
by detectives.” Isla Vista Investigative Summary Report by Santa 
Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, 155. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Rape and Resistance 
Linda Martín Alcoff (New York: Polity 2018). 264 pp. $69.95. 
ISBN: 978-0-745-69191-6. 
Reviewed by Charlotte Witt 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, CHARLOTTE.WITT@UNH.EDU 
Rape and Resistance is a very timely and important book. It 
enters a public conversation about sexual assault centered 
on the “Me Too” movement, recent charges of racism and 
colonialism in the media, treatment of figures like author 
Junot Díaz (both a victim of sexual assault and a perpetrator 
of sexual harassment), and a reassessment of the harms 
of rape and sexual assault in the context of an emerging 
vision of sexual agency. Consequently, this is a book with 
much to offer readers; it is rich with themes and ideas that 
extend far beyond the narrow confines of the traditional 
topics of consent, rape, and harm. In addition, Alcoff’s 
discussion is methodologically complex, using first-person 
accounts (including her own), social scientific information, 
literary accounts, and philosophical reflection to develop 
her narrative. Throughout the volume, Alcoff reflects on 
the epistemological issues raised by her methodology, 
especially the problem of testimonial injustice that faces 
survivors’ speech. In what follows, I will touch upon several 
themes in the book that I found most interesting and 
thought-provoking without pretending to do justice to the 
volume as a whole. 
In the Introduction, titled “Rape after Foucault,” Alcoff sets 
the goal of “complexifying” our understanding of rape and 
sexual assault to include all the myriad ways in which there 
can be “a violation of sexual agency, of subjectivity, of our 
will” (12). That is the fundamental harm of sexual violation. 
Alcoff turns to Foucault at several points as a resource for 
framing her discussion of these broad conceptual issues 
and, in doing so, also demonstrates the inadequacy of 
analyses that turn on the legalistic notion of consent. 
The notion of consent is too impoverished to be helpful 
in addressing the full range of issues on the table, and, 
in addition, it presupposes a heteronormative sexual (and 
sexist) ideology. In contrast, Foucault’s complex views on 
sexual agency provide a richer resource to capture a view of 
sexual agency that acknowledges the workings of relations 
of power without entirely abandoning the possibility of 
change and creativity. Alcoff notes that “[t]echnologies 
of the self are techniques not of normalization but of 
expansive self-making” (88). For Alcoff, Foucault’s notion 
of sexual self-fashioning is useful in envisioning what 
genuine sexual agency and subjectivity might look like. 
Although Alcoff finds potential for thinking about sexual 
agency in Foucault’s aesthetic idea of cultivating an art of 
the sexual self, she also makes the case for an investigation 
of sexual norms that “remains attentive to the feedback 
loops of discourse and the multiple ways in which it might 
be aligned with power . . .” (108). In other words, and 
despite appearances to the contrary, Alcoff argues that the 
Foucauldian anti-naturalist and anti-normative perspective 
on sexual practices can—in fact—be harnessed in the 
service of a normative critique of rape and sexual violation. 
I have radically compressed Alcoff’s nuanced interpretation 
of Foucault here in order to highlight a possible tension in 
her pairing the notion of aesthetic self-fashioning with the 
possibility of a normative critique of the sexual pleasures 
that might be involved in that liberatory self-creation. 
A second important theme is Alcoff’s global focus.
Rape and Resistance opens by noting a growing public 
consciousness about the issue of rape and sexual violence 
internationally, especially concerning the phenomenon of 
rape as an instrument of war in the former Yugoslavia and 
many other locales undergoing conflict. Although Alcoff’s 
book is a virtual compendium of important philosophers and 
theories, it is striking that she does not mention Catherine 
MacKinnon’s important—though controversial—theoretical 
and legal work in bringing the topic of wartime rape as a 
form of genocide and as an instrument of war in the Balkans 
to the world’s attention. Alcoff cautions that thinking about 
rape from an international perspective is both required and 
an invitation to a false and too easy universalism that does 
not recognize local conditions, local power structures, 
and local meanings. How is it possible to both respect the 
complexity of power and meaning surrounding sexuality 
and sexual practices in a particular culture while at the 
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same time engaging in normative critique? In a chapter 
titled “Decolonizing Meanings,” Alcoff addresses these 
complex challenges of interpretation with a fascinating 
comparative discussion of the respective roles (and 
limitations) of the concepts of honor and consent in the 
discursive construction of sexual crimes. The role of honor 
and the idea of honor crimes points to the centrality of the 
family and the community in some social contexts, whereas 
the notion of consent focuses instead on the individual in 
a legal context. Moreover, these concepts are threads in 
a web of meaning and power; they can only be properly 
understood in their concrete social contexts. Given the 
profound discursive differences anchored by the notion of 
honor or of consent, is there anything universal or common 
to be said about rape and sexual assault? Alcoff responds 
cautiously, yet affirmatively: “Different concepts are useful 
in different societies for making sense of violence, as well 
as justifying crimes, mitigating sentences and blaming 
victims. But these differences at the discursive level coexist 
with some apparent universals, such as the existence of 
extra-individual effects and the effects of violence on the 
subjectivity of the individual” (167). Her detailed discussion 
of the challenges of truly wrestling with political, cultural, 
and semantic differences around rape and sexual assault 
is impressive. 
Finally, the theme of intersectionality runs through Rape 
and Resistance as a core epistemic principle and policy 
guideline. It links Alcoff’s insistence on a global focus that 
avoids simplistic universality to her rejection of binaries of 
east and west, victim and perpetrator, woman and man. She 
reminds us of the ways in which racialized identities make a 
difference because of the way in which the charge of sexual 
assault was used as a weapon against black men on behalf 
of white women and white supremacy. This deplorable 
history is reiterated today in the racist use of sexual assault 
hysteria surrounding immigrant and migrant populations in 
Europe and the US. There are many relevant histories of 
rape and sexual assault once we adopt an intersectional 
perspective. In the book’s closing section, “A Question of 
Love,” Alcoff refers to the Dominican-American writer Junot 
Díaz whose novels center the effects of colonial domination 
on sexual relations that feature pervasive sexual assault 
and sexism, and the idea that the damage flows outward 
in many directions including generationally. In an uncanny 
recapitulation of many of the themes of Alcoff’s book, Díaz 
stands as both a victim and perpetrator, both a product 
of colonialism and its ills, and a creator of new lives and 
possibilities. 
Still, there is a lingering question of responsibility that 
underlies the necessary sophistication and complexity of an 
intersectional analysis of human behavior. And, in the same 
vein, we might wonder about the possibility of apology, 
repentance, and appropriate forgiveness. In a recent New 
York Times column on an open letter she signed deploring 
the media treatment of Díaz, Alcoff puts the questions like 
this: 
Can we hold people to account at the same time as 
we acknowledge their own victimization? Can we 
remain aware of multiple forms of oppression in 
our analysis? Can we demand more of a structural 
and systemic analysis without reducing individual 
responsibility? Can we respect the rage we are 
hearing as well as plan for a different future? I 
believe we must.1 
Rape and Responsibility makes a strong case for a global, 
intersectional approach to the issues of rape and sexual 
assault. The argument is detailed, subtle, and persuasive. 
In addition, the book develops the concept of sexual self-
fashioning as a valuable form of sexual agency, and this 
is an attractive expansion beyond the limits of sexual 
consent. But there remains a tension between the concept 
of a free and creative sexual agency and the idea that there 
are important social norms that restrain that agency and 
ought to do so. There is more work to be done. 
NOTES 
1.	 Open Letter Against Media Treatment of Junot Díaz, The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, May 14, 2018. Available at https:// 
www.chronicle.com/blogs/letters/open-letter-against-media­
treatment-of-junot-diaz/. 
Blackwell’s A Companion to Simone de 
Beauvoir 
Edited by Laura Hengehold and Nancy Bauer. Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2017. 552 pages. $195. ISBN: 978-1-118­
79602-3. 
Reviewed by Céline Leboeuf 
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
In its earliest phases, notably in the 1990s, studies of 
Simone de Beauvoir focused on making the case that she 
was a philosopher in her own right and that her theoretical 
works were not derivative of Jean-Paul Sartre’s. If anything, 
Laura Hengehold and Nancy Bauer’s (eds.) A Companion 
to Simone de Beauvoir firmly rests this case. The thorough 
engagement with and critiques of Beauvoir’s philosophy in 
this collection establish her on the same footing as thinkers 
more readily recognized as part of the canon, including, 
but not limited, to Sartre. 
At 552 pages in length, the Companion is not only a 
monumental work and the longest collection published on 
Beauvoir to date, but it is also the first in Blackwell’s series 
of companions to be dedicated to a woman philosopher. 
It is composed of forty essays and divided into four parts: 
“Re-reading The Second Sex,” “Beauvoir’s Intellectual 
Engagements,” “Beyond The Second Sex,” and “Beauvoir 
and Contemporary Feminism.” 
“Re-reading The Second Sex” considers the reception 
of Beauvoir and central themes in the work. The themes 
covered—the body (Ruth Groenhout and Emily Anne Parker), 
childhood and narcissism (Emily Zakin), sexuality (Mary Beth 
Mader), motherhood (Alison Stone, Nancy Bauer, and Sara 
Cohen Shabot), love (Tove Pettersen), and the woman as 
Other (Tanella Boni)—are likely to be familiar to Anglophone 
readers of The Second Sex. By contrast, discussions of 
Beauvoir’s intellectual context and reception might be less 
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well known and are of particular interest. For instance, 
Sandra Reineke’s “The Intellectual and Social Context of 
The Second Sex” allows us to understand the socio-cultural 
background to Beauvoir’s masterwork. Complementing 
this essay is Ingrid Galster’s “‘The limits of the Abject.’ The 
Reception of Le Deuxième Sexe in 1949,” which plunges us 
into the scandal caused by the publication of The Second 
Sex as well as the violent critiques—both from the Right and 
the Left—of her work. Three essays orient us to more recent 
discussions of Beauvoir. First, Stella Sanford’s “Beauvoir’s 
Transdiciplinarity: From Philosophy to Gender Theory” 
examines the ways in which Beauvoir launched the field of 
feminist philosophy and neighboring academic disciplines. 
Second, Kathryn Gines’s “Simone de Beauvoir and the Race/ 
Gender Analogy in The Second Sex Revisited” revisits and 
critiques the erasure of Black women’s experiences in The 
Second Sex, but brings newer considerations to the table, 
by highlighting the limits to the resources that Beauvoir 
had to understand race and by analyzing Black feminist 
readings of Beauvoir. Third, Emily Grosholz’s “Two English 
Translations of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex” 
begins by appraising the original translation of The Second 
Sex by H. M. Parshley from 1953, which has been subjected 
to attacks by Beauvoir scholars for the cuts it makes and for 
the obscuration of key philosophical concepts in the text, 
such as Mitsein and the distinction between the for-itself 
and the in-itself. Grosholz then offers a fair assessment 
of the new translation by Constance Borde and Sheila 
Mallovany-Chevallier, first published in 2009, defending it 
against certain criticisms voiced by Beauvoir scholars. 
“Beauvoir’s Intellectual Engagements” develops six 
comparative essays: two on Beauvoir and Hegel (Kimberly 
Hutchings and Zeynep Direk), two on Beauvoir and Merleau-
Ponty (Jennifer McWeeny and William Wilkerson), one on 
Marxism (Sonia Kruks), one on Structuralism (Eva Bahovec), 
and one on the debate over the influence between Beauvoir 
and Sartre (Christine Daigle). The discussions of Beauvoir’s 
debt to Marxism and her relation to Structuralism are 
especially interesting, because they lend a fresh perspective 
on her philosophical heritage, examinations of which have 
typically dealt with her appropriation of Hegel’s master-
slave dialectic in The Second Sex, the question of influence 
between her and Sartre, and the phenomenological roots 
of her thinking via Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. 
“Beyond The Second Sex” takes the reader through 
Beauvoir’s ethical and political philosophy (Kristana Arp, 
Laura Hengehold, Debra Bergoffen, Patricia Hill Collins), 
her fiction (Meryl Altman, Anne van Leeuwen, Shannon 
Mussett, Sally Scholz), her memoirs (Margaret Simons ad 
Ursula Tidd), her philosophy of history (Michel Kail), her 
travel writings (William McBride), and her less well-known 
tome Old Age (Penelope Deutscher). Several of the essays 
in this section tread unfamiliar territory by taking readers 
through relatively underexplored theoretical essays by 
Beauvoir, such as “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” “An Eye for an 
Eye,” and Old Age. Of special note, though, is William 
McBride’s “The Postwar World According to Beauvoir,” 
which contrasts America Day by Day, Beauvoir’s narrative of 
her first trip to the United States in 1947 and the critiques 
of American culture spurred by this voyage, and The Long 
March, a rarely read work by Beauvoir on China inspired 
by her visit to the country in 1955. McBride aims not only 
to reconstruct the perspective a French intellectual would 
have had on today’s rival nations in the 1950s, but also to 
trace the differences between the American and English 
translations of America Day by Day, revealing how parts of 
her criticisms of racism in the United States were concealed 
from American audiences. 
“Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism” caps the 
volume with contributions on race (Shannon Sullivan), 
transmasculine embodiment (A. Alexander Antonopoulos), 
Beauvoir’s multiple legacies to French feminism (Karen 
Vintges and Diane Perpich), as well as the challenges and 
innovations involved in translating her iconic sentence from 
The Second Sex, “One is not born, but rather becomes, 
a woman” (Kyoo Lee). This part orchestrates novel 
conversations between Beauvoir’s feminism and recent 
developments in the field. However, it is worth signaling 
that this part, comprised of five essays, is unfortunately the 
shortest of the volume: “Re-reading The Second Sex” and 
“Beyond The Second Sex” each contain fourteen essays, 
while “Beauvoir’s Intellectual Engagements” includes seven 
essays. Moreover, I was concerned about the relatively 
narrow scope of the essays on Beauvoir and contemporary 
feminism. For instance, Karen Vintges’s “Misunderstanding 
in Paris” tackles the appropriation of Beauvoir’s feminism 
by French feminists critical of Muslim practices of veiling, 
while Diane Perpich’s “Beauvoir’s Legacy to the Quartiers: 
The Changing Face of French Feminism” evaluates 
Beauvoir’s relevance to feminist activists in France’s more 
disadvantaged and primarily immigrant neighborhoods. In 
light of these observations, I wished that a more general 
essay on transnational critiques of Beauvoir would have 
found a home in this part of the volume. On a related 
note, I question the motivation for a section on Beauvoir 
and contemporary feminism as opposed to Beauvoir’s 
legacy for feminism in general, given the importance of 
Beauvoir for feminists of many stripes over the years since 
the publication of The Second Sex. For instance, I think of 
appropriations of Beauvoir by phenomenologically oriented 
feminists, such as Iris Marion Young and Sandra Bartky, and 
engagements by such critics as Judith Butler. Although 
these dialogues may be better known than those studied in 
the Companion, I wonder whether a synthetic essay on the 
history of Beauvoir’s contributions to American feminism 
should have figured in this part. 
More generally, I was perplexed by certain aspects of the 
composition of the collection. While none of the essays 
repeat themselves in terms of content, there are three 
chapters on motherhood, two on the connections between 
Hegel and Beauvoir, and two on those between Merleau-
Ponty and Beauvoir. By contrast, as I just mentioned, 
“Beauvoir and Contemporary Feminism” only contains 
five essays. I believe that the book would have been 
more forward-looking had the balance tilted more in the 
direction of contemporary engagements. Another curious 
lacuna is the lack of a chapter on Beauvoir’s conception of 
existentialism. Although comparisons between Sartre’s and 
Beauvoir’s versions of existentialism abound, it is regretful 
that there was no chapter that squarely addressed what 
existentialism meant for Beauvoir. 
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Despite these reservations about the composition of the 
collection, the Companion has much to offer to the field of 
feminist philosophy. The intersection of gender and race 
is an important theme in the volume, one present in the 
aforementioned essay by Kathryn Gines as well as in those 
by Tanella Boni (“Why is Woman the Other?”), Patricia Hill 
Collins (“Simone de Beauvoir, Women’s Oppression and 
Existential Freedom”), and Shannon Sullivan (“Race After 
Beauvoir”). Given the importance of intersectionality to 
feminist theory, these essays were fruitful in analyzing the 
shortcomings of Beauvoir’s perspectives on women of color 
as well as the potential for extending her methodology to 
intersectional feminisms. This last point is, in my eyes, a 
particularly promising line to explore, since Beauvoir’s 
phenomenological approach to the socially situated body 
is, as Sullivan points out, relevant to any discussion of bodily 
experience—whether from the perspective of the critical 
philosophy of race, disability studies, or queer theory, to 
name a few areas. Besides these chapters, Deutscher’s 
“Afterlives: Beauvoir’s Old Age and the Intersections of 
The Second Sex” also investigates intersectional moments 
in Beauvoir’s writings, but with a special focus on aging. 
On the whole, this intersectional slant is a very welcome 
running thread in the Companion, since many earlier 
collections on Beauvoir have deployed a decidedly less 
intersectional approach. 
Discussions of Beauvoir’s philosophical fiction also prolong 
our understanding of her legacy to feminism. In particular, 
Shannon Mussett’s “The Failure of Female Identity in 
Beauvoir’s Fiction” probes the difficulties women face in 
the formation of identity in patriarchal cultures, such as the 
temptation to overidentify with one’s romantic partners or 
with the social roles of wife or mother, through the lens of 
Beauvoir’s fictional works She Came to Stay, All Men Are 
Mortal, and “The Woman Destroyed.” Even if we have seen 
changes in the ways in which many women relate to these 
identities and roles since Beauvoir’s writing, this chapter 
showcases the continued relevance of her work. 
Readers of feminist philosophy who are not acquainted 
with Beauvoir will find the contributions in the Companion 
accessible avenues to pursue their own interests in 
conversation with Beauvoir. Those who are interested in 
themes such as the body, motherhood, or love will have 
much to explore. Ruth Groenhout and Emily Anne Parker 
consider Beauvoir’s account of the body and its position 
with respect to poststructuralist treatments of the body 
(Groenhout) and discussions of intersex bodies (Parker). 
Alison Stone, Nancy Bauer, and Sara Cohen Shabot each 
delve into Beauvoir’s notorious account of motherhood in 
The Second Sex, which begins, for readers who do not know 
the work, with a discussion of abortion. Each of these essays 
seeks to complicate earlier interpretations of Beauvoir as 
deeply critical of motherhood. Tove Pettersen’s “Love – 
According to Simone de Beauvoir” articulates Beauvoir’s 
contrast between authentic and inauthentic love, and 
compares the resulting conception of love with Sartre’s. In 
connection with the topic of intersectionality, Pettersen’s 
examination of lesbian love through the lens of The Second 
Sex is noteworthy; Pettersen’s essay should invite us to (re) 
consider what Beauvoir has to offer for conceptualizing 
“queer connection” (to borrow from the title of Hengehold’s 
chapter). Lastly, A. Alexander Antonopoulos’s chapter on 
transmasculinity will be of interest to feminists working on 
trans embodiment, especially those in search of an original 
spin on Beauvoir’s chapter on biological data in The Second 
Sex. 
On a methodological note, Margaret Simons’s retelling 
of Beauvoir’s oft-cited denials that she was a philosopher 
encourages us to reflect on the reception of feminist 
philosophy within the field. Why exactly did Beauvoir 
distance herself at times from philosophy? Was it out of 
deference to Sartre? Or did she see a tension between her 
work and traditional philosophical theorizing? In a similar 
vein, Stella Sanford’s essay on transdisciplinarity stresses 
The Second Sex’s unique position in philosophy and the 
impetus it gave to other academic disciplines. Although 
feminist philosophy has progressively become a more 
established subfield in philosophy and its relevance to 
other subfields has increasingly been recognized, her 
landmark work’s original “outsider status” should remind 
us that philosophy and neighboring academic fields can 
mutually enrich one another and that we should remain 
open to works that challenge our vision of philosophy. 
All in all, the Companion is a masterful work. It marks the 
culmination of over thirty years of studies dedicated to 
Beauvoir’s contributions to philosophy and beyond. 
Just Life: Bioethics and the Future of 
Sexual Difference 
Mary Rawlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
Reviewed by Ellie Anderson 
PITZER COLLEGE 
Mary C. Rawlinson’s Just Life: Bioethics and the Future of 
Sexual Difference intervenes in feminist philosophy and 
bioethics by resituating ethics between the universal and 
the particular. Rawlinson toes a line between an affirmation 
of universal abstractions and a rejection of them altogether. 
On the one hand, mainstream ethics has failed to recognize 
the way that its assumption of universality excludes a range 
of subjects, such as women. Discourses rooted in property 
rights in particular operate on the basis of such exclusions. 
On the other hand, feminist relativisms have failed to 
account for the universality of sexual difference. Rawlinson 
suggests that a solution may be found in what she calls 
“specific universals,” where the generativity of life is taken 
to be a unifying concept even as irreducible differences 
between humans are affirmed. Toward this aim, the book 
consists of a critique of social contract theory and biopower, 
followed by Rawlinson’s own development of alternative 
“specific universal” figures of ethics. The latter range from 
the ancient Greek figures of Ismene and Demeter to home 
cooks in the American and Global Souths. 
The book consists of four parts, preceded by a preface 
and introduction that feature some of the strongest 
parts of the book. At the outset, Rawlinson lays out the 
problem of universalism and suggests that the method of 
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critical phenomenology will allow her to develop multiple 
universals, since “the idea of the universal does not 
imply that there is one set of forms and laws for human 
experience” (xv). Human experience, while a universal 
concept, by definition allows for a diverse range within 
itself. Rawlinson suggests that an ethics that begins 
with generativity offers an alternative to the property-
based ethic of social contract theory. One of the clearest 
formulations of Rawlinson’s own intervention curiously 
comes in the acknowledgments, where she describes the 
book as an “uneasy marriage of Foucault’s genealogical 
method and Luce Irigaray’s thought of the irreducibility of 
sexual difference” (xxiv). That is, Just Life aims to perform 
a genealogy of modern ethics and refigure it by placing 
sexual difference at its center. 
Part One, “Critique of Rights,” analyzes social contract 
theory and biopolitics. Focusing especially on Hobbes, 
Rousseau, and Hegel, Rawlinson demonstrates in Chapter 
1 that rights-based discourses occlude women either by 
ignoring their role altogether (Hobbes) or by effectively 
limiting them to the familial domain of the home (Rousseau 
and Hegel). Hegel is especially taken to task for suggesting 
that sexual difference is a matter of the division of labor, 
where men have ownership over women’s labor (13). 
Rawlinson asserts that rights-based approaches are 
necessarily bound up with biopower and “the norms of 
sexual and racial identity that serve hierarchies of power 
and wealth” (48). As the chapter largely consists of textual 
summary, this conclusion remains opaque; one might look 
to Carole Pateman’s classic The Sexual Contract for a fuller 
development.1 Chapter 2 treats Rousseau and Foucault 
on the issue of power. In the final third of this chapter, 
Rawlinson sets out her own view. She suggests that critical 
phenomenology will allow us to “discover new universals” 
(73), such as the universal of generativity. She claims that 
attention to sexual difference invigorates an ethics of 
solidarity: all humans are connected by virtue of having 
been generated in someone else’s body (76). 
In Part Two, “Refiguring Ethics,” Rawlinson depicts new 
figures of the feminine. In what is perhaps the most original 
section of the book, Chapter 3 counters mainstream feminist 
discourse on Antigone by arguing that Ismene is a far 
better model for feminist ethics. Ismene “acts for the future 
and to promote life” (95). She prioritizes specific ethical 
commitments to the living over abstract duties to the dead 
(97). Antigone, on the other hand, exhibits undue care for 
the dead over the living by staking her life on her brother’s 
burial. Her commitment enforces a gendered division of 
labor whereby women are expected to work to sustain the 
(male) body. Chapter 4 turns to Demeter and Persephone, 
affirming a mother-daughter lineage largely missing in 
philosophy. Somewhat mystifyingly, the chapter asserts 
that “the double identity of mother/daughter constitutes 
Persephone and all mortals” (121). No explanation is given 
for this suggestion that all women, let alone all mortals, 
have a double identity as a mother and a daughter. 
Part 3, “Livable Futures,” addresses the ethics of eating 
and labor. Chapter 5 undertakes a critique of contemporary 
agribusiness, arguing that it is unethical and dangerous to 
human bodies and the environment. Rawlinson compellingly 
claims that bioethics should concern itself more with the 
conditions of agriculture under global capital than it should 
with questions of the individual’s relation to food (debates 
over the ethics of animal consumption come to mind here). 
For Rawlinson, ethics should be directly concerned with 
the interplay of producers, cooks, consumers, and food 
cultures. Chapter 6 argues that unemployment and wealth 
inequality are not only sociopolitical issues, but also salient 
ethical ones. Rawlinson asserts that all people have a 
right to life-sustaining work that commands respect. She 
writes, “Justice requires that I see the worker in the dress 
that I wear or the meal that I eat” (172). Rawlinson outright 
rejects some types of work as being inherently exploitative, 
naming sex work, surrogacy among Indian women, and 
telemarketing as examples. 
Part 4, “Sovereign Bodies: Politics of Wonder or the Right 
to Be Joyful,” comprises a single concluding chapter. Here, 
Rawlinson reasserts her investment in an ethics of solidarity 
and her rejection of a gendered division of labor rooted in 
property rights. 
Just Life posits an exciting trajectory that is highly relevant 
to contemporary feminist philosophy and bioethics. 
Feminist philosophy has in recent years been the site of rich 
investigations into the question of what unifies “women.”2 
The reinvigoration of this issue, which Talia Mae Bettcher 
has called the “purview concept,” comes after an ebb in 
interest after the essentialism debates of the 1990s.3 In 
light of current interest, Rawlinson’s promise of a feminism 
that rethinks the role of universality without rejecting it 
altogether is a compelling one. In addition, Rawlinson’s 
claim that bioethics’ focus on individual agency has been 
at the expense of sociopolitical analyses is promising. She 
suggests that issues such as high school dress codes and 
agribusiness should be taken seriously within bioethics. 
At the same time, the book is apt to leave readers hungry 
for a conceptual framework that is hinted at but never 
developed. The book succeeds in provoking its reader, but 
sidesteps answering the pressing questions it raises. 
The most relevant issue here is that of sexual difference. 
Sexual difference is the ostensible basis of Rawlinson’s 
view of specific universals, but receives very little treatment 
in the book. The closest the book gets to the “purview 
concept” is in Chapter 2, where Rawlinson writes: 
All women are comprised by the possibility of 
pregnancy, whether that possibility is thwarted 
by infertility or spectacular, as in the case of 
transwomen who, appearing as women, might very 
well appear as someone’s mother. The biology of 
the female sex reminds women early on of their 
capacity for pregnancy. (70) 
One might wonder whether it is really biology that 
reminds women of the possibility of pregnancy, or rather 
the patriarchal deployment of biopower that does so. 
Moreover, it remains unclear here to what extent Rawlinson 
is defining women on the basis of their fertility. If affirming 
such an association, the book leaves itself vulnerable to 
the questions to which any such view is subject: questions 
about trans* and intersex folks, as well as cis women 
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who are not fertile or past fertility. While the quotation 
above pays lip service to these questions, the book does 
not address them. If Rawlinson means to suggest that 
women are the category of people who appear to be 
capable of pregnancy, then her view is close to those of 
Sally Haslanger and Linda Martín Alcoff, who claim that 
counting as a woman is dependent on being taken to have 
a female biological role in reproduction.4 If this is the case, 
then Rawlinson’s view would take only some trans women 
to be women: namely, those who “pass” (see Katharine 
Jenkins). Given the book’s evasion of these questions and 
lack of engagement with relevant current debates within 
feminism, it is unclear how Rawlinson’s concept of specific 
universals improves upon the existing literature. 
Just Life often appeals to the value of life as a good 
that is worthy of unequivocal respect. Yet the reader is 
left wondering what is meant by “life,” as well as how 
an ethics that foregrounds its value may help resolve 
concrete dilemmas about which lives to favor in which 
situations (127). Rawlinson writes, for instance, “Critical 
phenomenology . . . works for life. It submits itself to 
life and promotes it” (73). What the book does not offer, 
however, is a critique of the notion of life; this is surprising, 
given Rawlinson’s Foucauldian leanings. A key feature of 
Foucault’s genealogy of biopower is the way that it valorizes 
life and allows the state to make decisions over life and 
death.5 This analysis is not at odds with what Rawlinson 
offers here, but one craves a definition of what she means 
by “life,” as well as a critique of the way this concept is 
deployed by the biopolitical institutions she decries. The 
Foucauldian influence might additionally suggest that the 
concept of sexual difference needs to be interrogated rather 
than uncritically affirmed. Johanna Oksala undertakes such 
an investigation in her recent work.6 
A related methodological question concerns critical 
phenomenology: while Rawlinson situates Just Life within it, 
she does not discuss any other phenomenologists. Critical 
phenomenology is associated here with an analysis of the 
“natural attitude” that allows us to critique current social 
conditions, but little development of this idea is offered 
(73). Just Life offers some enchanting lyrical descriptions 
of the ethics at work in concrete communities such as the 
Dastkar Craft Community Center in India and the Burgundy 
wine region of France, but these concrete descriptions are 
not obviously critical or phenomenological. This is perhaps 
a missed opportunity, because critical phenomenology 
is a burgeoning area in feminist philosophy and is in the 
process of developing rich intersectional methodologies.7 
Finally, the book presents itself as a critique of rights-
based discourses, but ends up affirming what appear to be 
rights. The conclusion, whose title includes “the Right to Be 
Joyful,” claims: “To thrive as an agent, each one must enjoy 
the integrity of her body, including her generativity” (187). 
It is difficult not to hear in this a perpetuation of the very 
property rights-based discourses Rawlinson dismisses. 
Does this statement not assert one’s right to enjoy the 
integrity of one’s own body? In addition, the statement risks 
justifying the gendered division of labor that Rawlinson 
associates with Hegel. Does upholding generativity as the 
locus of women’s universality not entrench the division of 
labor that associates women with their power to give birth? 
Related to this is the ambiguity of the book’s notion of 
generativity. Rawlinson sometimes associates generativity 
specifically with women (7), but at other times asserts 
that all humans are generative (71). Is the universal of 
generativity meant to unite all humans, or only women? If 
the former, why does sexual difference need a future? 
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Men’s Intrusion, Women’s Embodiment. A
Critical Analysis of Street Harassment 
F. Vera-Gray. Routledge Research in Gender and Society, 
2017. 182 pages. 
Reviewed by Meryl Altman 
DEPAUW UNIVERSITY 
There are no new ideas still waiting in the wings to 
save us as women, as human. There are only old and 
forgotten ones, new combinations, extrapolations 
and recognitions from within ourselves—along 
with the renewed courage to try them out.1 
– Audre Lorde, Poetry Is Not a Luxury 
As Storm Heter remarked at a recent UK Sartre Society 
conference, “‘applied phenomenology’ is a redundancy.” 
Perhaps this helps explain how Simone de Beauvoir’s The 
Second Sex galvanized feminist activism in the last century 
and continues to inspire practical understanding and action 
today. Fiona Vera-Gray’s valuable book is deeply rooted 
in Beauvoir’s phenomenological account of women’s 
ambiguous embodiment, the understanding that a woman 
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“is her body, but her body is also something other than 
herself,” that the body is a situation that grounds, and then 
carries, our experience of the world and of who we are. 
The feminist “desire to resist removing women’s agency 
in responding to men’s violence and/or intrusion, without 
claiming that actions made within unequal conditions are 
expressions of absolute freedom” finds a helpful pathway, 
she argues, with Beauvoir’s concepts of “ambiguity” and 
the “situated self” (57).2 
Vera-Gray also draws on Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of “living 
body,”3 “body schema,” and “habit-body,” and Heidegger’s 
ideas of entanglement with, and attunement to, the world; 
the pioneering insights of Sandra Bartky on shame and 
humiliation, and Iris Marion Young’s investigations of 
women’s “inhibited intentionality,” also feature in her deft 
analysis, alongside philosophical work on embodiment by 
Gail Weiss, Sara Heinamäa, and others. But she draws also 
on what she terms the “knowledge base” about violence 
against women created by social scientists and feminist 
practitioners over the past three or four decades,4 and the 
core of the book is her own empirical research, a study 
undertaken with fifty women from different age groups 
and backgrounds whose experiences and insights were 
captured through inductive, iterative qualitative methods. 
Her book contributes usefully to several different fields, 
and also stands as an intriguing example of how philosophy 
and empirical inquiry can fully intertwine, with neither 
becoming the handmaid of the other. 
Vera-Gray’s starting point is Liz Kelly’s (1988) idea of 
sexual violence as a continuum, the insight “that there was 
a connection between the mundane everyday intimate 
intrusions most women and girls experience and the forms 
of abuse which are considered crimes and worthy of legal 
intervention.”5 She deploys the concept of “male intrusion” 
to capture a full range of interactions, showing how the 
“ordinary” occurrences, the interruptions, commands 
(“smile!”), insults (“oi, ugly!”), sexual commentary (“look 
at the tits on that!”), lewd invitations, etc. that are “just 
part of growing up,” as girls continue to be told (“that’s 
life, dearie”), are connected to male behavior that is 
coded as criminal, such as flashing, stalking, public 
masturbation, attempted and completed rape. Her aim is 
to re-center women’s experience of public space and the 
“phenomenological texture” of how we move through it. 
This importantly includes what Liz Kelly called “safety 
work,” an idea analogous to Arlie Hochschild’s “emotional 
labor”: “the level of strategising and planning that women 
undertake in responding to, avoiding and/or coping with 
men’s violence, such as the imposition of limits. . . . Such 
work, repeated over time, becomes habitual and through 
this is a form of hidden labour, absorbed into the body” 
(134). This ongoing need for what one of her subjects 
calls “the right amount of panic,” balanced between the 
responsibility to protect ourselves (or be blamed if we 
don’t) and the fear of being paranoid or silly, mean that 
even when “nothing really happened,” something does
happen. Safety work, and the intrusions that suddenly 
remind us that we can be viewed as (only) a body, produce 
an alienated body-subject and a particular gendered 
variation on “the paradox of the bodily-self as both subject 
and object” (98), weaving a web of restrictions on women’s 
freedom (a word she is not afraid to use) and sustaining 
an underlying silent consensus that public space is male 
space and women inhabit it at our peril. Indeed, we may 
experience our own bodies as the source of danger. 
Vera-Gray’s rendering of Beauvoir’s understanding of 
embodiment is exact, and she provides a clear introduction 
to the phenomenological tradition (both feminist and pre­
feminist) and the ways it overlaps with feminist standpoint 
theory, once the latter is properly understood as a dynamic 
project rather than a set of fixed “givens” or attributes.6 
The connection she draws between Beauvoir’s concept 
of situation and Donna Haraway’s “situated knowledges” 
is especially persuasive. She also shows where Beauvoir’s 
account partly overlaps, but is preferable to, the accounts 
of Foucault and Bourdieu on which feminists often draw; 
she shows (as others have) that Judith Butler’s critique of 
Beauvoir was based on misreading into her work a rigid 
sex-gender distinction which is not actually there.7 But 
Vera-Gray’s real innovation—and in many ways the heart 
of the book—is the way she centers the voices of her 
subjects, by compiling what she calls “a hybrid poem in 
50 voices”: every description of every intrusion, and every 
description by a woman of how she responded, brought 
into a big list and then randomized. This became a corpus 
for her analysis, but she also reproduces big, undigested 
chunks of it right on the page, and these stand alone, in 
alternation with the chapters in her own (more scholarly) 
voice. In her words, 
It is difficult, overwhelming, shocking, never-
ending, repetitive, exhausting—capturing some of 
the phenomenological texture of being a woman 
in public. This representation can only be partial; I 
make no claim for a universalized experience. What 
I wanted was a way to connect women’s voices 
across their commonalities without collapsing 
the ways in which every particular woman 
experiences men’s violence differently based on 
social and personal locations and histories. A way 
of recreating for the reader something of the way 
the experience is lived; that sudden feeling of 
being pulled outside of yourself, without wanting, 
without warning. Interrupted, disrupted. Intrusion.8 
As she says, this is “not an easy read: the raw materials of 
this study are, and remain, raw in both senses, and working 
through them can bring back one’s own buried experience 
. . . with the hope that this can deepen our connection 
to one another, our determination to work collectively 
for a world where such things no longer constitute the 
habituated substrate of living as a woman. To the reader 
who has never had these experiences, I ask you to bear 
witness . . . and to those who’ve had many . . . I hope you 
find some validation.” Philosophy and theory thus become 
a way in to what is harmful and painful, rather than a 
defensive escape: the goal is to change it. 
Working through this heterogenous heaping up of 
experiences and responses also reminds us that, as Gail 
Weiss says, there can be “no such thing as ‘the’ body”— 
every body is someone, some one9—while simultaneously 
fighting the tendency of mainstream discourse to treat 
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intrusions and violence in an atomized, episodic way. Too 
much focus on “who-was-he-and-what-was-he-thinking” 
can create a (smallish) category of “deviant” men and block 
the scarier structural analysis of male power. Perhaps this 
is the greatest theoretical payoff of Vera-Gray’s book: while 
we are rightly suspicious of universal accounts, we need 
not abandon the search for general ones, or throw up our 
hands as any conceivable “we” dissolves into an infinite 
dissemination of granular incommensurable “I’s.” 
As a Beauvoir scholar, I am excited by this book because 
it deeply understands what Beauvoir herself was trying to 
do, particularly in the second volume of The Second Sex. 
Beauvoir’s long and seemingly overlapping quotations from 
all sorts of sources, giving first-person accounts of women’s 
experiences, build a picture of what Vera-Gray calls the 
“phenomenological texture” of life as a woman, through 
strategies of apparent redundancy which acknowledge 
differences between and within, singularities in how each 
woman or girl responds, some with fear and some with 
pleasure, balancing every person’s right to her own story 
with the need for generalized collective understanding in 
the service of solidarity.10 This is what gets left out, I think, 
when we teach only the Introduction to the Second Sex. We 
also don’t think enough, in my view, about how committed 
Beauvoir herself was to the value of empirical investigation, 
in the Second Sex and elsewhere.11 
Maybe attending to the stories Beauvoir lets us hear 
throughout the book can help us see why the Second Sex
worked, and worked powerfully, for so many women to 
whom philosophy (in the academic sense) was a closed 
book. If anything is dated about Beauvoir, it is not these 
phenomenological accounts, as Vera-Gray says and 
illustrates by bringing Beauvoir’s words into parallel with 
the words of her own study subjects; she wisely doesn’t 
give many quotations or long ones from Beauvoir, but 
the “poem,” and her substantial contextualized quotation 
from her own transcripts in the course of analysis, function 
analogously. The piling up of affect does not merely point 
at, but actively conveys, the ambiguity of living experience, 
which cannot be represented by an either/or binary (sexual 
or not sexual, desire or repulsion, what happened vs. what 
might have happened, etc.). No one woman could have had 
all these experiences and responded in all these myriad 
ways, but nonetheless they added up to . . . something, to 
what it was and is to walk through the world situated as a 
female body.12 
Vera-Gray’s study will also be of great interest to social 
scientists and feminist practitioners in the field. The 
phenomenological reading can help show why law and 
policy, which require that behaviors be operationalized and 
divided into neat, clear categories, really can’t produce a 
safe and comfortable environment for women, although 
we are still obligated to try. Attempts to measure behaviors 
episodically, in terms of what is done or what was felt at 
the time, miss the powerful effects of “safety work” when 
it succeeds, and counting incidents of harassment in 
particular will miss, among other things, the intrusions that 
are not “unwelcome” but nonetheless “uninvited”13 and 
part of the overall landscape of male entitlement. Moreover, 
operating from a “crime framework” and focusing on “what 
counts” misreads the continuum as more of a hierarchy, 
and “such hierarchical positioning risks losing how the 
quieter forms of intrusion, those experienced by women 
as a restriction in freedom, rely on the possibilities of the 
louder, criminal forms, to have the particular impact that 
they do” (22). Also, the harm of a thing that happens is 
not limited to the perceived harm of that thing at the time 
it happens to the person it happens to. She concludes 
that legal and scholarly languages can’t be made to fit 
together seamlessly, but that both are needed: “one frame 
need not replace the other” (12). (While she doesn’t quite 
say so, her work can also help explain why the results of 
well-intentioned gender-neutral policies have been so 
disappointing.) 
Vera-Gray does some counting herself, to show the 
magnitude of what she is discussing, but with attention to 
what is left out; indeed, her title’s framing of “public space” 
in terms of “street harassment” does not quite satisfy her, 
especially with the exponential growth of online worlds. 
(Feminists wanted an end to the “public/private split,” I 
guess, but not like this.) Moreover, it is now clear that the 
“street” experiences her subjects describe are standard 
operating procedure in many workplaces. Delimiting the 
phenomena under study becomes even harder; tackling 
the problem, even more urgent. 
While the results of Vera-Gray’s study have also been 
published in a separate version aimed at more general 
audiences,14 I hope Men’s Intrusion, Women’s Embodiment
will be eventually made available in paperback form: it 
strikes me as a clear, teachable text for feminist philosophy 
and theory classes. It might also be used in Feminist 
Methodology classes grounded in the social sciences, 
as there’s food for thought in the way she “co-created” 
meanings with her subjects, through initial interviews 
conducted as conversations, followed up by asking 
them to record intrusions they experienced in structured 
notebooks (which were turned in and analyzed), and 
then met for a further collaborative reflection on what the 
research showed. The way she went about “researching the 
ordinary” (30), and the way she discusses the ethical issues 
involves, is a contribution in itself. 
Vera-Gray’s last chapter, “Inhabiting Ourselves,” begins to 
suggest a way forward: since, as Beauvoir said, “woman is 
not a fixed reality but a becoming” and the “habit-body” 
is “open” (Merleau-Ponty), we can make ourselves more 
aware of and begin to change it, through the adoption of 
“counterhabits,” a conscious practice of disruption and/or 
“restoration” (169). This could include re-valuing our “safety 
work” as resistance, and reclaiming feminist practices of 
self-defense from what non-feminist hands have made of 
it. But this is just a sketch of possibilities: surely the way 
forward will have to go beyond how we “work on ourselves.” 
It will be good to hear more about how she imagines this. 
Meanwhile, just beyond the horizon of Vera-Gray’s project 
lie some questions Beauvoir also prompts us to ask: What 
is the impact of what is unwanted in the way of sexual 
attention, on shaping what can be wanted, what is wanted, 
what “wanting” even means? How does the “experiential 
template of risk” involved in women’s embodied attitude 
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to the world affect our relationship to matters that might 
seem unconnected to “the body” as such, matters like 
writing, speaking up in a faculty meeting, venturing into an 
unknown area of intellectual work? running for Congress? 
(For example, what if we extended the idea of “safety 
work” to, for example, the constant second-guessing and 
self-policing one does in so-called professional contexts, 
“safety work” that is particularly invisible, and discounted, 
when it works, as it now often does?) Beauvoir’s claim for 
how women were held back was a more sweeping one. 
There is still work to do. 
NOTES 
1.	 From “Poetry is Not a Luxury” (1986), quoted by F. Vera-Gray (12). 
Further references to the book I’m reviewing will be incorporated 
in the text. 
2.	 This is becoming more widely understood, as Vera-Gray shows, 
thanks to several decades of scholarship by Margaret Simons, 
Sonia Kruks, and Toril Moi among others, and the (2011) English 
re-translation by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevalier. 
3.	 She follows Sara Heinamäa in translating not “lived body” but 
“living body,” as she explains (15): “I use the terms ‘living body’ 
and ‘living experience’ instead of the conventional ‘lived,’ to 
further emphasize our temporality as well as the role of our 
active processes in creating the body and experience as we live 
it.” See also 57. 
4.	 This includes what she calls the “prevalence literature,” and 
accounts written to guide clinicians and practitioners who work 
professionally with victim-survivors, as she herself has done for 
a number of years. 
5.	 Liz Kelly, “Preface,” x. 
6.	 She quotes K. Weeks (Constituting Feminist Subjects, Cornell 
1998): “a standpoint is a project, not an inheritance” (Vera-Gray, 
27). 
7.	 Vera-Gray references Toril Moi’s work and Sara Heinamaa’s; 
another very good account is Moya Lloyd, Judith Butler: From 
Norms to Politics (Polity, 2007). Vera-Gray gives a nice example 
(59) of how Beauvoir’s first translator, H. M. Parshley, had a lack 
of awareness to phenomenological language and thus distorted 
an account of embodied experience into an apparent dualistic 
essentialism. 
8.	 Preface, xiii. 
9.	 Gail Weiss, Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality 
(Routledge, 1999), 1, quoted 56. 
10. This points to another unfortunate effect of Parshley’s editing: 
in an understandable attempt to make the text shorter and 
more “readable,” he cut many of these quotations entirely and 
shortened or paraphrased many others. 
11.	 A collection edited by Ingrid Galster, Simone de Beauvoir: Le 
Deuxième sexe: le livre fondateur du féminisme moderne en 
situation (Paris; Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2015) provides a 
detailed, chapter-by-chapter guide to the non-philosophical 
sources Beauvoir consulted in researching The Second Sex; the 
empirical strands are even stronger in Old Age and The Long 
March. 
12. For another interesting discussion of this mode of argument, see 
Patricia Moynagh, “Beauvoir on Lived Reality, Exemplary Validity, 
and a Method for Political Thought,” in Simone de Beauvoir’s 
Political Thinking, ed. Lori Jo Marso and Patricia Moynagh, 11–30 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006). 
13.	 The adjustment from “unwanted” or “unwelcome” to “uninvited” 
(7, 11) is a brilliant stroke, I think, because it captures a basic fact 
about these situations: that whether or not women “want” them 
does not matter. As Susan Estrich put it in Real Rape (Harvard, 
1987), “consent is presumed.” 
14.	 The Right Amount of Panic: How Women Trade Freedom for Safety
(Policy Press, 2018). 
The Social and Political Philosophy of 
Mary Wollstonecraft 
Edited by Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee (Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 240 pp. ISBN 9780198766841. 
Reviewed by Valerie Williams 
EMMANUEL COLLEGE 
The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, 
edited by Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, is an excellent 
collection of twelve philosophical essays written by 
scholars at the forefront of Wollstonecraft research. Their 
self-professed aim in presenting this collection is to show 
the “breadth of current leading philosophical research in 
Wollstonecraft’s work.”1 The issues addressed throughout 
the volume are, indeed, many and varied. They include but 
are not limited to concerns about the nature of freedom, 
the relationship between friendship and marriage, and the 
role of rights and duties to both individuals and society. 
Wollstonecraft scholars will almost certainly find this text 
now among the critical texts with which one ought to 
engage when writing on Wollstonecraft. However, this text 
should also appeal to historians of philosophy interested 
in the philosophical moves made throughout modernity 
and between antiquity and modernity. Contemporary 
philosophers with interests in social and political 
philosophy, feminist philosophy, or ethics will find much as 
well. Taken altogether, The Social and Political Philosophy of 
Mary Wollstonecraft not only shows many new paths taken 
in Wollstonecraft scholarship, but also invites scholars to 
pursue further research by providing new opportunities for 
dialogue with her text. 
One particular strength of this collection is that the authors 
converse with each other. As a result, readers are able to see 
opposing sides of an issue or how one interpretation can 
serve as a foundation for other insights. For example, in the 
first chapter, Sylvana Tomaselli argues that Wollstonecraft 
“did not in fact seem to believe the eradication of the 
consequences of innate differences possible; indeed, she 
did not consistently appear to desire it.”2 In chapter nine, 
Lena Halldenius disagrees with this very point. Alan Coffee 
and Philip Pettit have different arguments about what 
“freedom” means for Wollstonecraft.3 Catriona Mackenzie 
makes use of both Coffee and Halldenius’s works to 
support her own argument. 
Initially, readers may question how broad the current 
research on Wollstonecraft is: five of the collection’s 
twelve pieces focus on Wollstonecraft’s republicanism. 
Given the historically contentious nature of classifying 
Wollstonecraft within a specific tradition, this may seem 
skewed. With that said, Bergès and Coffee make a good 
case for including so many articles that draw upon 
republicanism. The connections between Wollstonecraft 
and republicanism are, by comparison, new. Moreover, the 
lens of republicanism has helped philosophers not only 
to better understand key concepts, such as equality and 
freedom, within Wollstonecraft’s works, but also to tease 
out further implications of her work. 
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There are relatively few reasons to criticize the work, but 
as with any collection of essays, some are more successful 
than others. Some essays may have been overly ambitious 
in what they set out to accomplish within their limited 
pages. Some authors needed to establish clearer stakes 
for their arguments. Often, though, the authors realize the 
limitations of their chapters, and one would hope that other 
scholars take on the task of fleshing out additional avenues 
for investigation. As a collection aimed at discussing 
contemporary Wollstonecraft scholarship, readers with 
interests in Wollstonecraft and socialism or Wollstonecraft 
as a commentator on race and class may wish for a stronger 
focus on these issues. 
Nevertheless, the work as a whole is still diverse. The 
first three chapters loosely hang together insofar as they 
concern the ways in which Wollstonecraft’s predecessors 
are useful for understanding Wollstonecraft’s works. Of 
particular note is Nancy Kendrick’s chapter in which she 
uses Aristotle to show how Wollstonecraft has replaced the 
notion of marriage as a friendship of utility with the notion 
that marriage is a friendship of virtue. The textual evidence 
she uses regarding reciprocation and perfection is both 
clear and convincing, and the essay should serve scholars 
of Aristotle and Wollstonecraft well in the years to come. 
Martina Reuter’s chapter, “The Role of the Passions in Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Notion of Virtue,” represents a masterful 
example of close textual analysis of Wollstonecraft’s 
discussion of the Houyhnhnms and Yahoos from Jonathan 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. Reuter’s analysis reveals that, for 
Wollstonecraft, passions give human beings real choices 
to do what is virtuous or what is not. The Houyhnhnms 
simply do not have this choice open to them. It is in choice 
that Wollstonecraft finds virtuous action. An action is not 
virtuous if one does it because one must; rather, an act is 
virtuous when one chooses to do it. This lends credence to 
the view that Wollstonecraft is a virtue ethicist. 
The middling chapters of The Social and Political Philosophy 
of Mary Wollstonecraft address what I consider to be 
implications of Wollstonecraft’s work for contemporary 
social and ethical philosophy. For example, Mackenzie 
argues that Wollstonecraft’s own position on autonomy 
anticipates debates within contemporary relational 
autonomy theory. Mackenzie does, indeed, paint with a 
“broad brush,” but this invites additional scholarly research 
into the relationships she lays out in her work. 
In “Mary Wollstonecraft, Children’s Human Rights, and 
Animal Ethics,” Botting shows that while Wollstonecraft 
does not extend rights to animals, she may nevertheless be 
useful to animal rights theorists insofar as Wollstonecraft 
“modeled how to use a radically utopian ideal of rights to 
push for a richer and creative realization of rights in hostile 
or unreceptive legal systems” (95).4 The majority of Botting’s 
work, however, is aimed at capturing Wollstonecraft’s 
conception of the parent-child relationship. 
Laura Brace’s “Wollstonecraft and the Properties of (Anti-) 
Slavery” provides a bridge into the next five chapters on 
republicanism by focusing on freedom. Brace demonstrates 
that both Wollstonecraft and the abolitionists of her day 
hold that people have mistaken the way the world appears
for the way the world actually is; they both hold that 
women and non-whites merely appear to be incapable of 
freedom because of the various ways in which they have 
been socialized. Wollstonecraft differed from abolitionists 
in some respect. Many abolitionists considered the deep 
problem with slavery to be the lack of contract between 
master and slave; Wollstonecraft did not think that slavery 
would be less morally problematic if slaves voluntarily 
contracted away their lives. 
The republican chapters begin with a bang. Pettit provides 
readers with a singularly clear entrance into thinking 
about the republican dimensions of Wollstonecraft’s 
thought. He uses Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll’s House to illustrate 
the particular set of questions about what it means for a 
wife to be free, and to show readers one of the ways in 
which Wollstonecraft drew upon the republican tradition’s 
conception of freedom. In A Doll’s House, the wife enjoys 
no legal or political freedom to do as she pleases; however, 
if the husband allows her to do as she pleases anyway, 
it is unclear whether she is free in any meaningful sense. 
On the republican view, in which freedom is about non-
domination, if someone can stop you from doing as you 
please, this makes you unfree. Here is where Pettit says 
that Wollstonecraft seems particularly republican: she 
wants women not to depend upon men’s kindness for their 
freedom of mind or freedom to act. 
In chapter eight, Susan James argues for the view that 
Wollstonecraft is a Spinozist on the issue of rights. James 
then addresses four potential problems with holding the 
view that rights are powers to act and offers four solutions 
to these problems on behalf of Wollstonecraft. The fourth 
solution, however, opens Wollstonecraft up to a criticism 
that Wollstonecraft “allows anyone to do anything they 
can.”5 James observes that Wollstonecraft uses the natural 
law to circumvent this particular criticism and goes on to 
make a larger conceptual claim about the relationship 
of republicanism to liberalism. James comments that 
this attempt to bridge republicanism and the natural law 
“contributes to what will become the triumph of liberalism 
over republicanism—the subordination of theories 
organized around a conception of equal freedom as the 
overarching value of political life to theories grounded on 
individual moral rights.”6 
Halldenius attempts to identify a coherent notion of 
representation in Wollstonecraft’s work. Halldenius would 
do well to set the stakes of her argument at the beginning of 
the chapter so that readers can know why Wollstonecraft’s 
conception of representation is particularly important. 
Halldenius’s argument requires reading Wollstonecraft as a 
republican, juxtaposing her views with those of her rough 
contemporaries, and reading the text closely to understand 
how her concept of a duty impacts her commitments to 
the notion of representation. She is successful in this 
close reading of the text, and her comments on duty will 
be useful to Wollstonecraft scholars regardless of their 
interest in representation. 
Among the most successful chapters, Coffee’s “Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Public Reason, and the Virtuous 
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Republic” shows that virtue is a necessary component of 
Wollstonecraft’s conception of freedom. Coffee contends 
that the relationship between virtue and freedom in 
Wollstonecraft’s theory sheds light on contemporary 
concerns in republicanism about accommodating diversity 
while maintaining freedom. Although there are many
noteworthy insights in this chapter, one of particular 
importance is that Wollstonecraft offers both moral and 
pragmatic reasons for favoring freedom. For readers 
familiar with Wollstonecraft’s work, this reasoning is 
recognizable as the backbone of Wollstonecraft’s claims 
about why women should be granted an education: without 
it, they will fail to be good people and cause men to be 
unfree. It is in Wollstonecraft’s call for independence as a 
necessary condition for freedom that Coffee finds some 
advice for contemporary republicans: they should foster an 
environment in which all groups have access to the means 
by which to conduct public discourse. This is difficult to 
enact in practice, but the point of this article stands: 
Wollstonecraft continues to contribute to discussions 
regarding multiculturalism. 
The last chapter on Wollstonecraft’s republicanism 
attempts to reconcile feminist and republican ideals to 
some extent by examining Wollstonecraft and Sophie de 
Grouchy on the role of mothering. In her essay, Bergès 
provides an excellent overview of de Grouchy’s work for 
readers who might be unfamiliar. While Wollstonecraft 
and de Grouchy agree that mothering is indispensable 
to the development of republican virtues, they differ in 
their appraisal of wet nurses. Wollstonecraft maintains 
that women with wet nurses become vicious; de Grouchy 
does not. Bergès suggests that Wollstonecraft’s familiarity 
with wet nurses in England may have prevented her from 
seeing how wet nurses can be used well. Bergès concludes 
that de Grouchy may open up an avenue for reconciling 
the republican commitment to developing virtuous citizens 
with the feminist desire for mothers to be able to choose 
to work. However, Bergès does note that this solution is 
somewhat limited by practical and theoretical constraints. 
To echo a sentiment shared by Bergès and Coffee, readers 
may wish that the text were longer. As Barbara Taylor points 
out in the final chapter of the work, there is little reference 
outside of footnotes and brief discussions regarding the 
role of Christianity in Wollstonecraft’s work. And even 
though Bergès and Coffee are careful to frame their project 
in terms of presenting current philosophical research, it 
is striking that there is little discussion of Wollstonecraft’s 
liberalism. With that said, Bergès and Coffee have compiled 
an outstanding volume filled with philosophical insight that 
will be useful to many. 
NOTES 
1.	 Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, “Introduction,” in The Social and
Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Sandrine Bergès
and Alan Coffee, 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
2.	 Sylvana Tomaselli, “Reflections on Inequality, Respect, and Love 
in the Political Writings of Mary Wollstonecraft,” in The Social and 
Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Sandrine Bergès 
and Alan Coffee, 14–33 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
3.	 Alan Coffee, “Mary Wollstonecraft, Public Reason, and the 
Virtuous Republic,” in The Social and Political Philosophy of 
Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, 184 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
4.	 Eileen Hunt Botting, “Mary Wollstonecraft, Children’s Human 
Rights, and Animal Ethics,” in The Social and Political Philosophy 
of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, 95 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
5.	 Susan James, “Mary Wollstonecraft’s Conception of Rights,” in 
The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. 
Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, 161 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
6.	 Ibid., 163. 
NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR 2019–2020
Adriel M. Trott (APA Blog Series Editor), Kathryn J. Norlock 
(Associate Chair 2019), Charlotte Witt (Chair 2019), 
Margaret Atherton (Member 2019), Amy R. Baehr (Member 
2019), Michael C. Rea (Member 2019), Rachel V. McKinnon 
(Member 2020, on leave), Julinna C. Oxley (Member 2020), 
Katie Stockdale (Member 2021), Nancy Bauer (Member 
2021), Nicole J. Hassoun (Member 2021), Janet A. Kourany 
(Member 2021), Lauren Freeman (Newsletter Editor), Peggy 
DesAutels (Site Visit Program Director). 
THE WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY BLOG IS A YEAR
OLD! 
The series continues to solicit contributions on topics about 
women in the field, about women in the public sphere, or 
about the research women in the field are doing. We are 
working on cultivating a space for women and genderqueer 
folks to discuss these issues, but the comment sections 
still tend to be populated by men, and often men who are 
telling the posters how to better think about diversity, so 
it’s still a work in progress. People who are interested in 
supporting the series might consider submitting a post to 
the series editor (Adriel M. Trott at trotta@wabash.edu) or 
commenting on posts. 
CSW POSTERS
Two new posters are available for purchase on the CSW 
website (http://www. apaonlinecsw.org/). 
CSW SESSION ON #METOO DRAWS AN
OVERFLOW CROWD AT THE EASTERN APA 
Speakers Cassie Herbert, Elizabeth Harman, Linda Alcoff, 
and Saba Fatima spoke to a large and appreciative room, 
and showed how enlightening and important feminist 
reflection on current topics can be. 
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ANNOUNCEMENTS 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
Global Structural Injustice and Minority Rights 
Date: Friday, March 13–Sunday, March 15, 2020
 
Location: Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
 
Keynote Speakers 
Avigail Eisenberg, University of Victoria
 
Stephen Gardiner, University of Washington
 
Catherine Lu, McGill University
 
Conference Theme 
The concept of structural injustice is one that has been 
given a lot of attention by political philosophers in recent 
years. Iris Young defined structural injustice as a kind of 
moral wrong that is distinct from unjust, biased or malicious 
actions by individual actors or policies of states. Rather, 
structural injustice is the result of actions by many different 
actors and institutions over long periods of time, actions 
which are not necessarily unjust and may even be morally 
neutral or positive. Even though the individual actions may 
not be unjust in themselves, the resulting structural features 
may be said to be unjust because they unfairly constrain 
some people’s options and threaten them with deprivation, 
where as they benefit others. Individual actions play a role, 
of course, since structural injustice is maintained through 
the behavior and actions of individuals, but the focus of 
moral concern is the structures that perpetuate it. 
The structural injustice framework has been used to 
discuss domestic political questions. But can it also be 
used to consider global social and political challenges? The 
guiding question of this conference is: Can the concept of 
structural injustice be fruitfully applied to global problems? 
For example, can the harms of climate change, forced 
displacement, gender inequality, economic inequality, etc., 
be understood as forms of structural injustice? Furthermore, 
can this framework help us to understand how we should 
ascribe responsibility for these global challenges? 
A particular focus of this conference will be minority rights. 
Can structural injustice help us to understand how to better 
address injustices experienced by members of global 
minorities such as Indigenous populations, refugees, 
climate refugees, members of the LGBTQ community, 
etc.? How have global minorities attempted to resist and 
transform the conditions of structural injustice that impact 
them?  Should global minorities (and their allies) aim 
to transform domestic or global institutional structures 
(or both)? How can global minorities (and their allies) 
collaborate to resist and transform structural injustice? 
Papers relating to any aspect of the theme of global 
structural injustice and minority rights will be considered. 
Please email 300–500 word abstracts to Ava Sasani 
(sasani.a@husky.neu.edu) by July 1, 2019. 
This conference is organized by the Department of 
Philosophy at Northeastern University in Boston in 
cooperation with UiT The Arctic University of Norway 
and the Globalizing Minority Rights Project (www.uit.no/ 
research/gmr). The conference is supported by a grant 
from the Norwegian Research Council. 
CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR WOMEN IN
PHILOSOPHY 
October 25, 2019–October 27, 2019 
University of Guelph, Canada 
Our conference theme is “Feminism and Food.” This 
conference asks participants to consider how food, as 
a topic worthy of philosophical investigation, is related 
to feminist challenges to traditional discourse. How has 
food been discussed in the history of philosophy, or 
overlooked? How has feminist philosophical scholarship 
taken into account issues including the ethics and politics 
of food production, availability, and consumption? What 
counts as food, and how are metaphysical claims regarding 
the nature of food related to our attitudes to animals, to 
climate, and to cultural geographies? 
A block of rooms has been reserved at the Delta Hotel, 
directly across from the University of Guelph. The last day 
to book is Wednesday, September 25, 2019. 
You can make your reservation here. 
Delta Hotels Guelph Conference Centre 
50 Stone Road West 
Guelph, ON. N1G 0A9 
CONTRIBUTOR BIOS 
Meryl Altman teaches English and Women’s Studies at 
DePauw University in Indiana. She has just completed a 
book, Beauvoir in Time. 
Ellie Anderson is visiting assistant professor of philosophy 
at Pitzer College. Her research focuses on phenomenology, 
deconstruction, and feminist theory. She recently received 
her PhD from Emory University and has published articles 
on the work of Simone de Beauvoir in the Continental 
Philosophy Review and the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy. She is co-author of the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy’s entry, “Feminist Perspectives on the Self.” 
She is currently completing a book project on selfhood and 
intersubjectivity. 
Elle Benjamin is a PhD candidate at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst. She mainly works in metaphysics, 
but also has strong interests in social and feminist 
philosophy, atypical cognition, and the intersection of 
autism and feminism. Her dissertation attempts to reconcile 
Humean objections to an ontology of states of affairs 
through the development of a metaphysics of relations 
called Positionalism. But this project may just be a futile 
manifestation of weak central coherence. 
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Agnes Callard is associate professor and director of 
Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Philosophy at 
the University of Chicago. She received her BA from the 
University of Chicago in 1997 and her PhD from Berkeley 
in 2008. Her primary areas of specialization are ancient 
philosophy and ethics. Her book, Aspiration: The Agency 
of Becoming, was published by Oxford University Press in 
2018. 
Céline Leboeuf is an assistant professor in the Philosophy 
Department at Florida International University. Her current 
research lies at the intersection of continental philosophy, 
feminist philosophy, and the critical philosophy of race. 
Inspired by the idea of philosophy as a way of life, her work 
aims to develop an art of living the body in a world that 
primarily understands the bodies of members of oppressed 
groups through the lens of reductive stereotypes. At 
present, she is investigating the effects of stringent beauty 
standards on women’s experiences of their bodies, probing 
the experience of mixed-race individuals, and exploring her 
never-ending fascination with Simone de Beauvoir. 
Kate Manne is an assistant professor of philosophy at 
Cornell University, where she’s been teaching since 2013. 
Before that, she was a junior fellow at the Harvard Society 
of Fellows. Manne’s research is in moral philosophy, 
feminist philosophy, and social philosophy. She also 
regularly writes opinion pieces, essays, and reviews for 
a wider audience—in venues including The New York 
Times, The Boston Review, The Huffington Post, the Times 
Literary Supplement, Newsweek, and New York Magazine. 
She recently published her first book, Down Girl: The Logic 
of Misogyny (Oxford University Press: New York, 2018). She 
is currently working on her second book, Entitled (Crown 
US/Penguin UK). 
Kathryn J. Norlock is the Kenneth Mark Drain Chair in 
Ethics and Professor of Philosophy at Trent University 
in Peterborough, Ontario, and associate chair of the APA 
Committee on the Status of Women. She is a co-founder 
and co-editor of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, the peer-
reviewed, online, and Open Access journal for feminist 
philosophy. She feels your pain if you keep changing 
your syllabus for an undergraduate feminism course and 
recommends assigning Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Down 
Girl for the final two weeks of term. She is best contacted 
at kathrynnorlock@gmail.com. 
Briana Toole is a philosopher and post-doctoral fellow in 
the Department of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY. She 
works at the intersection of epistemology, feminist theory, 
and the philosophy of race and gender. Briana is interested 
primarily in examining the relationship between social 
identity and knowledge, focusing in particular on how 
standpoint epistemology can be used to better understand 
epistemic oppression. Her research is largely inspired by 
her experiences as a biracial teenager growing up in the 
Florida panhandle. These experiences led her to found the 
philosophy outreach program Corrupt the Youth, which aims 
to bring philosophy to populations that traditionally lack 
access to it. She has written on issues relating to diversity 
and philosophy in Times Higher Education, and her research 
has been featured on the Examining Ethics podcast. 
Valerie Williams is an assistant professor of philosophy at 
Emmanuel College in Boston, Massachusetts. Her research 
lies at the intersection of the history of philosophy, feminist 
philosophy, and social and political philosophy. She works 
primarily on the role of the family in early modern and 
modern philosophy but also has interests in early modern 
conceptions of education and its role in political life. 
Charlotte Witt is professor of philosophy and humanities 
at the University of New Hampshire. She is the author of 
Substance and Essence in Aristotle and Ways of Being 
in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, both published by Cornell 
University Press. She is the co-editor of A Mind of One’s 
Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity and three 
other collections, including Adoption Matters: Philosophical 
and Feminist Essays. Her most recent work includes a 
monograph, The Metaphysics of Gender (Oxford 2011), and 
an edited volume, Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in 
the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self (Springer 2011). 
Witt is chair of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. 
Audrey Yap is an associate professor in the Philosophy 
Department at the University of Victoria, in Canada, which 
stands on unceded Lekwungen territory. She is a lapsed 
philosopher of mathematics who now works primarily in 
feminist epistemology, and anti-oppressive philosophy 
more generally. She writes on issues around epistemic 
injustice and gendered violence, and is thinking these days 
about how we might view both perpetrators and victims of 
violence and oppression using non-ideal theories. 
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